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ABSTRACT 
 
Previous research has shown facilitatory effects on attention and perception when object 
pairs are positioned for action compared to when they are not positioned for action. The 
present thesis aimed to better understand the mechanisms underlying this paired-object 
affordance effect. Chapters 2 and 3 showed that different but interacting parieto-frontal 
networks contribute to the effects of paired-object affordance in healthy participants. Chapters 
4 and 5 explored the effects of paired-object affordance on visual extinction; the data showed 
that recovery from extinction was sensitive to the familiarity of the object pair and the 
completeness of the active object rather than the passive object within an interacting pair. 
Finally, the role of contextual information and task demands on the automatic perception of 
paired-object affordance effects was directly explored. The results indicate that only explicit 
but not implicit task demands (searching for an action vs. a colour pair, respectively) had 
facilitatory effects on performance and that semantic information in a scene also modulates 
the automatic perception of paired-object affordance. The findings provide novel behavioural 
and neuroimaging evidence that paired-object affordance is influenced by contextual 
information and task demands, with the active object (the tool) within a pair modulating the 
allocation of attention. 
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CHAPTER 1:  GENERAL INTRODUCTION 
 
1.1 Introduction 
Vision plays an important role in interacting with the environment. Much of the evidence 
reviewed in this thesis indicates that, when we see objects (e.g., a cup, a knife, and a fork), we 
appear to automatically “know” what to do with them or how to use them. For example, we 
act to grasp a knife by its handle to spread butter on a toast or we use it together with a fork to 
cut a steak. How do these automatic responses happen? It is assumed that perception and 
action are not independent but are rather directly related to each other (Rizzolatti & Matelli, 
2003). Supporting evidence for a direct linkage comes from the concept of affordance, 
proposed originally by J.J. Gibson (1979). The present thesis investigates how this direct 
linkage can be modulated by presenting two objects in different contexts, manipulating 
attentional allocation, and varying task demands. Each chapter will include a detailed review 
of the literature and the relevant theories. In the present introduction, I will primarily focus on 
reviewing concepts that are relevant to the entire thesis. I will start by discussing the 
affordance concept for single objects (section 1.2), then I will discuss affordance in relation to 
pairs of objects (paired-object affordance; section 1.3) and finish by presenting 
neurocognitive models related to affordance (section 1.4 and 1.5).  
 
1.2 Affordance 
Gibson (1979) first introduced the term affordance to describe the action possibilities an 
environment offers an animal – suggesting that, we perceive the world in terms of 
 2 
 
opportunities for action. What an object affords is determined by the physical properties of the 
object (e.g., shape, orientation, size) and shaped by the action capabilities of the agent. For 
example, a cup affords a power grip using both hands by a child, while this cup only affords 
grasping with one hand by an adult. The perception of affordance is also influenced by the 
action context in which an object is presented. Seeing a spoon next to a cup will afford a 
stirring action while a spoon next to a bowl will afford an eating action (the context 
modulation of affordances will be outlined in section 1.3). Furthermore, previous research has 
shown that the presence of a hand interacting with an object triggers or primes possible 
actions (e.g., Kumar, Riddoch, & Humphreys, 2013; Kumar, Yoon, & Humphreys, 2012). 
Thus, Gibson’s concept of affordance can be extended to include the presence of a hand as an 
additional affordance cue to afford a corresponding motor response. In the present thesis, I 
will use the extended concept of Gibson’s affordance, specifically the extensions of context 
and hand cues to the concept of affordance as well as their interaction are the focus of the 
thesis. Gibson’s concept will be discussed first, followed by the extended concept of 
affordance, although in both cases the term affordance will be used. To avoid confusion, I will 
use the term paired-object affordance to refer to affordance effects offered by pairs of objects 
(see section 1.3). 
Gibson (1979) proposed that affordances are perceived directly without the need to 
recognise the object first – thus postulating a direct link between perception and action. 
Accordingly, the physical properties of the object itself (its affordance) automatically generate 
a motor response, even when there is no motor response required. Affordance is typically 
measured using stimulus-response compatibility paradigms (Michaels, 1988). Here 
participants view graspable objects (e.g., cups) and they have to make speeded responses to 
object properties (e.g., the vertical orientation of an object). Compatibility effects (i.e., faster 
 3 
 
responses), as index of affordance perception, are observed when the task-irrelevant 
orientation of a graspable object matches the response hand. In a seminal study, Tucker and 
Ellis (1998) presented pictures of graspable objects with the object handle pointing towards 
the left or the right. Participants had to determine by left-right key presses whether an object 
was upright or inverted. The authors found that responses were faster when the required 
manual response (e.g., right button press) was congruent with the task-irrelevant orientation of 
the object’s handle (e.g., handle pointed to the right). This result is consistent with a motor 
response being automatically activated by the position of the task-irrelevant handle. Symes, 
Ellis, and Tucker (2007) supported that the task-irrelevant orientation of an object rather than 
the visually salient area of an object triggers the affordance effect. The authors presented 
artificial graspable 3D cylinders oriented to either the left or to the right. Note that these 
objects had not been previously associated with any action procedure (compared to household 
items such as a cup). Participants were required to make semantic decisions about the object’s 
texture using left-right button presses. Compatibility effects were observed when the 
orientation of the object corresponded with the response hand. Interestingly, compatibility 
effects were observed independent of whether attention was cued to the visually salient 
nearest or farthest area of the cylinder (Experiment 5). Symes et al. argued that the observed 
compatibility effect reflects affordance (i.e., orientation of the object) rather than attentional 
processing of the most salient or behaviourally relevant feature of an object (but see below for 
arguments for an attention-related hypothesis). Several other studies have demonstrated that 
affordance compatibility effects even occur when the object itself is task-irrelevant (e.g., 
responding to an imperative target superimposed on an object; Xu, Humphreys, & Heinke, 
2015; Phillips & Ward, 2002) or regardless of which part of the object is attended (e.g., 
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similar cueing effects were observed when the handle or the functional part of an object cued 
the location of a target; Vainio, Ellis, & Tucker, 2007).  
To sum up, these data are consistent with affordances being evoked automatically, even 
when irrelevant to the task. Converging evidence has shown that the observation of graspable 
objects (i.e., tools) automatically activates action representations in corresponding motor 
areas, even in cases where no hand response actually needs to be made (for 
neuropsychological evidence, see e.g., di Pellegrino, Rafal, & Tipper, 2005; Riddoch, 
Humphreys, Edwards, Baker, & Willson, 2003; for experimental evidence, see e.g., Phillips & 
Ward, 2002; Tucker & Ellis, 1998; for neuroimaging evidence, see e.g., Grezes, Tucker, 
Armony, Ellis, & Passingham, 2003; Grafton, Fadiga, Arbib, & Rizzolatti, 1997).  
However, recent evidence has cast doubt on the automatic perception of affordance as 
suggested by Gibson (for reviews, see e.g., Borghi & Riggio, 2015; van Elk, van Schie, & 
Bekkering, 2014; Thill, Caligiore, Borghi, Ziemke, & Baldassarre, 2013). Instead, there is 
growing evidence that affordance is sensitive to the task and the context. For example, 
affordance compatibility effects were absent when participants had to categorise objects 
(Netelenbos & Gonzalez, 2015; Derbyshire, Ellis, & Tucker, 2006) or when they had to make 
colour decisions (Pellicano, Iani, Borghi, Rubichi, & Nicoletti, 2010; Tipper, Paul, & Hayes, 
2006). Tipper et al. (2006) suggested that the occurrence of compatibility effects require 
attention being directed to action-relevant object properties such as object orientation or size, 
while attention to action-unrelated features acts against the activation of affordance-related 
responses (but see, Vainio et al., 2007). Affordance perception is also influenced by 
contextual factors such as the location of the object in space (e.g., Costantini, Ambrosini, 
Tieri, Sinigaglia, & Committeri, 2010), the ownership of the object (Constable, Kritikos, & 
Bayliss, 2011), the presence of another person (Cardellicchio, Sinigaglia, & Costantini, 2013), 
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the presence of other objects (e.g., Borghi, Flumini, Natraj, & Wheaton, 2012), and contextual 
information about action (e.g., the presence of a congruent or incongruent hand grip; Yoon & 
Humphreys, 2005). The latter two factors will be the focus of this present thesis and will be 
discussed in detail in the corresponding chapters. Taken together, the reviewed studies 
indicate that affordance perception is not automatic per se; instead affordances may be 
influenced by the task and contextual information. In Chapter 6, the role of task demands and 
context on the automatic perception of affordance was explicitly investigated by using an 
implicit (finding colour pairs) and an explicit (finding action pairs) visual search task.  
In addition to the effects of task and context on affordance perception, there is also 
evidence that attention modulates affordance activation (Matheson, Newman, Satel, & 
McMullen, 2014; Kostov & Janyan, 2012; Handy & Tipper, 2007; Handy, Grafton, Shroff, 
Ketay, & Gazzaniga, 2003; Anderson, Yamagishi, & Karavia, 2002). It has been suggested 
that tools bias attention based on the visual asymmetry created by the position of the handle, 
and this attentional capture towards the handle (the most salient part of an object) generates 
the motor response (Anderson et al., 2002; see also Cho & Proctor, 2010). In particularly, the 
handle of a tool rather than its functional end seems to bias visual attention (Matheson et al., 
2014; for the opposite result see, van der Linden, Mathot, & Vitu, 2015; Roberts & 
Humphreys, 2011b). Using electroencephalography (EEG), Matheson et al. (2014) showed 
that the handle of a tool triggered an early visual attentional response in the extrastriate visual 
cortex, and argued that this early response is presumably elicited before a motor response in 
motor-related areas is activated (see also, Goslin, Dixon, Fischer, Cangelosi, & Ellis, 2012). A 
somewhat different approach to investigate attentional capture by the tool comes from Handy 
and colleagues (Handy & Tipper, 2007; Handy et al., 2003). In their EEG study (Handy et al., 
2003), participants had to respond by button press to a target superimposed over a graspable 
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or a non-graspable tool. The authors found an early visual attentional response (using event-
related potentials) to task-irrelevant tools compared to non-tools when presented in the right 
visual field (i.e., the appropriate location for action). Handy et al. (2003) concluded that tools 
capture attention and argued for a right visual field dominance in visuomotor processing.  
Further support for attentional capture by the tool comes from neuropsychological studies 
with patients suffering from visual extinction. Visual extinction, a neuropsychological 
disorder of attention, impairs the report of multiple items in the environment. Patients 
frequently fail to detect a contralesional stimulus when an ipsilesional stimulus appears 
simultaneously but they are able to detect a single contralesional stimulus when presented 
alone (Driver & Vuilleumier, 2001; Karnath, 1988). Di Pellegrino et al. (2005) presented cups 
with different handle orientations to parietal patients with visual extinction after right parietal 
brain damage. Patients reported the contralesional cup more often when the handle afforded a 
left-hand rather than a right-hand grasp. The authors proposed that action-relevant object 
features automatically capture visual attention by activating corresponding motor 
representations. Hence, patients with parietal lesions are nevertheless able to perceive 
affordance in the environment. 
A link between affordance and attention can be also observed with pairs of objects 
affording a mutual action (e.g., pouring for cup and teapot). Presenting single objects in an 
action relationship next to another object (e.g., cup-teapot) modulates affordance, extending 
the notion of affordance beyond effects offered by single objects (cf. Gibson, 1979). The 
pairings of objects is of particular relevance for the present thesis and will be outlined next. 
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1.3 Paired-object affordance  
There is now substantial evidence that perception and attention are facilitated when two 
objects afford a mutual action (cup-teapot) compared to when they are unrelated (e.g., cup-
knife; e.g., Wulff, Laverick, Humphreys, Wing, & Rotshtein, 2015; Laverick et al., 2015; 
McNair & Harris, 2014; Wulff & Humphreys, 2013; Borghi et al., 2012; Roberts & 
Humphreys, 2011a; Roberts & Humphreys, 2011b; Yoon, Humphreys, & Riddoch, 2010; 
Humphreys, Wulff, Yoon, & Riddoch, 2010a; Adamo & Ferber, 2009; Green & Hummel, 
2006; Riddoch et al., 2003). In a seminal study, Riddoch et al. (2003) demonstrated recovery 
from extinction in fronto-parietal patients when the left and the right stimulus were oriented in 
a way that implied a functional relation (teapot and cup are facing each other) or not (teapot 
and cup are facing away from each other). Riddoch et al. suggested that extinction is 
ameliorated by the affordance for action offered by the action relation between the objects (cf. 
Gibson, 1979). Riddoch et al. (2006; 2003) argued that action relations between objects 
implicitly influence visual attention: When an action (functional) relation between two objects 
exists, these objects can be automatically grouped together as an “action unit” and in turn, the 
exaggerated attentional bias to favour the ipsilesional stimulus in extinction patients can be 
overcome due to attentional allocation to both members of an action-related object pair 
simultaneously. Riddoch et al. also distinguished between active and passive objects in an 
action relation, with the active object (the tool) being the stimulus that is actively used in the 
action and passive objects the stimulus that is passively held during the action. On error trials, 
when patients correctly reported only one of two items, patients reported the tool rather than 
the passive object when the objects were oriented for action but not when they were not 
oriented for action, regardless of its location in space (see also, Wulff & Humphreys, 2015, 
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2013). The presence of an action relation biased which object was first attended, even though 
patients were not consciously aware that two stimuli were presented. 
Recovery from extinction also occurred with unfamiliar object pairs, indicating that the 
presence of an action relation, rather than the familiarity with the action, is critical (Riddoch 
et al., 2006). In a follow-up study, Humphreys et al. (2010a) examined whether the affordance 
effect offered by functional object pairs is modulated by the perspective in which objects are 
presented and the way objects are grasped for using them. The authors used coloured 
photographs of objects being grasped by a hand (either congruent or incongruent with those 
premorbidly used by the patients), and the perspective of the person holding the object was 
manipulated (first-person perspective, 1PP vs. third-person perspective, 3PP). In line with 
Riddoch et al. (2003), patients showed less extinction when the objects were correctly 
positioned for action compared to when they were not. The novel result was that recovery 
from extinction was stronger when the objects were held in hands whose positions were 
congruent with those used premorbidly by the patients. On top of this, the effect was 
enhanced when the objects were seen from a 1PP rather than from a 3PP. In Chapter 4, using 
the same design as Humphreys et al. (2010a), the effects of action familiarity on paired-object 
affordance in extinction patients were further explored. More specifically, I tested whether 
recovery from extinction can also be observed with objects which are unfamiliar as a pair 
(e.g., corkscrew-cup). If yes, are the effects increased when the objects are held by a hand 
which corresponds with the hand one would normally use? Also, is the graspability of objects 
important for the affordance effect? More precisely, does it make a difference in recovery 
from extinction whether the tool or whether the passive object within an object pair has a 
broken handle? This question was explored in Chapter 5. 
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Beneficial effects of action relations on attention and perception have been also reported in 
healthy participants (e.g., Xu et al., 2015; McNair & Harris, 2014; Roberts & Humphreys, 
2011a; Roberts & Humphreys, 2011b; Yoon et al., 2010; Roberts & Humphreys, 2010b; 
Adamo & Ferber, 2009; Green & Hummel, 2006; Bach, Knoblich, Gunter, Friederici, & 
Prinz, 2005). For example, participants were faster making action decisions about functional 
object pairs when the objects were correctly co-located for action compared to when they 
were not (Bach et al., 2005). Using an attentional blink procedure, assumed to measure the 
allocation of visual attention (Raymond, Shapiro, & Arnell, 1992), the role of attention on 
affordance perception was directly studied by Adamo and Ferber (2009) and McNair and 
Harris (2014). These two studies showed a reduced attentional blink when T1 (e.g., hammer) 
and T2 (e.g., nail) formed a functional pair, suggesting that functional relations between 
objects enhance attentional selection, and thus the report of the otherwise extinguished T2 
item. 
The particular role of the tool and its location within a functional pair has been highlighted 
in several studies. Similarly to neuropsychological patients, healthy participants show a 
preferential bias towards the tool rather than the passive object (Wulff et al., 2015; Laverick et 
al., 2015; Xu et al., 2015; McNair & Harris, 2014; Roberts & Humphreys, 2011a; Roberts & 
Humphreys, 2010b) and performance is better when the tool is aligned with the hand the 
participant would normally use to perform the action (Laverick et al., 2015; Xu et al., 2015; 
Roberts & Humphreys, 2011a; Yoon et al., 2010). This latter result indicates that affordance 
perception is sensitive to the hand-object alignment. The effect of hand-object alignment in 
the context of functional pairs was further explored in the present thesis. Specifically, Chapter 
3 assessed whether the motor cortex is sensitive to the way functional pairs are grasped, 
comparing neutral and tilted-interactive hand postures. 
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Taken together, there is evidence that affordance effects are modulated by the context 
objects are presented in, with beneficial effects on perception and attention when two objects 
afford a mutual action and when these objects are congruently grasped and aligned with the 
hands an observer would use to perform such an action. However, it remains unclear what 
mechanisms underlie affordance effects for paired objects. Two factors have been suggested 
and these will be reviewed below.   
 
1.3.1 Mechanisms underlying paired-object affordance  
Humphreys and colleagues (for recent reviews, see Humphreys et al., 2013; Humphreys et 
al., 2010b) suggested that the affordance effect for paired objects might reflect two 
components: a visual response to the visual familiarity of the object pair (referred to as visual-
based affordance) and a motor response to possible actions evoked by the objects (referred to 
as motor-based affordance). Humphreys and Riddoch (2007) proposed that the effects of 
action relation may reflect statistical learning of the spatial relations between objects. When 
two objects are frequently used together in action relative to when they are not, the co-
occurrence statistics for this object pair will be increased and thus perceptual grouping and 
perceptual report of the stimuli will be improved (i.e., there should be less extinction in a 
patient with a spatial bias in attention; see also Humphreys et al., 2010b). Consistent with the 
visual-based affordance response, extinction is reduced when the depicted action is familiar 
and seen both from a 1PP and a 3PP (Humphreys et al., 2010a). On top of this, however, 
affordance effects are larger when objects are seen from a 1PP perspective and align with the 
hands the patients would typically use for the action (Humphreys et al., 2010a). Whether 
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similar visual- and motor-based affordance responses also occur with unfamiliar object pairs 
was studied in Chapter 4. 
The distinction, between visual- and motor-based components of the affordance effect also 
fits with data from healthy participants. For example, Roberts and Humphreys (2010a) 
showed that there was increased activity in visually-responsive areas of the brain (e.g., the 
lateral occipital complex, LOC) when action-related objects were presented (for a similar 
result using transcranial magnetic stimulation, TMS, see Kim, Biederman, & Juan, 2011). The 
activity in these brain regions is typically linked to object processing (Goodale & Milner, 
1992). On the other hand, Kumar et al. (2012) reported enhanced activity over the motor 
cortex when participants viewed a hand congruently grasping an object compared with when 
an incongruent hand grasp was depicted (for fMRI evidence, see Yoon, Humphreys, Kumar, 
& Rotshtein, 2012). There was also increased desynchronisation in mu rhythm activity over 
motor regions for congruent compared with incongruent grasp conditions (Kumar et al., 
2013). This increased desynchronisation is consistent with a stronger motor response to 
stimuli congruent with an action compared to when the stimuli were incongruent with an 
action. Furthermore, viewing action-related objects either congruently or incongruently 
grasped led to left lateralised activation in motor-related parieto-frontal regions, while 
unrelated object pairs activated parieto-frontal areas bilaterally; the bilateral activation 
probably reflects the diminished perception of affordance (Natraj et al., 2013). 
In Chapter 2, the neural correlates of visual- and motor-based affordance responses to 
paired objects were investigated in healthy participants. The role of visual-based affordance 
cues was studied by manipulating the orientation of the objects to each other and the 
perspective in which the stimuli were presented, while motor-based affordances were 
examined by aligning the gripped objects either with the hands the participants would 
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normally use to produce the action or the other hand (cf. Humphreys et al., 2010a). To further 
examine the role of visual- and motor-based affordance responses to paired objects, motor-
evoked potentials (MEPs) induced by TMS over the primary motor cortex (M1) were 
recorded in Chapter 3. Here I assessed whether motor cortex excitability is affected by the 
context in which gripped objects are presented. 
Gibson (1979) suggested that we directly perceive action possibilities when we view tools. 
This direct route from vision to action has been incorporated in the dual-route model from 
vision to action (Riddoch, Humphreys, & Price, 1989). This model will be discussed below. 
 
1.4 Dual-route model from vision to action 
The ability to interact with objects is crucial for everyday life. There is growing evidence 
that action knowledge about how to interact with objects or how to manipulate objects can be 
retrieved via two routes. Firstly, it is assumed that the retrieval of action knowledge relies on 
access to semantic knowledge (e.g., Ochipa, Rothi, & Heilman, 1992). For example, seeing a 
fork will activate the action eating by accessing previous semantic knowledge about forks. 
This indirect semantic route is mediated by temporo-occipital regions within the ventral visual 
stream associated with object representation (Goodale & Milner, 1992; Ungerleider & 
Mishkin, 1982). Secondly, access to action knowledge can be also mediated by the physical 
properties of the object (its affordance; cf. Gibson, 1979) which automatically activates action 
and motor procedures bypassing semantic knowledge (referred to as procedural knowledge). 
For example, the shape of a knife affords a cutting or spreading action using a power grip 
while the shape of a cup affords a drinking action using a precision grip. The direct route goes 
from the occipital to the parietal lobe (dorsal visual stream) associated with object use (e.g., 
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Goodale & Milner, 1992). The indirect and the direct routes have been integrated into the 
dual-route model from vision to action (Riddoch et al., 1989), which assumes that action 
retrieval and object use are mediated by two separate routes.  
The dissociation of impairments between optic aphasia and visual apraxia supports the 
existence of two separate routes from vision to action, one focusing on semantic knowledge 
(intact in visual apraxia, impaired in optic aphasia) and the other one supporting action 
procedures afforded by the structural properties of the objects (intact in optic aphasia, 
impaired in visual apraxia; Riddoch et al., 1989). However, converging evidence suggests that 
the direct and the indirect semantic routes are not entirely separate, instead they are linked 
(e.g., Wulff et al., 2015; Laverick et al., 2015; Mizelle, Kelly, & Wheaton, 2013; Osiurak, 
Jarry, & Le Gall, 2010; Silveri & Ciccarelli, 2009; Osiurak et al., 2008; Frey, 2007; Yoon, 
Heinke, & Humphreys, 2002; Bozeat, Ralph, Patterson, & Hodges, 2002; Hodges, Bozeat, 
Lambon Ralph, Patterson, & Spatt, 2000; Buxbaum, Schwartz, & Carew, 1997). For example, 
Wulff and colleagues (Wulff et al., 2015; Laverick et al., 2015) showed that making action 
decisions and selecting objects for action required the involvement of both the direct and the 
indirect semantic routes from vision to action (cf. Riddoch et al., 1989). Wulff et al. (2015) 
also compared lesion locations between patients who were impaired when selecting real 
objects for action (e.g., fork-knife) with patients who were able to perform the task. Impaired 
patients relative to intact patients had lesions to dorsal fronto-parietal (direct route) and 
ventral anterior temporal (indirect route) regions. The authors suggested that lesions to both 
the direct and the indirect routes can impair the ability to select objects for action. In Chapter 
6, I further investigated the relation between procedural and semantic knowledge on paired 
object selection using a touchscreen interface. I also assessed whether the retrieval of action 
knowledge is modulated by age. 
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1.5 Neurocognitive models related to affordance 
The above cited research and the present thesis investigated affordance using single objects 
or pairs of objects, respectively. In these studies, static pictures of objects implying an action 
without depicting the actual action being executed were used. The aim of these studies was to 
explore the direct perception of affordance and its role on attention. Nevertheless, ideas about 
affordance are related to other theories linking perception and action such as (i) the tool 
network (Lewis, 2006), (ii) the action observation network (AON; Grafton, 2009), and (iii) 
the mirror neuron system (MNS; Rizzolatti & Fogassi, 2014). Even though all these models 
use objects/tools as stimuli, they all focus on different aspects of the perception-action 
coupling: The tool network focuses on tool use, whereas the AON and the MNS examine how 
we understand other people’s actions. The link between affordance and these three models 
will be discussed next. 
 
1.5.1 Tool-selective network  
Over the last 10 years, it has been established that viewing tools, a special category of 
objects (Creem-Regehr & Lee, 2005) activates a distributed left-lateralised network including 
the pre-motor cortex (PMC; planning of tool-related actions), the posterior middle temporal 
gyrus (pMTG; semantic knowledge about tools and tool motion) and the posterior parietal 
cortex (representation of tool skills; for recent reviews, see Orban & Caruana, 2014; 
Beauchamp & Martin, 2007; for meta-analyses, see Lewis, 2006; Grezes & Decety, 2001). 
The activation of regions within both the dorsal and the ventral visual stream fits well with the 
proposal of Creem-Regehr and Lee (2005) that tools can be “processed for what they are, but 
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also for how they can be used” (p. 457; see also e.g., Canessa et al., 2008; Noppeney, 2008; 
Johnson-Frey, 2004; Chao & Martin, 2000; Goodale & Milner, 1992).  
The automatic activation of dorsal (pre-motor and parietal) areas when viewing tools, 
assumed to be involved in reaching and grasping (Jeannerod, Arbib, Rizzolatti, & Sakata, 
1995), corresponds well with Gibson’s affordance concept (1979). It has been suggested that 
the dorsal motor-related activations reflect the neural correlates of the affordance effect 
(Orban & Caruana, 2014; Thill et al., 2013; Grezes & Decety, 2002, see also Rizzolatti & 
Matelli, 2003, for the revised dorsal visual stream model). Specifically, the visual properties 
of tools such as their shape, size, orientation or graspability (encoded by the inferior parietal 
lobule, IPL; Maranesi, Bonini, & Fogassi, 2014) rather than conceptual knowledge associated 
with the tool have been suggested to be responsible for affordance perception (Vingerhoets, 
Vandamme, & Vercammen, 2009; but see Tucker & Ellis, 2004).  
The tool network is strongly linked to tool use. Frey (2007) proposed that tool use relies on 
both sensory-motor and semantic representations (cf. Binkofski & Buxbaum, 2013; Chao & 
Martin, 2000). However, theories of human tool use are beyond the scope of the present 
thesis, and therefore will not be further discussed (for recent tool use reviews, see van Elk et 
al., 2014; Orban & Caruana, 2014; Osiurak et al., 2010; Lewis, 2006; Johnson-Frey, 2004; 
Johnson-Frey, 2003). 
Interestingly, both viewing and using tools activates the same left-lateralised parieto-
frontal network (e.g., Lewis, 2006). It has been suggested that these regions contain mirror 
neurons – neurons which discharge when an goal-directed action is performed as well as 
when an action is passively viewed (Gallese, Fadiga, Fogassi, & Rizzolatti, 1996; di 
Pellegrino, Fadiga, Fogassi, Gallese, & Rizzolatti, 1992). The MNS and its role in action 
observation and action execution will be discussed in section 1.5.3. 
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To sum up, the tool network is automatically activated during the observation of tools, and 
this may provide the substrate of a strong link between the visual perception of a tool and its 
perceived action potential.  
 
1.5.2 Action observation network 
While the tool network is automatically activated during the mere viewing of graspable 
objects, the AON is automatically activated during the observation of another person’s action 
(for a meta-analysis, see Caspers, Zilles, Laird, & Eickhoff, 2010). The AON has been 
associated with action understanding by means of action simulation based on mirror neurons 
(Grafton, 2009). In other words, observing another person’s action elicits simulation 
processes which depend upon the type of observed action (e.g., goal-directed vs. body-related 
actions). The AON comprises a bilateral distributed network including the inferior frontal 
gyrus (IFG), the PMC, the superior temporal sulcus and the IPL (Grafton, 2009, see also 
Caspers et al., 2010). Grafton (2009) stressed that the AON partly overlaps with areas 
involved in executing goal-directed actions (PMC and IPL; Grezes & Decety, 2001) and with 
areas containing mirror neurons (PMC and IPL; Rizzolatti & Craighero, 2004, see below). 
The shared neural representations between action observation and action execution are 
assumed to be the basis for understanding other people’s actions and intentions (Rizzolatti & 
Craighero, 2004), which will be reviewed in section 1.5.3. 
It has been shown that the observation of goal-directed hand/arm actions evokes 
somatotopic PMC and IPL activation (simulation), supporting a direct match between action 
observation and action execution (Buccino et al., 2001). Moreover, the activation of the AON 
(in particular the PMC and the IPL) is influenced by the motor repertoire of the observer (e.g., 
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responding differentially to viewing a human being vs. a dog performing actions; Buccino, 
Binkofski, & Riggio, 2004) and the familiarity with the action (e.g., Gardner, Goulden, & 
Cross, 2015; Calvo-Merino, Grezes, Glaser, Passingham, & Haggard, 2006; Calvo-Merino, 
Glaser, Grezes, Passingham, & Haggard, 2005).  
In sum, the AON is a framework that can provide insights into the mechanisms underlying 
action understanding. However, although the AON can simulate simple actions and decode 
their intentions, more complex actions such as tool use may require the involvement of other 
areas beyond the AON (Grafton, 2009). 
 
1.5.3 Mirror neuron system 
There are several theories of how we understand the actions of others. The most influential 
theory is the mirror neuron account. Mirror neurons have been first discovered in the 
monkey’s pre-motor cortex (area F5; Gallese et al., 1996; di Pellegrino et al., 1992), and 
subsequently in the monkey’s anterior intraparietal area (AIP; for a review, see Fogassi et al., 
2005). In both areas, mirror neurons respond to both when the experimenter performs a goal-
directed action and when the monkey performs a similar action. The direct matching between 
action execution and action observation (the mirroring mechanism) is evident in both 
monkeys and humans, and it has been argued to be the neurophysiological mechanism 
underlying action and intention understanding (Rizzolatti, Fogassi, & Gallese, 2001; for 
reviews, see Rizzolatti & Fogassi, 2014; Thill et al., 2013; Molenberghs, Cunnington, & 
Mattingley, 2012; Rizzolatti & Sinigaglia, 2010; Fabbri-Destro & Rizzolatti, 2008; Buccino et 
al., 2004; Rizzolatti & Craighero, 2004; Rizzolatti, Fadiga, Gallese, & Fogassi, 1996, but see 
Turella, Pierno, Tubaldi, & Castiello, 2009, for a critical review). More specifically, it is 
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proposed that we recognise and understand other people’s actions and their intentions by 
automatically mapping the observed action onto our own motor representations ('motor 
resonance'; Rizzolatti & Fogassi, 2014; Rizzolatti et al., 2001). In this sense, our brain 
represents the actions of others in a similar way to how it represents our own actions. The 
mirror mechanism has been also associated with imitation learning (e.g., Rizzolatti & 
Craighero, 2004; Rizzolatti et al., 2001; Jeannerod, 1994). However, as stated by Rizzolatti et 
al. (2001), there might be other possible mechanisms beyond the mirror mechanism which 
contribute to action understanding. 
In contrast to the affordance concept which relates to action perception and sensorimotor 
representations while observing graspable objects, the mirror mechanism is concerned with 
the perception of others people’s actions and intentions elicited by goal-directed action stimuli 
(for reviews, see e.g., Avanzini et al., 2012; Ortigue, Sinigaglia, Rizzolatti, & Grafton, 2010; 
Perry & Bentin, 2009; Iacoboni et al., 2005; Buccino et al., 2004; Buccino et al., 2001; 
Iacoboni et al., 1999). The core regions of the human MNS are the precentral gyrus, the IFG 
and the IPL (Fabbri-Destro & Rizzolatti, 2008; Rizzolatti & Craighero, 2004), with the IFG 
mediating action intention understanding (Ortigue et al., 2010; Hamilton & Grafton, 2008; 
Iacoboni et al., 2005). Interestingly, the precentral gyrus (PMC) and the IPL (both dorsal 
stream areas) are assumed to be the neural substrates underlying affordance effects (e.g., 
Grezes & Decety, 2002). More precisely, so-called canonical mirror neurons in area F5 and 
the AIP fire to the mere observation of graspable objects and during grasping movements 
(Murata, Gallese, Luppino, Kaseda, & Sakata, 2000; Murata et al., 1997), suggesting that 
these areas might be the neurophysiological basis of sensorimotor transformations, and thus 
grasping (and the extraction of the associated affordance; Jeannerod et al., 1995; for a recent 
review, see Turella & Lingnau, 2014).  
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As the observation of graspable objects (affordance) and goal-directed actions (mirror 
neurons) activates shared (PMC and IPL) and specific (IFG) neural representations, it is 
plausible that action goal understanding is mediated by both mirror and canonical neurons 
(note that the perception of action possibilities depends upon context/goal; cf. Bach, 
Nicholson, & Hudson, 2014), while understanding the intentions of another person’s action 
might require additional activation of the IFG (which is beyond the concept of affordance).  
An alternative framework for action understanding and action prediction is proposed by 
Bach et al. (2014). In their affordance-matching hypothesis, the authors argue that action 
understanding and action prediction is based on object knowledge – knowledge about an 
object’s function and how it can be used, respectively. Accordingly, action understanding and 
action prediction is mediated by matching observed and predicted actions: a match between 
observed action and an object’s typical function facilitates inferring the goal of an observed 
action, while a match between observed action and the correct manipulation of objects 
facilitates predicting actions. Bach et al. suggested that the role of mirror neurons is to 
confirm a previously predicted action, based on an object’s affordance extraction of another 
person’s action, probably mediated by canonical-mirror neurons, i.e., neurons that fire to both 
object presentation and to actions performed by others (Bonini, Maranesi, Livi, Fogassi, & 
Rizzolatti, 2014; but see, Uithol & Maranesi, 2014).  
Taken together, the exact relation between affordance and mirror neurons is still unclear 
and requires further investigations (see Thill et al., 2013, for a comprehensive review between 
the relation of affordance and mirror neurons). 
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1.6 Overview of the thesis 
The present thesis explored the mechanisms underlying paired-object affordance effects in 
different contexts and the effects of paired objects on perception and attention focusing on 
three main topics: (i) the relations between paired-object effects and visual- and motor-based 
affordances; (ii) the neural correlates underlying paired-object affordances and (iii) the effects 
of paired-object affordance in selecting objects for action in visual search tasks. Chapter 2 
investigated the neural correlates underlying paired-object affordance effects using the same 
stimulus set and a similar design to Humphreys et al. (2010a). The data show that paired-
object affordance is mediated by interactions between visual-based affordance cues associated 
with responses in occipito-parietal cortices and motor-based affordance cues associated with 
responses in frontal motor cortices. Chapter 3 further evaluated the role of motor cortices in 
paired-object affordance perception applying TMS over the left or the right M1. The results 
indicate that the right (non-dominant) M1 supports cognitive changes related to the processing 
of paired objects. Chapter 4 and 5 investigated the effects of visual- and motor-based 
affordance cue manipulations on recovery from visual extinction. Chapter 4 assessed whether 
recovery from extinction also occurs with unfamiliar object pairs (visual-based affordances), 
while Chapter 5 tested whether the effects of paired-object affordance require the involved 
objects to be graspable (motor-based affordance) by comparing performance on objects with 
intact (graspable) or broken (non-graspable) handles. The results indicate that both visual- and 
motor-based affordance cues contribute to paired-object affordance effects, with the 
magnitude of the effects being dependent upon visual familiarity with the object pairs and the 
completeness of the tool rather than the object that is acted upon. Chapter 6 looked at the 
relations between procedural and semantic knowledge when selecting pairs of objects for 
action among distracters using participants varying in age and using two different search 
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tasks. Participants had to search either for an action pair in the explicit action task or for 
matching colour pairs in the implicit visual search task. The results show that paired-object 
affordances generate effects on explicit performance, highlighting the role of task demands in 
selection processes. Age influenced performance in the action task, with increased 
performance in middle-aged adults which then decreases in later life. Chapter 7 gives a 
summary of results, and suggests future studies based on the limitations of this thesis. 
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CHAPTER 2:  DISTINCT NEURAL EFFECTS OF PERSPECTIVE AND HAND 
ALIGNMENT ON PAIRED-OBJECT AFFORDANCE: AN FMRI STUDY
1
 
 
2.1 Abstract 
Attention is facilitated when two objects afford a mutual action, with the effect of action 
boosted when object pairs are viewed from a 1PP rather than a 3PP and when objects are 
aligned with how they would be grasped for action. Two processes might mediate the 
affordance effect: a visual-based affordance response, which is affected by the orientation and 
position of the objects, and a motor-based affordance response, which is related to hand-
object interactions. The present chapter examined the neural correlates of the paired-object 
affordance effect. Participants performed a one-back memory task while viewing pairs of 
objects aligned for right- or left-handed actions, presented from a 1PP or 3PP and positioned 
for action or not. Increased responses for objects correctly positioned rather than incorrectly 
positioned for action (reflecting visual-based affordance cues) were found in inferior parietal 
and superior-middle temporal cortices. This effect was enhanced when the objects were 
viewed from a 1PP. In contrast, motor-based affordance cues increased activity in the superior 
medial frontal gyrus (SmFG), with this response also being enhanced by 1PP stimuli. 
Responses to 1PP relative to 3PP stimuli were larger in the posterior cingulate and postcentral 
gyri. This chapter demonstrates that paired-object affordance arises from interactions between 
visual-based affordance cues associated with responses in temporo-parietal cortices and 
motor-based affordance cues associated with responses in frontal motor cortices. 
                                                 
 
1
 Chapter 2 is an adapted version of Wulff, M., Humphreys, G. W., & Rotshtein, P. (submitted). Distinct neural 
effects of perspective and hand alignment on paired-object affordance: an fMRI study. Cortex. 
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2.2 Introduction 
Interacting with objects is essential for everyday activities such as preparing a cup of tea or 
making a sandwich. Such activities commonly involve interacting with two objects at the 
same time – with one object (the active object) acting upon the other (the passive object; e.g., 
bottle opener and a bottle, respectively). Previous work has established that functional 
relations between objects facilitate attention and perception (e.g., Wulff & Humphreys, 2013; 
Borghi et al., 2012; Roberts & Humphreys, 2011a; Yoon et al., 2010; Humphreys et al., 
2010a; Green & Hummel, 2006; Riddoch et al., 2003). It has been argued that perceptual 
facilitation arises from affordance cues present in the stimuli. Affordance is traditionally 
defined in terms of the physical properties of an object that potentiate specific actions directly 
(Gibson, 1979). Affordance is based not only on the shape and orientation of an object in 
space but also on the context in which the object is presented in. For example, a bottle will 
afford a pouring action when presented next to a glass but a filling action when presented next 
to a water tap. Potential actions can also be evoked by viewing a hand interacting with an 
object (Kumar et al., 2013; Kumar et al., 2012). Thus Gibson’s concept of affordance (1979) 
can be extended to include the presence of a hand as an additional cue that potentiates an 
action. Whether the effects of a hand grasping an object are modulated by the same functional 
and neural processes as effects of the relative positioning of objects is unclear. Here we 
compared the neural correlates of the two types of affordance cues: visual-based affordance 
cues based on the spatial relations between objects and motor-based affordance cues based on 
hand-object interactions (for a recent review, see Humphreys et al., 2013). 
There is accumulating evidence demonstrating that perception is affected by visual-based 
affordance cues. Green and Hummel (2006), for example, showed that object identification 
increased when a target (e.g., a glass) and a distracter (a jar) were positioned to afford a 
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mutual action (pouring) but not when an unrelated but correctly positioned distracter was 
presented (see also Roberts & Humphreys, 2011a). Similarly, participants were faster to make 
action decisions when an object was presented in the context of another object that potentiated 
a mutual action compared to when it was presented next to an object which did not potentiate 
a mutual action (Borghi et al., 2012). Furthermore, the presence of a functionally related 
object can affect the kinematics for reaching, grasping and lifting a target object (De Stefani, 
Innocenti, Bernardi, Campione, & Gentilucci, 2012).  
A similar advantage for interacting pairs has been found with neuropsychological patients. 
Riddoch et al. (2003) showed that attentional deficits were ameliorated when two objects 
were positioned in a way that afforded a mutual action compared to when the objects were 
unrelated. At the neural level, it has been suggested that visual-based affordance is mediated 
by temporo-occipital region (Roberts & Humphreys, 2010a). Enhanced activity in the lateral 
occipital complex (LOC) and the fusiform gyrus (FFG) was observed for interacting 
compared to non-interacting objects (see also Kim & Biederman, 2011). TMS applied to the 
right LOC disrupted object affordance effects raised from visual-based affordance cues (i.e., 
the effect of positioning objects next to each other; Kim et al., 2011; though see, Baeck et al. 
2013). In contrast to the above studies, positioning tools for actions in correct functional pairs 
was associated with responses in but not limited to the ventral visual stream (Mizelle & 
Wheaton, 2010b). Mizelle and Wheaton (2010b) compared functional magnetic resonance 
imaging fMRI responses for correct and incorrect tool positions for action (tool grasp by a 
hand vs. placed on the table) and functional pairings (e.g., hammer-nail vs. hammer-mug, in 
both cases the objects were positioned to afford a mutual action). When the tool was 
positioned for action, irrespective of the functional pairing, increased responses were 
observed in a widespread network, including the posterior occipital gyrus and precuneus, 
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middle and inferior temporal gyri, inferior and superior parietal gyri, and inferior and middle 
frontal gyri, with increased responses in this network for correct (familiar) compared with 
incorrect functional pairs. Furthermore, fMRI adaptation studies have been shown that 
occipito-parietal areas are sensitive to changes in object orientation but not to object 
identification (Niimi, Saneyoshi, Abe, Kaminaga, & Yokosawa, 2011; Valyear, Culham, 
Sharif, Westwood, & Goodale, 2006), with this orientation effect only being present when the 
objects were graspable (vs. non-graspable objects; Rice, Valyear, Goodale, Milner, & 
Culham, 2007). Taken together, these results suggest that an object grasped by a hand and 
positioned for action as part of a familiar functional object pair is coded by bilateral ventral 
(occipito-temporal) and dorsal (posterior occipital and superior parietal-frontal) visual 
pathways, with primarily involvement of the left inferior parietal cortex. 
Motor-based affordance cues also enhance perception. Motor-associated responses are 
modulated by the way a hand interacts with an object. For example, action decisions are 
facilitated when objects are congruently (vs. incongruently) grasped (e.g., Wulff et al., 2015; 
Laverick et al., 2015; Borghi et al., 2012; Yoon & Humphreys, 2005). Participants are faster 
at making action decisions than semantic decisions when the object position matched the 
participant’s handedness (for a similar result with neuropsychological patients, see 
Humphreys et al., 2010a). Mizelle, Kelly, and Wheaton (2013) presented functional object 
pairs oriented for action with a correct or incorrect tool grip (e.g., the tool was grasped by its 
handle and the functional end of the tool was oriented toward the recipient of the action or 
not). For the correct tool grip, there was enhanced response in bilateral fronto-parietal and 
temporo-occipital cortices, while incorrect tool grip conditions activated bilateral superior and 
middle temporal cortices. Recently, we showed that lesions to bilateral pre-motor, left parietal 
and right temporal cortices were associated with reduced effects of grip congruency on action 
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decisions (Wulff et al., 2015). An fMRI study showed increased activity in superior medial 
frontal, left inferior parietal and right superior temporal cortices for congruently gripped and 
acted upon objects compared to incongruent object use (Yoon et al., 2012). Enhanced EEG 
activity (Kumar et al., 2012) as well as reduced mu synchronization over the motor cortex 
(Kumar et al., 2013) has been reported when participants viewed a hand congruently grasping 
an object compared with when an incongruent hand grip was depicted (see also Petit, Pegna, 
Harris, & Michel, 2006). Hand alignment effects (i.e., whether the tool is held by the 
dominant or the non-dominant hand) have also been reported to modulate mu coherence over 
parietal and pre-motor regions, with coherence for contralateral observed tools (Kelly, 
Mizelle, & Wheaton, 2015). Reduced mu rhythm in the sensorimotor cortex has been 
associated with motor preparation (Pfurtscheller, Neuper, Andrew, & Edlinger, 1997) as well 
as with execution and observation of hand-object interactions (Muthukumaraswamy, Johnson, 
& McNair, 2004; Muthukumaraswamy & Johnson, 2004). Thus, when grip congruency is 
modulated by hand alignment (e.g., the left hand holding a tool) enhanced motor excitability 
has been reported for incongruent-misaligned (less common) hand grips. The opposite pattern 
can be observed when congruency is manipulated by the way a hand grasps the tool, with 
increased motor response for congruent grip conditions. In sum, these studies highlight the 
importance of frontal-motor regions in representing motor-based affordance cues, and 
specifically suggest that different motor cues (aligned vs. incongruent) may result in opposite 
pattern of activation.  
Finally, the action observation literature highlights the importance of visual perspective 
(1PP vs. 3PP) in triggering sensory-motor representations. Watching video clips of actions 
from a 1PP elicits larger neural responses in fronto-parieto-occipital areas (e.g., precentral 
gyrus, postcentral gyrus, IPL, inferior occipital gyrus) than when the action is presented from 
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a 3PP (e.g., Watanabe et al., 2011; Hetu, Mercier, Eugene, Michon, & Jackson, 2011; Hesse, 
Sparing, & Fink, 2009; Alaerts, Swinnen, & Wenderoth, 2009; Bruzzo, Borghi, & Ghirlanda, 
2008; Jackson, Meltzoff, & Decety, 2006; Saxe, Jamal, & Powell, 2006; Chan, Peelen, & 
Downing, 2004; Vogt, Taylor, & Hopkins, 2003; Maeda, Kleiner-Fisman, & Pascual-Leone, 
2002), though other studies have not found any effect of perspective on performance or brain 
responses (e.g., Bortoletto, Mattingley, & Cunnington, 2013; Oosterhof, Tipper, & Downing, 
2012; Anquetil & Jeannerod, 2007). Recently, Kelly et al. (2015) demonstrated opposite 
effects of tool alignment, with the dominant hand response being affected by perspective, 
suggesting that perspective plays a key role in modulating both visual- and motor-based 
affordance cues. 
The combined impact of visual- and motor-based affordance cues was examined by Wulff 
and colleagues (Wulff & Humphreys, 2013; Humphreys et al., 2010a) in two 
neuropsychological studies of fronto-parietal patients with visual extinction. Most patients 
had right hemisphere lesions. The authors presented pairs of objects held by a hand. The 
objects were positioned to potentiate an interaction or not (facing each other vs. facing away 
from each other), presented from a 1PP or 3PP and were aligned or misaligned with the 
patients’ pre-morbidly dominant hand. Recovery from extinction was increased when 
interacting objects were presented from a 1PP and when the objects were aligned with the 
hands the patient would typically use for the action (Humphreys et al., 2010a). This suggests 
that visual- and motor-based affordance cues have an interactive effect on attention and 
perception. Note that even though these patients have commonly damage to the right IPL 
(e.g., Chechlacz et al., 2013; Karnath, Himmelbach, & Küker, 2003), they remained able to 
respond to the effects of action. As suggested by (Humphreys et al., 2010a), it could be that 
the effects are driven by neural areas separate from these involved in spatial attention (e.g., 
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the left IPL for processing hand-object interactions; van Elk, 2014; Buxbaum, Kyle, 
Grossman, & Coslett, 2007; Grezes & Decety, 2002). 
In the present chapter, we investigated the combined effects of visual- and motor-based 
affordance cues on the neural responses to paired-object affordance with healthy participants. 
Visual- and motor-based affordance cues were manipulated using a similar approach to 
Humphreys et al. (2010a). Using congruently gripped functional object pairs in a full factorial 
design, we assessed whether the effects were driven by (i) visual-based affordance cues by 
manipulating the position of the objects to each other (correctly or incorrectly co-located for 
action, Figure 2.1) and/or (ii) the effects are driven by motor-based affordance cues by 
gripping the tool (active object) with the right or left hand. Thus, the active object could be 
either anatomically aligned or misaligned with the dominant hand. Finally, (iii) each 
functional pair was presented from a 1PP or a 3PP. We assumed that the perspective 
manipulation would trigger both visual- and motor-based affordance processing, as 
perspective effects have been reported for both action observation and tool use studies 
examining the effects of object orientation on performance (see above). Based on the 
neuropsychological data (Wulff & Humphreys, 2013; Humphreys et al., 2010a), we 
anticipated that in addition to the main effects of each affordance cue (i.e., action relation, 
hand alignment, and perspective) the three different experimental factors would interact. 
Specifically, we expected that viewing stimuli from the 1PP would increase the neural effects 
of the objects’ co-location for action and hand alignment in the above predicted regions, as 
previously observed with neuropsychological patients. In line with previous literature, we 
anticipated that visual-based affordance cues would affect responses in occipito-temporal and 
occipito-parietal cortices; motor-based affordance cues would be primarily associated with 
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responses in motor-associated areas in the frontal cortex while the combined effect of the 
various affordance cue types would be primarily observed in fronto-parietal motor areas. 
 
2.3 Methods 
 
2.3.1 Participants 
Eleven right-handed healthy participants (two females; Mage = 65.09; SD = 12.14) were 
recruited from the volunteer panel at the School of Psychology, University of Birmingham. 
Handedness was determined by self-report. We recruited relatively older participants for two 
reasons: First we were interested in investigating the neural effects of paired-object 
affordance after extensive hands-on experience with tools; this experience is often lacking or 
very limited in the undergraduate student population who have limited experience with 
cooking or “do-it-yourself” tasks. Secondly, our cohort served as age-matched control 
participants for an fMRI study we ran with patients suffering from visual extinction which 
will be reported in a separate publication. Participants received £20 for their participation. 
Informed consent was obtained from all participants and the study was approved by the local 
Ethical Review Committee. 
 
2.3.2  Stimuli 
Thirty-two coloured photographs of common objects were used – the same as those in 
Humphreys et al. (2010a). Each photograph depicted an item grasped by a hand and held 
above a table, photographed from a 1PP and from a 3PP. The individual items for each 
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perspective were combined into 16 object pairs that were commonly used together (e.g., bottle 
and bottle opener; see Figure 2.1a and Figure 2.1b for the 1PP and the 3PP, respectively). The 
two items were presented simultaneously, one on the right and one on the left side of fixation. 
We note that there were low-level visual differences between 1PP and 3PP stimuli, with 3PP 
stimuli in contrast to 1PP stimuli depicting more body parts due to the angle of the camera. 
However, there was no difference between correctly and incorrectly co-located object pairs 
for actions within each perspective condition, as the same pictures were used but their 
location was switched across conditions.  
The experiment was a full factorial repeated-measures 2 x 2 x 2 design with the following 
factors: (1) the action relation between objects, the items were presented so that they appeared 
either to interact with each other (e.g., the bottle opener is about to open the bottle; referred to 
as action relation, AR) or not (e.g., the bottle is facing way from the bottle; referred to as non-
action relation, NAR). (2) Hand alignment, the object pairs were positioned for right-handed 
or left-handed actions with the hands aligned or misaligned with those the participant would 
use to perform the action (referred to as RH and LH, respectively). Since we tested only right-
handed participants, hand alignment was congruent for RH actions and incongruent for 
observing LH actions (e.g., for RH actions, the right hand holds the bottle opener while the 
left hand holds the bottle). Finally, (3) each object pair combination was presented from a 1PP 
or a 3PP. Note that from a 3PP the RH alignment is anatomically correct, while the LH 
alignment is mirror-matched correct (as if looking in a mirror). 
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Figure 2.1. Examples of two-item stimuli presented from a first-person perspective (a), and 
from a third-person perspective (b). The objects were positioned as interacting pairs (left 
panels) or as non-interacting pairs (right panels). The active object (the bottle opener) was 
grasped either by the right hand (right-handed action; upper panels) or the left hand (left-
handed action; lower panels). 
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2.3.3 Design and procedure 
A similar design to Humphreys et al. (2010a) was used. Data for the two perspective 
conditions (1PP and 3PP) were collected in four separate runs on the same day, two runs for 
each perspective. The order of the perspective conditions was counterbalanced across 
participants, participants started either with the two runs of the 1PP or the 3PP. Each run 
contained thirty-two, 18s blocks, each block comprised of a separate condition (four blocks of 
each condition). In each block, we presented 18 object pairs at a 1Hz rate (700ms stimuli + 
300ms fixation). In addition, 24 fixation-only blocks lasting 8s were pseudo-randomly 
interleaved between the experimental blocks to ensure they were relatively equally distributed 
across the experiment. 
In all functional scans, participants performed a one-back working memory task. 
Participants were asked to press a response button with their right index finger whenever an 
object pair was identical to the one immediately preceding it. This task was chosen to ensure 
that participants maintained attention throughout the experiment. The repetition stimuli were 
relatively rare (12.5%), treated as catch trial and modelled separately in the fMRI design as 
regressors of no interest. Importantly, the trials of interest did not require a motor response, 
hence, any responses in motor-associated areas cannot be simply attributed to hand 
movements. Prior to the fMRI experiment, participants completed a practice block of 148 
trials for each perspective to ensure adequate performance in the task; the stimuli on these 
practice trials were different from those employed in the experimental trials to avoid carry-
over effects.  
Stimulus representation was controlled by E-prime software (Version 2.1; Psychology 
Software Tools, 2006). Stimuli were projected onto a screen inside the fMRI scanner and 
viewed from a distance of approximately 65 cm via a head coil mounted mirror. Stimuli 
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subtended 11.42° x 8.69° of visual angle and were located 0.86° on either side of central 
fixation. All stimuli were displayed on a black background. 
 
2.3.4 fMRI data acquisition 
Imaging data were acquired using a 3T Philips Achieva scanner (Philips Healthcare 
Systems, Eindhoven, The Netherlands) at the Birmingham University Imaging Centre. A T1-
weighted 1 x 1 x 1 mm anatomical image was acquired for each participant (sagittal 
orientation, TE/TR = 3.8/8.5 s). EPI images were acquired using an eight-channel SENSE 
head coil with a sense factor of 2. Thirty-three axial oblique slices, 3.5 mm thick were 
obtained in an ascending order (TR/TE = 2000 ms/35 ms, 79.1° flip angle, 2.5 x 2.5 x 3.5 mm 
voxel-size, 240 x 240 mm² field of view). The scan included 4 dummy volumes; for the data 
we used 202 functional volumes per run. As the MRI scanner received a software upgrade in 
the middle of our data collection, five participants were scanned with a flip angle of 85°; the 
type of MRI sequence was included as a covariate of no interest in the statistical analysis (see 
below).  
 
2.3.5  fMRI data analysis 
Data analysis was performed using SPM 8 (Wellcome Department of Imaging 
Neuroscience, London; www.fil.ion.ucl.ac.uk/spm). The pre-processing steps included slice 
timing correction of all slices to the onset of the middle slice, spatial realignment and 
unwrapped (correction for head movements and distortions by head movement interactions; 
Andersson, Hutton, Ashburner, Turner, & Friston, 2001), co-registration of the mean EPI 
image to the T1-weigthed image. Normalization parameters for transforming the data to 
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Montreal Neurological Institute (MNI) space were computed on the T1 images using the 
advanced segment-normalise procedure (Ashburner & Friston, 2005). These parameters were 
applied to the EPI data and images were re-sliced to 3 x 3 x 3 mm voxels and spatially 
smoothed with a full width at half maximum Gaussian kernel of 9 mm to minimise inter-
participant variability and adhere to the requirements of the random field theory (Worsley & 
Friston, 1995). 
The General Linear Model was used for statistical analysis (Friston et al., 1995). First, we 
estimated the effect of each condition for each participant averaged across the two functional 
runs for each perspective by convoluting the canonical hemodynamic response function with 
the onset of each event of each condition [2 (perspective) x 2 (action relation) x 2 (hand 
alignment)]. We modelled separately the repetition events (catch trials) which included the 
participant’s response to ensure that any motor response did not interact with our results. In 
addition, the six realignment parameters were included as regressors of no interest to account 
for movement-related variance. High-pass filtering (128 s) was used to increase signal-to-
noise ratio by removing scanner and physiological noise. 
To allow generalisation of the results, we used random effects analysis. Here we entered 
the images from all participants generated by the first-level analyses for each of the eight 
conditions (i.e., 2 x 2 x 2). In this analysis, we assumed dependency and unequal variance 
between the conditions. The two types of MRI sequences were modelled as a covariate of no 
interest to ensure that our results were not affected by these differences.  
The analysis focused on three main effects: (i) the action relation, (ii) the perspective and 
(iii) the hand alignment. In addition, based on previous studies with neuropsychological 
patients where the 1PP boosted the effects of the action relation and hand alignment 
(Humphreys et al., 2010a), we examined the neural correlates that were associated with these 
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simple effects: (i) 1PP: AR > NAR and (ii) 1PP: LH vs. RH. To ensure that the observed 
effects were specific to the 1PP and were not observed for 3PP stimuli, we used the 
corresponding interaction contrast as an inclusive mask at p < .05 (uncorrected): (i) 1PP: AR 
> NAR & 3PP: NAR > AR [i.e., (1PP_AR - 1PP_NAR) - (3PP_AR - 3PP_NAR )] and (ii) 
1PP: LH > RH & 3PP: RH > LH, and vice versa, respectively. We used a similar approach to 
test for the neural correlates of objects correctly co-located for actions that were grasped by 
congruently aligned hands (active object in the dominant hand). We had a priori hypotheses 
regarding the expected sources of the interaction, and hence used simple effects to test these 
hypotheses; interaction as a mask was used to restrict the search space. For descriptive 
purpose of the main clusters of interests only, we extracted the parameter estimates (betas) 
from a 6-mm sphere around the cluster’s peak and plotted these results in charts. 
For all analyses, we used a family-wise error (FWE)-corrected threshold of .05 at 
peak/cluster-level. Using the FSL default, the voxel threshold was set to (T(10) > 2.37, p < 
0.01). All results are reported in the MNI coordinate system. The anatomical labelling was 
done with the Anatomical Automatic Labeling toolbox (Tzourio-Mazoyer et al., 2002) and the 
Human Brain Atlas (Duvernoy, 1991). The approximately corresponding Brodmann’s areas 
were determined using MRIcron software (http://www.sph.sc.edu/comd/rorden/mricron/).  
 
2.4 Results 
 
2.4.1 Behavioural results 
The overall accuracy during the one-back task was 68%. The performances were reliably 
above chance, t(10) = 3.32, p = .008. Although the accuracy is relatively low, it does match a 
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previous study with elderly participants (Laverick et al., 2015) using a one-back task 
performed on stimuli depicting hand-object interactions (mean = 75% ± 27% SD). We note, 
though, that in this study young and elderly participant’s performed similarly in terms of 
accuracy. It is difficult to explain why accuracy was relatively low. It may relate to the 
relative rarity of the catch trial targets, the relative high visual similarity of the stimuli (two 
hands holding two objects), or the age of the participants.  
We next tested whether accuracy was affected by the conditions. The accuracy data were 
entered into three-way within-participant design ANOVA with the factors being perspective 
(1PP, 3PP), action relation (AR, NAR), and hand alignment (RH, LH). There was only a 
borderline interaction between action relation and hand alignment, F(1,10) = 5.52, p = .046). 
Surprisingly, although not significant participants tended to be more accurate when the 
interacting pair was presented for a left-handed vs. a right-handed action (typically the 
incongruent hand position for right-handed participants), t(10) = 2.17, p = .055, while there 
was no effect of hand alignment for non-interacting pairs (p = .402). Overall, importantly the 
results indicate that the task was equally difficult across the different conditions. This ensured 
that any observed results cannot be driven by differences in completing the task per se. 
 
2.4.2 Imaging data 
First we report the neural correlates of the main effects of action relation, perspective, and 
hand alignment (Table 2.1, Figure 2.2 - 2.4). Then we present the neural correlates associated 
with these simple effects (e.g., the interaction between action relation and perspective; Table 
2.2 - 2.4, Figure 2.5 - 2.6). A schematic summary of the results is illustrated in Figure 2.7. 
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Table 2.1 Main effects of action relation, perspective and hand alignment 
 
            
Region BA Cluster size Peak-Z MNI Coordinates (mm) 
        x y z 
a) AR > NAR 
      IPL 40 1158*  4.78* -39 -40 55 
Precuneus 23  381* 3.86 6 -52 31 
STG extends to 21  474* 3.84 60 -28 1 
   MTG 
   
54 -64 13 
   FFG 
   
45 -46 -17 
       b) LH > RH 
      SmFG 6 1062* 4.87 6 14 67 
Hippocampus/PHG 30  391* 3.40 15 -25 -14 
       c) 1PP > 3PP 
      Postcentral gyrus 3  340* 4.06 -18 -34 49 
PCC 40  347* 3.78 21 -52 34 
Note. AR = action relation; NAR = no action relation; 1PP = first-person perspective; 3PP = 
third-person perspective; RH = right-handed action; LH = left-handed action; BA = 
Brodmann’s area; IPL = inferior parietal lobule; STG = superior temporal gyrus; MTG = 
middle temporal gyrus; FFG = fusiform gyrus; PCC = posterior cingulate cortex; SmFG = 
superior medial frontal gyrus; PHG = parahippocampal gyrus. 
* At peak/cluster-level p < .05 (FWE-corrected). 
 
2.4.2.1 Visual-based affordance cues 
The main effect of action relation (Table 2.1a, Figure 2.2). Increased neural activity for 
interacting relative to non-interacting objects was observed in left IPL (including the 
intraparietal sulcus, IPS, superior parietal lobule and the supramarginal gyrus, SMG). At a 
lower threshold, the right IPS (MNI: 33 -37 52; peak-Z = 4.04) showed a similar response 
pattern. Additional regions that were sensitive to the action relation were the right precuneus 
(extending to the cingulate cortex) and the right MTG/superior temporal gyrus (STG; 
extending into the FFG). We note that the precuneus was deactivated during the experimental 
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conditions. This is a common activation pattern for this region, showing decreased activation 
during cognitive demanding tasks relative to rest (for a review, see Cavanna & Trimble, 
2006). The reversed contrast did not show any above threshold responses. 
 
 
Figure 2.2. Activation foci for main effect of action relation (AR > NAR) were overlaid on a 
single-participant structural MNI-template (FWE-corrected p < .05; cluster defining threshold 
p < .01, uncorrected). The bar graph shows the averaged effect size extracted from a 6-mm 
sphere centred on the peak coordinate of inferior parietal lobule (IPL; circled in red), 
precuneus and superior temporal gyrus (STG)/middle temporal gyrus (MTG). Error bars show 
SEMs. Abbreviations: AR = action relation; NAR = no action relation; 1PP = first-person 
perspective; 3PP = third-person perspective; RH = right-handed action; LH = left-handed 
action. 
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2.4.2.2 Motor-based affordance cues 
The main effect of hand alignment (Table 2.1b, Figure 2.3). There was enhanced 
activation for object pairs depicting left-handed actions vs. right-handed actions in the 
bilateral SmFG (extending to the superior frontal gyrus, SFG) and the right hippocampus 
(extending to the parahippocampal gyrus, the lingual gyrus and the globus pallidus). We note 
that the activation pattern in the SmFG cluster was similar across both perspectives, but the 
effects were stronger for 1PP than 3PP stimuli (see below for the interaction results and Table 
2.2, Figure 2.5). There were no above threshold responses for the reversed comparison. 
 
 
Figure 2.3. Activation foci for the main effect of hand alignment (LH > RH) were overlaid on 
a single-participant structural MNI-template (FWE-corrected p < .05; cluster defining 
threshold p < .01, uncorrected). The bar graph shows the averaged effect size extracted from a 
6-mm sphere centred on the peak coordinate of superior medial frontal gyrus (SmFG; circled 
in red). Error bars show SEMs. Abbreviations: AR = action relation; NAR = no action 
relation; 1PP = first-person perspective; 3PP = third-person perspective; RH = right-handed 
action; LH = left-handed action. 
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2.4.2.3 Combined visual- and motor-based affordance cues 
The main effect of perspective (Table 2.1c, Figure 2.4). Viewing pairs of objects from a 
1PP vs. a 3PP resulted in activation in the left postcentral gyrus (extending to the middle 
cingulum) and the right posterior cingulate (extending to the IPS and precuneus). We note that 
these regions partly overlapped with the effects observed for objects correctly positioned for 
action (see above and Table 2.1a, Figure 2.2). There were no above threshold responses 
showing increased responses to 3PP vs. 1PP stimuli. 
 
 
Figure 2.4. Activation foci for the main effect of perspective (1PP > 3PP) were overlaid on a 
single-participant structural MNI-template (FWE-corrected p < .05; cluster defining threshold 
p < .01, uncorrected). The bar graph shows the averaged effect size extracted from a 6-mm 
sphere centred on the peak coordinate of postcentral gyrus (PoCG) and posterior cingulate 
cortex (PCC; circled in red). Error bars show SEMs. Abbreviations: AR = action relation; 
NAR = no action relation; 1PP = first-person perspective; 3PP = third-person perspective; RH 
= right-handed action; LH = left-handed action. 
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The interaction between action relation and perspective (Table 2.2, Figure 2.5). 
Increased responses for interacting vs. non-interacting objects presented from a 1PP were 
observed in the left SmFG (extending to the SFG and the MFG), the left frontopolar cortex 
(extending to the anterior cingulate), the bilateral MTG (extending to the STG, the angular 
gyrus and the SMG), and the left posterior cingulate/precuneus. Note that the cluster 
involving the precuneus observed here, overlapped with the cluster showing a main effect for 
action relation (see above and Table 2.1a, Figure 2.2), suggesting the effect of action relation 
in this cluster was enhanced by the 1PP. Similarly, the interaction effect in the right MTG 
overlapped partly with the main effect of action relation (see above and Table 2.1a, Figure 
2.2). Thus, the precuneus and the right MTG appear to process two different visual affordance 
cues driven by the orientation of the objects: spatial relation between objects (AR vs. NAR) 
and view point (1PP vs. 3PP). 
 
Table 2.2 Common activation clusters for interaction between action relation and perspective 
(inclusive masking; p < 0.05, uncorrected) 
       
Region BA Cluster size Peak-Z MNI Coordinates (mm) 
        x y z 
[1PP: AR > NAR] incl. mask [1PP: AR > NAR & 3PP: NAR > AR] 
  Frontal 
      SmFG 9  490* 3.56 -9  47  52 
Frontopolar cortex 10  382* 3.36 -9  59  16 
Temporal 
      MTG 21  740*  4.80* -60 -49  4 
MTG 22 115  4.68*  66 -37  4 
Parietal 
      Precuneus/PCC 23  943* 3.87  -6 -55  31 
Note. AR = action relation; NAR = no action relation; 1PP = first-person perspective; 3PP = 
third-person perspective; BA = Brodmann’s area; SmFG = superior medial frontal gyrus; 
MTG = middle temporal gyrus; PCC = posterior cingulate cortex. 
* At peak/cluster-level p < .05 (FWE-corrected). 
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Figure 2.5. Activations for the action relation and perspective interaction using inclusive 
masking (p < .05), were overlaid on a single-participant structural MNI-template. SPM was 
threshold at p < .05 FWE-corrected; cluster defining threshold p < .01, uncorrected. The bar 
graph shows the averaged effect size extracted from a 6-mm sphere centred on the peak 
coordinate (circled in red) of middle temporal gyrus (MTG) and precuneus. Error bars show 
SEMs. Abbreviations: AR = action relation; NAR = no action relation; 1PP = first-person 
perspective; 3PP = third-person perspective; RH = right-handed action; LH = left-handed 
action. 
 
The interaction between perspective and hand alignment (Table 2.3, Figure 2.6). 
Objects positioned for left-handed actions vs. right-handed actions presented from a 1PP 
activated the bilateral SmFG (extending to the postcentral gyrus), the left precentral sulcus 
and the left cerebellum (extending to the parahippocampal and the lingual gyrus). The 
interaction effect observed in the SmFG overlapped with the cluster showing a main effect of 
hand alignment (see above Table 2.1b, Figure 2.5), suggesting that the effect of hand 
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alignment observed was facilitated when objects were viewed from a 1PP. There were no 
above threshold responses for 1PP stimuli when the tool was gripped by the right hand (right-
handed action) vs. the left hand (left-handed action).  
 
Table 2.3 Common activation clusters for interaction between perspective and hand alignment 
(inclusive masking; p < 0.05, uncorrected) 
              
Region BA Cluster size Peak-Z MNI Coordinates 
        x y z 
[1PP: LH > RH] incl. mask [1PP: LH > RH & 3PP: RH > LH] 
  SmFG (extends to PreCS) 6  1693*  4.79*  3  17 64 
PreCS 43  869* 3.85 -57 -1 25 
Cerebellum    743* 4.16 -21 -70 -20 
Note. 1PP = first-person perspective; 3PP = third-person perspective; RH = right-handed 
action; LH = left-handed action; BA = Brodmann’s area; SmFG = superior medial frontal 
gyrus; PreCS = precentral sulcus. 
* At peak/cluster level p < .05 (FWE corrected). 
 
 
 
Figure 2.6. Activations for the perspective and hand alignment interaction using inclusive 
masking (p < .05) were overlaid on a single-participant structural MNI-template. SPM was 
threshold at p < .05 FWE-corrected; cluster defining threshold p < .01, uncorrected. The bar 
graph shows the averaged effect size extracted from a 6-mm sphere centred on the peak 
coordinate (circled in red) of superior medial frontal gyrus (SmFG). Error bars show SEMs. 
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Abbreviations: AR = action relation; NAR = no action relation; 1PP = first-person 
perspective; 3PP = third-person perspective; RH = right-handed action; LH = left-handed 
action. 
 
The interaction between action relation and hand alignment (Table 2.4). When objects 
were correctly co-located for action and oriented for left-handed actions (vs. right-handed 
actions), there was activation in the left putamen (extending to the globus pallidus). There 
were no above threshold responses for correctly co-located stimuli when the tool was aligned 
for right-handed actions compared to when the tool was aligned for left-handed actions. 
 
Table 2.4 Common activation clusters for interaction between action relation and hand grip 
(inclusive masking; p < 0.05, uncorrected) 
              
Region BA Cluster size Peak-Z MNI Coordinates 
        x y z 
[AR: LH > RH] incl. mask [AR: LH > RH & NAR: RH > LH] 
   Putamen 
 
121  4.72* -27 -7 13 
Note. AR = action relation; RH = right-handed action; LH = left-handed action; BA = 
Brodmann’s area. 
* At peak/cluster level p < .05 (FWE corrected). 
 
2.5 Discussion 
The present chapter investigated the neural correlates of visual- and motor-based 
affordance cues contributing to paired-object affordance. We manipulated action relations 
between objects (visual-based affordance cues), hand alignment (motor-based affordance 
cues), and perspective (visual- and motor-based affordance cues). Figure 2.7 presents a 
schematic summary of the results. Action relations, associated with visual-based affordance, 
affected primarily responses along the dorsal route from temporal to inferior parietal areas. 
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Responses to hand alignment, assumed to reflect motor-based affordance, influenced activity 
in SmFG. The perspective manipulation modulated responses to visual-based affordance cues 
in inferior parietal areas and changed responses to motor-based affordance cues in the SmFG. 
Thus the perspective manipulation should be viewed within the context of both visual- and 
motor-based affordance cues. Together, the results suggest that paired-object affordance is 
mediated through visual- and motor-based affordance cues. The former one was associated 
with activity in temporal-parietal regions and the latter one with frontal motor activity but the 
two networks also interacted.  
 
 
Figure 2.7. Schematic summary of the results. Abbreviations: AR = action relation; NAR = 
no action relation; 1PP = first-person perspective; 3PP = third-person perspective; RH = right-
handed action; LH = left-handed action. 
 
2.5.1 Neural correlates for visual-based affordance cues 
The data suggest that a network of regions along the dorsal visual pathway is sensitive to 
the way objects are positioned. Specifically, bilateral inferior parietal cortices, right superior-
middle temporal areas and precuneus showed stronger responses to correctly co-located 
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objects for action, with the effect in these regions being enhanced when the objects were 
viewed from a 1PP. The precuneus and the MTG were sensitive to both the perspective and 
action relation manipulation as well as to their interaction.  
The involvement of temporo-occipital regions in mapping action relations between objects 
as a function of their orientation and position is in agreement with the previous literature (Kim 
& Biederman, 2011; Kim et al., 2011; Roberts & Humphreys, 2010a). In line with Mizelle 
and Wheaton (2010b), we showed that viewing interacting objects activated not only temporal 
but also inferior parietal regions. The recruitment of parietal areas for correctly co-located (as 
opposed to incorrectly co-located) object for actions may seem contradictory to prior studies 
by Roberts and Humphreys (2010a) and Kim et al. (Kim & Biederman, 2011; Kim et al., 
2011) who found only occipito-temporal activation for interacting object pairs. However, our 
study differed from these previous studies in several crucial aspects. Firstly, these previous 
studies used drawings of objects and not realistic pictures as in the present study (see also, 
Mizelle & Wheaton, 2010b). Recent studies have shown that the naming of realistic pictures 
compared to line drawings recruits more reliably the IPS (Valyear, Cavina-Pratesi, Stiglick, & 
Culham, 2007) and participants are faster to name photographs of tools than line drawings of 
the same implement (Salmon, Matheson, & McMullen, 2014). Secondly, in the study of 
Roberts and Humphreys (2010a) participants had to make a motor response for every trial, 
while in the present study motor responses were only required on catch trials. Thus, it is 
possible that the motor response preparation for every trial masked the more subtle effect of 
visual-based affordance on motor-associated cortices in Roberts and Humphreys’ study. 
Finally, Mizelle and Wheaton (2010b) and we presented objects with a hand grip. There is 
compelling evidence that the presence of a hand affects responses in motor-associated areas, 
including the inferior parietal cortex associated with the processing of graspable objects (e.g., 
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Lewis, 2006; Creem-Regehr & Lee, 2005; Grezes & Decety, 2001; Chao & Martin, 2000) and 
when observing hand-object interactions (e.g., Grafton, 2009). The predominately left IPL 
activity in the present study is consistent with the unilateral activation in the left IPL observed 
by Rumiati et al. (2004) when participants had to pantomime unimanual actions to visually 
presented objects (e.g., bottle opener) while controlling for perceptual, lexical, semantic, and 
motor processes. The authors suggested that the left IPL is the anatomical correlate of linking 
the visual properties of an object and its perceived action potential (i.e., its affordance; see 
also, Maranesi et al., 2014). We assume that this linkage is enhanced when objects are 
grasped by a hand. Taken together, we speculate that the additional activation of the left 
parietal cortex depends upon both the format of the stimuli and the nature of the task. 
Specifically, we suggest that the involvement of the dorsal pathway in processing visual-
based affordance cues evoked by object pairs requires more realistic pictures of hand-object 
interactions. 
 
2.5.2 Neural correlates for motor-based affordance cues 
Responses of SmFG were affected by motor-based affordance cues (hand alignment), with 
these responses being magnified by 1PP stimuli. The SmFG (known as well as the 
supplementary motor area, SMA) has previously been reported during action observation, in 
particular when viewing graspable objects (for a recent meta-analysis, see Caspers et al., 
2010; Grezes & Decety, 2002). It is also assumed that the SmFG has an important role in 
inhibiting response execution to object affordance – actions triggered by the visual properties 
of objects (Nachev, Kennard, & Husain, 2008). Lesions to the SmFG have been associated 
with the alien limb syndrome, in which the hand executes unintended actions, typically 
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triggered by the environment (Della Sala, Marchetti, & Spinnler, 1991). Furthermore, patients 
with focal SmFG lesions showed deficits in automatic and unconscious inhibition of 
unwanted actions (Sumner et al., 2007). 
In line with a recent EEG study by Kelly et al. (2015), we observed increased motor cortex 
responses for misaligned compared with aligned object pairs with respect to the preferred 
hand of the participant, with the effects being stronger for 1PP stimuli. Note that the effects 
were not reversed for 3PP stimuli and they were also not lateralized. In the present study, we 
did not observe any increased responses for aligned relative to misaligned hand conditions. 
The present results appear to be conflicting to previous behavioural findings with 
neuropsychological patients (Humphreys et al., 2010a) and healthy participants (e.g., Yoon et 
al., 2012) showing improved perception when object pairs were aligned (vs. misaligned) with 
the preferred hand use. One potential way of resolving this apparent discrepancy is to consider 
the impact hand alignment manipulation has on action familiarity. Seeing actions performed 
with the preferred hands is more common, and thus more familiar than seeing actions 
performed with the non-preferred hands especially in the 1PP. There is increasing evidence 
that action representations are influenced by novelty and sensorimotor experience, with 
greater activation for unfamiliar than for familiar actions (e.g., Plata Bello, Modrono, 
Marcano, & Gonzalez-Mora, 2014; Liew, Sheng, Margetis, & Aziz-Zadeh, 2013; Cross, 
Stadler, Parkinson, Schutz-Bosbach, & Prinz, 2013; Cross et al., 2012; though the opposite 
has also been reported, e.g., Gardner, Goulden, & Cross, 2015; Ruther, Tettamanti, Cappa, & 
Bellebaum, 2014; Calvo-Merino, Grezes, Glaser, Passingham, & Haggard, 2006; Calvo-
Merino, Glaser, Grezes, Passingham, & Haggard, 2005). It has also been shown that the less 
‘automated’ an action is (e.g., using the left hand), the more widespread activities in motor-
related areas can be observed (e.g., Schluter, Krams, Rushworth, & Passingham, 2001; 
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Jenkins, Brooks, Nixon, Frackowiak, & Passingham, 1994). This effect was specifically 
observed in the SmFG, where unfamiliar but plausible functional object pairs elicited more 
responses than familiar and common action pairs (Hoeren et al., 2013).  
In sum, we suggest that the SmFG may be involved more in inhibiting potential plausible 
actions that are less common. The same object pair is likely to evoke competing motor 
responses based on past experience and/or stored knowledge, with the less likely motor 
response being stronger inhibited. This may be part of the mechanisms that ensure that only 
plausible and intended actions are carried out, assuming that common and familiar actions are 
more likely to be intended. The results indicate that the behavioural effects of hand alignment 
might have arisen from an increase in motor inhibition triggered by the SmFG, leading to 
performance costs for aligned object pairs and performance benefits for misaligned objects. 
Clearly, further research is needed to clarify the role of SmFG and response inhibition in 
response to motor-based affordance cues. 
 
2.5.3 Effects of visual perspective – combined visual- and motor-based affordance cues 
We observed stronger response for 1PP versus 3PP in sensory-motor and posterior 
occipital-parietal cortices. The increased postcentral gyrus activity for 1PP stimuli is in line 
with previous neuroimaging (e.g., Hetu et al., 2011; Hesse et al., 2009; Jackson et al., 2006; 
Ruby & Decety, 2001) and TMS studies (3PP; Alaerts et al., 2009; Maeda et al., 2002). 
Jackson et al. (2006), for example, showed stronger involvement of sensory-motor cortices 
when the actor’s perspective was congruent with the observer’s own perspective. The 1PP 
advantage may arise because the observed action can be directly mapped onto the observer’s 
own sensory-motor representations. In contrast, viewing actions from a 3PP may require 
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spatial transformation to map the corresponding motor representations, and thus leading to 
weak or delayed representations (Jackson et al., 2006). Thus, the observed activity in the 
postcentral gyrus for 1PP stimuli reflects the congruence between the observed action and the 
participant which seems to be independent from low-level visual features differences (i.e., the 
amount of body parts depicted in each stimulus) between 1PP and 3PP stimuli. Though, it is 
plausible that low level differences between 1PP and 3PP conditions contributed to this effect. 
As discussed above, perspective also modulated effects of action relations in the MTG and 
precuneus and hand alignment in the SmFG. In both cases differential affordance effects were 
enhanced when objects were viewed from 1PP. 
The observed results mirror previous behavioural findings with neuropsychological 
patients and healthy participants showing improved perception for correctly co-located 
objects for action (Yoon et al., 2010; Humphreys et al., 2010a; Riddoch et al., 2003), with the 
effect being enhanced when the objects were viewed from a 1PP (Humphreys et al., 2010a). 
This suggests that the perceptual advantages driven by visual-based affordance cues are 
mediated by regions along the dorsal pathway, with the precuneus and the MTG playing a key 
role in processing position and perspective affordance cues. 
In the present study, we presented pairs of objects that afford an action without showing 
the actual action being executed. It is tempting to speculate how our present results relate to 
the AON (Grafton, 2009) and the mirror neuron system (MNS; Rizzolatti & Fogassi, 2014). 
An important theoretical and empirical difference between the two research fields is that 
object affordance research is concerned with the potential of actions initiated by the static 
environment specifically the shape and size of an object, while the AON and the MNS are 
associated with observing another person performing a dynamic action. Even though the task 
of the present study did not directly or explicitly require processing of the goal or the 
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intention of the observed actions, implicit processing might have occurred. It is likely that an 
action goal was easier to perceive when objects were correctly positioned for action (‘goal-
directed actions’) compared to when they were incorrectly positioned for action (‘non-goal-
directed actions’). Thus, brain regions associated with goal understanding could have been 
also automatically activated when viewing static pictures of pairs of objects. In line with this 
assumption are the activations observed in the right MTG and the left IPL for action-oriented 
objects. These regions have been previously associated with understanding the intention of an 
observed action (e.g., De Lange, Spronk, Willems, Toni, & Bekkering, 2008) and the goal of 
an action (e.g., Hamilton & Grafton, 2006), respectively. However, in contrast to the AON 
and the MNS, viewing of paired objects did not activate inferior frontal and pre-motor 
cortices which are associated with the direct matching between action observation and action 
execution (the mirroring mechanism; Rizzolatti, Fogassi, & Gallese, 2001). Taken together, 
the present results indicate that affordance and action understanding have distinct and shared 
neural representations. Further studies are needed to provide further insights into the relation 
between affordance and action understanding. 
 
2.6 Study limitations 
In our stimuli an object was always depicted along with a hand. This may have led to 
overlapping visual-and motor-based affordance responses, and thus a strict dissociation 
between visual-and motor-based affordance cues with the present stimuli set is not possible. 
However, we suggest that the use of the term visual-based affordance cue is appropriate 
during the object’s orientation and position manipulation, as the observed effects are primarily 
driven by the perceptual properties of the objects; neural responses were found in regions 
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along the dorsal pathway. In contrast, the presence of a hand evoked responses in motor-
associated areas, suggesting that hand alignment primarily reflects a motor-based affordance 
cue. Taken together, the data indicate that paired-object affordance is driven by a combined 
and interactive effect of visual- and motor-based affordance cues, resulting in the recruitment 
of different but interacting neural networks. 
The study had a relatively small sample size (11 participants). To increase statistical 
power, we used a within-subject block design associated with a high signal-to-noise ratio 
(Friston, Zarahn, Josephs, Henson, & Dale, 1999). Furthermore, to assess the strength of the 
evidence for the observed results, we computed a Bayes factor for each of the reported effect. 
The Bayes factor is based on the mean and variability of the measure. Using the response of 
the 6-mm sphere around the reported cluster’s peak, we found that for all reported peaks the 
Bayes factor was higher than 1.26. This means that the peak height provides weak to 
moderate evidence for the observed effect size. We note, though, that our main reliability 
assessment relied on thresholding the data at the cluster-level. However, since cluster-level 
reliability is not based on variability between participants, we could not use this measure in 
assessing the strength of the evidence or the study power. Taken together, although we only 
report data that survived FWE-correction, suggesting that the findings do not support a null 
hypothesis (no difference between conditions), we still need to exert caution when 
considering the size of the above reported effects (i.e., peak height) as these may be 
overestimated.  
 
 53 
 
2.7 Conclusion 
The present chapter demonstrate that both visual- and motor-based affordance cues 
contribute to paired-object affordance. Visual-based affordance cues (manipulated by 
changing the orientation and position of objects) were processed in left inferior parietal 
regions, while motor-based affordance cues (based on hand alignment) led to increased 
activity in the SmFG. The perspective manipulation increased responses to both visual- and 
motor-based affordance cues. The results suggest that paired-object affordance is mediated by 
different but interacting neural networks.  
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CHAPTER 3:  PAIRED-OBJECT AFFORDANCE AFFECTS MOTOR CORTEX 
EXCITABILITY
1
 
 
3.1 Abstract 
The previous chapter revealed that paired-object affordance is mediated by different but 
interacting bilateral parieto-frontal networks. The present chapter further explored the role of 
M1 in paired-object affordance. More specifically, it was investigated whether left and right 
M1 excitability is modulated by the position of functional object pairs using TMS-induced 
MEPs. Right-handed participants observed object pairs in three hand contexts: no hand, held 
with a neutral or with a tilted-interactive hand posture. The hand posture implied action 
relation when the hands were facing each other but not when the hands were facing away. The 
objects were aligned for right- or left-hand actions. Reliable effects were only observed in the 
non-dominant (right) hemisphere. MEPs were greater for action-oriented objects aligned for 
non-dominant (left) vs. right-hand actions. For non-action oriented objects, an effect of hand 
posture was observed, with lower MEPs for left-hand actions when the hand posture was 
tilted compared to when it was neutral. The results indicate that the excitation of the non-
dominant (right) M1 was influenced by action relation, hand alignment and hand posture, 
with stronger responses when the tool was gripped by the non-dominant hand and when the 
objects were action-oriented. The data suggest that M1 excitability is modulated by cognitive 
processes supporting paired-objects affordance.  
                                                 
 
1
 Chapter 3 is an adapted version of Wulff, M., Galea, J. & Rotshtein, P. (submitted). Paired-object affordance 
affects motor cortex excitability. Cerebral cortex. 
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3.2 Introduction 
Everyday activities such as making a cup of tea typically involve interacting with objects, 
linking perceptual and motor systems. There is accumulating evidence that objects engaged in 
a functional relation (e.g., knife and fork) facilitate attention and perception (McNair & 
Harris, 2014; Wulff & Humphreys, 2013; Borghi et al., 2012; Roberts & Humphreys, 2011a; 
Yoon et al., 2010; Humphreys et al., 2010a; Adamo & Ferber, 2009; Green & Hummel, 2006; 
Riddoch et al., 2003). However, less is known about the modulation of the motor system 
when seeing interacting object pairs. Within an object pair, the affordance “values” are often 
asymmetric, with the tool (the active object) typically acting upon the other (passive) object to 
produce the action (cf. Riddoch et al., 2003). Hence it is plausible that interacting object pairs 
compared to non-interacting object pairs are potentially associated with a stronger 
involvement of the motor cortex. Here we asked whether the excitability of M1 is modulated 
by hand-object interactions in the context of functional object pairs. More specifically, the 
present chapter investigated the extensions of context and hand cues to the concept of 
affordance as well as the interaction between them on the excitability of the motor system. 
Previous research has shown that the observation of others performing or interacting with 
an object compared to the single object observation excites the motor cortex (for a recent 
review, see Naish, Houston-Price, Bremner, & Holmes, 2014; see also, Natraj et al., 2013; 
Kumar et al., 2012; Meister, Wu, Deblieck, & Iacoboni, 2012; Perry & Bentin, 2009; Prabhu 
et al., 2007; Rizzolatti et al., 1996; Fadiga, Fogassi, Pavesi, & Rizzolatti, 1995). Motor 
resonance is evident when the same muscles in the observer are excited as those involved 
when executing the same action (e.g., Leonard & Tremblay, 2007; Montagna, Cerri, Borroni, 
& Baldissera, 2005; Maeda et al., 2002; Aziz-Zadeh, Maeda, Zaidel, Mazziotta, & Iacoboni, 
2002; Fadiga et al., 1995). This implies a direct matching between observation and execution 
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(Gallese et al., 1996). There is also some evidence for a hemispheric asymmetry in motor 
control, with the right (non-dominant) pre-motor cortex being more strongly activated during 
the observation of bi- compared to unimanual actions (Heitger, Mace, Jastorff, Swinnen, & 
Orban, 2012; see also, van den Berg, Swinnen, & Wenderoth, 2010), while no strong 
lateralisation has been also reported (Aziz-Zadeh, Koski, Zaidel, Mazziotta, & Iacoboni, 
2006). Of particular relevance to the present study are the effects of grip congruency and 
object affordance cues (e.g., orientation, size) on motor resonance. Mounting evidence 
suggests that the motor cortex is sensitive to grip congruency, i.e., the familiarity/correctness 
by which a hand interacts with an object (e.g., Kumar et al., 2013; Kumar et al., 2012; Cesari, 
Pizzolato, & Fiorio, 2011; Grezes et al., 2003; Binkofski et al., 1999). It has been shown that 
viewing appropriately compared to inappropriately gripped objects modulated EEG activity 
over the central sulcus (Kumar et al., 2012; Petit et al., 2006) as well as increased mu de-
synchronisation in pre-motor and motor cortices (Kumar et al., 2013). Neuroimaging and 
lesion analysis have also demonstrated the involvement of the pre-motor cortices in 
processing grip congruency (Wulff et al., 2015; Yoon et al., 2012). At a behavioural level, 
studies have reported better performance at making action decisions for appropriately 
compared to inappropriately gripped objects (Wulff et al., 2015; Laverick et al., 2015; Borghi 
et al., 2012; Yoon & Humphreys, 2005).  
Object affordance cues, in the absence of a hand, also affect motor resonance. Buccino 
Sato, Cattaneo, Roda, and Riggio (2009) reported left M1 excitability for right hand but not 
left hand oriented objects, with the effect diminished when the affordance of the object was 
violated by presenting the object with a broken handle (for EEG evidence, see Drew, Quandt, 
& Marshall, 2015; Goslin et al., 2012; though see, Lien, Jardin, & Proctor, 2013; 
Cardellicchio, Sinigaglia, & Costantini, 2011, for failed replications of hand alignment 
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effects). Behaviourally, performance was facilitated when the object location matched the 
response hand (Vankov & Kokinov, 2013) or the preferred hand of the participant when 
performing an action (Yoon et al., 2010; Humphreys et al., 2010a). Taken together, these 
results suggest a strong link between the action-related properties of an object and the 
corresponding motor response (cf. Gibson, 1979).  
Note that the effects of grip and alignment as reported above were investigated using single 
objects rather than multiple objects. However, in everyday life we are surrounded by multiple 
objects which can form functional relations with each other (e.g., hammer-nail). A few 
behavioural studies have examined the combined effects of functional relations between 
objects and hand alignment on attention (Wulff & Humphreys, 2015, 2013; Yoon et al., 2010; 
Humphreys et al., 2010a). For example, patients with right fronto-parietal lesions and visual 
extinction were better at detecting objects positioned for action when the objects were viewed 
from a 1PP and when they were aligned with their preferred hands (Humphreys et al., 2010a). 
Wulff, Humphreys, and Rothstein (2014) recently tested the neural correlates underlying 
paired-object affordance in healthy participants using the same stimulus set as in Humphreys 
et al.’s study (2010a). The authors showed that the activity of the left pre-motor and primary 
motor cortex for object pairs positioned for action and viewed from a 1PP was sensitive to the 
alignment of the objects with the observer’s effectors.  
The present study was designed to further investigate the involvement of motor cortex, and 
specifically motor resonance when viewing functional object pairs in different action 
contexts. To do so, TMS was applied over left or right M1 and MEPs from the first dorsalis 
interosseous (FDI) and the abductor digiti minini (ADM) of right-handed participants were 
recorded while they observed functional object pairs. Motor resonance was assessed by 
presenting the objects aligned for left- or right-hand actions (i.e., the tool was gripped with the 
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right or left hand, respectively). We also included three grip manipulations: (i) not grasped by 
hands, (ii) held with a neutral or (iii) a tilted-interactive hand posture. This was done to 
increase the “potential for action” in the viewed pairs. We assumed that tilted-interactive grips 
would elicit a stronger potential for action than neutral grips, whereas the neutral grip 
condition would evoke a higher potential for action than the no grip condition. Furthermore, 
we expected different FDI and ADM muscle activity when participants viewed tilted-
interactive and neutral hand postures, with higher FDI muscle activation for tilted-interactive 
postures due to increased force requirements of the FDI while FDI and ADM should be 
equally involved when viewing neutral hand postures (for a recent review of muscle 
specificity, see Naish et al., 2014). We also manipulated the hand-object posture for gripped 
objects to imply an action relation between objects or not. A mutual action (e.g., hammering) 
was afforded when the hands were facing towards each other (referred to as action relation), 
while no mutual action was implied when the hands were facing away from each other 
(referred to as non-action relation). In line with the motor resonance idea, we anticipated that 
the lateralised M1 responses would reflect the hand that grasps the active object in the pair 
(e.g., stronger excitability in right M1 for left gripped tools). The effect is assumed to be 
enhanced for action-oriented objects and for tilted-interactive hand postures (stronger 
affordance cues).  
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3.3 Method 
 
3.3.1 Participants 
Eighteen right-handed participants (13 females; mean age = 20.4, SD = 3.0) from the 
University of Birmingham took part in the study. Handedness was assessed using the 
Edinburgh Handedness Inventory (Oldfield, 1971); the Mean Laterality Index (LI) was 89.0 
(SD = 17.1). Participants received cash or course credits for their participation. All 
participants reported normal or corrected-to-normal vision. None of the participants reported 
any neurological or psychiatric impairment, nor did they have any contraindication to TMS 
(Rossi, Hallett, Rossini, & Pascual-Leone, 2009; Wassermann, 1998). Informed consent was 
obtained from all participants and the study was approved by the local Ethical Review 
Committee.  
 
3.3.2 TMS and MEP recording 
Participants wore a cap and sat relaxed in front of a computer screen with the arms and 
hands rested on a table. TMS pulses were delivered using a 70-mm diameter figure-of-eight 
coil (Magstim Rapid, Whitland, UK). The coil was placed tangentially to the scalp with the 
handle pointing backward at a 45° angle with respect to the anterior-posterior axis. For each 
participant, the motor “hot spot” for the FDI in both motor cortices was determined by 
roughly 20 single pulses of TMS delivered at a supra-threshold stimulus intensity. After that, 
the resting motor threshold for the FDI muscle, defined as the minimum TMS intensity that 
evokes a MEP of greater than 50 µV in at least 5 out of 10 consecutive trials, was determined 
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(Rossini et al., 1994). This spot was marked on the cap to ensure a consistent coil position 
throughout the experiment; the coil was held in place manually by the experimenter (MW). 
The intensity of the TMS was then adjusted to evoke consistently an MEP of approximately 1 
mV in the first session. This intensity was used for both the right and left M1 stimulation 
session.  
We note that the intensity of the TMS needed to evoke a 1 mV MEP is typically weaker for 
the dominant (left) relative to the non-dominant (right) hemisphere (e.g., Hammond, 2002; 
Macdonell et al., 1991). The reason for keeping the TMS intensity (rather than the MEP 
amplitude) constant across motor cortices was to ensure that the stimulated hemisphere would 
not be confounded by the intensity of the stimulation within a participant (cf. Maeda, Keenan, 
Tormos, Topka, & Pascual-Leone, 2000). Furthermore, it also allowed us to explore the 
differences in stimulation intensities within each hemisphere. To ensure session order did not 
act as a confound, session order was included as a covariate in all analyses (see below).  
Within the first session of the present study, when TMS was applied to the left (dominant) 
hemisphere, the required intensity to elicit a MEP was marginal lower than when TMS was 
applied to the right (non-dominant) hemisphere in the first session, t(8) = -2.25, p = .055. The 
stimulation intensity across participants ranged between 54% and 78% of the maximum 
stimulator output for the left M1 (mean 65%: SD = 8.26) and between 60% and 82% (mean 
68%: SD = 7.53) for the right M1.  
MEPs were recorded simultaneously from the FDI and the ADM muscles of the 
contralateral hand with disposable self-adhesive surface electrodes (Henleys Medical Supplies 
Ltd.). The active electrodes were placed over the muscle belly of both FDI and ADM muscles 
and the reference electrodes over the tendon of both muscles. The electromyographic (EMG) 
data were recorded approximately 500 ms before and after the TMS pulse to control for pre-
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activation and background activity. MEPs were amplified (1000x) and filtered (20-1000 Hz) 
using 1902 quad system amplifier (CED 1902, Cambridge Electronic Design, Cambridge, 
UK), sampled (5 kHz; CED 1401), and then recorded by a computer using Signal software 
(Version 4.08; Cambridge Electronic Devices, Cambridge, UK) and stored for off-line 
analysis.  
 
3.3.3 Apparatus and stimuli 
Thirty coloured pictures of common household objects were used (Table 3.1). Each object 
was photographed from a 1PP using three grip conditions: (i) no hand grip, (ii) a neutral hand 
posture (the gripped object faced away from the observer) and (iii) a tilted hand posture (the 
gripped object faced towards a possible recipient; see Figure 3.1). Note that in both grip 
conditions the objects were grasped appropriately for object use. In the no hand grip 
condition, we presented the objects alone in a neutral position (the objects did not afford a 
particular hand grip). The no hand grip condition was identical to the neutral hand posture 
condition with the exception that no hand was present; the no grip and the neutral posture 
condition were analysed separately to assess the effect of hand presence on motor excitability. 
All images were horizontally flipped in Microsoft Office Picture Manager (Version 12) to 
create the mirror image of each item.  
The individual gripped objects were combined into 15 functional pairs (Table 3.1, Figure 
3.1) positioned for (i) a right-hand action (active object on the right side, passive object on the 
left side) and (ii) a left-hand action (active object on the left side, passive object on the right 
side). These two conditions were depicted with the objects either implying a mutual action or 
not, resulting in ten conditions [Action relation (oriented for action, not oriented for action) x 
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Posture (neutral, tilted) x Alignment (positioned for a right-hand or for a left-hand action)]. 
Note the factor action relation was only manipulated when a hand was present (see Figure 
3.1.). In the no hand condition, we presented the objects aligned for right- or left-hand actions 
but in both cases the objects were oriented for action. The two items were presented 
simultaneously, one on the right and one on the left side of fixation. 
E-prime software was used for stimulus presentation and the timing of the TMS (Version 
2.0; Psychology Software Tools, 2006). The stimuli were presented on an 18-inch monitor 
(spatial resolution of 1024 x 768 pixels, frame refresh rate 60 Hz). The stimuli subtended 
10.29° x 8.56° of visual angle and were located 0.86° either to the left or right side of central 
fixation.  
 
Table 3.1 Object pairs used in the study 
   
Active  Passive Action familiarity rating (SD) 
Peeler Potato 2.06 (1.11) 
Bottle opener Bottle 2.50 (1.04) 
Paint brush Paint pot 3.00 (1.28) 
Whisk Bowl 3.39 (1.29) 
Knife Fork 3.44 (1.29) 
Scourer Washing up liquid 3.72 (0.96) 
Tin opener Tin 3.78 (1.17) 
Teapot Cup 3.94 (1.21) 
Screw driver Screw 4.00 (1.24) 
Tea spoon Coffee jar 4.17 (0.92) 
Scissors Paper 4.17 (1.15) 
Spatula Frying pan 4.17 (1.20) 
Trowel Plant pot 4.22 (1.06) 
Corkscrew Wine 4.28 (1.07) 
Scoop Ice cream 4.78 (0.55) 
Note. Standard deviation in brackets. 
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Figure 3.1. Example of experimental stimuli. Stimuli were presented with (a) no hand grip 
and with a hand grip (b and c). The gripped objects were (b) positioned for action and (c) not 
positioned for action. The hand grip posture was neutral or tilted. All pairs of objects were 
oriented either for right-hand actions with the tool (the bottle opener) on the right side (right 
panel) or for left-hand actions with the tool on the left side (left panel).  
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3.3.4 Design and procedure 
Each participant took part in two sessions (TMS to left M1, TMS to right M1) on different 
days. The order of sessions was counterbalanced across participants; the order of sessions was 
included as covariate to ensure that differences in the session order would not affect our 
results. The experimental design consisted of three factors: Action relation (oriented for 
action, not oriented for action), Grip (no grip, neutral grip, tilted grip) and Alignment 
(positioned for right-hand action, positioned for left-hand action). In each session, participants 
completed 600 trials, 60 trials for each condition, lasting approximately 45 min. The 
conditions were pseudo-randomised. Each object pair was repeated four times in each 
condition. In addition, there were 48 catch trials in which participants performed an object 
detection task. Participants were instructed to press a button with the index finger 
contralateral to the stimulated hemisphere whenever they saw a picture of a toothpaste tube or 
a plug. This task was chosen to ensure that participants paid attention to the visual stimuli 
throughout the experiment; catch trials were not included in the analysis. Importantly, the 
trials of interest did not require a response, hence, any MEP responses cannot be attributed to 
hand movements.  
Each trial began with a white central fixation presented on a black background for 
3000 ms, followed by an object pair for 1000 ms. On every trial, a single TMS pulse was 
applied to the participants’ primary left or right M1; the pulse was applied simultaneously 
with the offset of the object pair. MEPs were recorded simultaneously from the FDI and the 
ADM muscle of the contralateral hand. There was a break after every 20 trials to minimise 
fatigue and TMS exposure. Throughout the experiment, participants were instructed to keep 
both hands still and relaxed. Muscle relaxation was monitored by visual feedback of the EMG 
signal. 
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To ensure that the object pairs were highly familiar to participants’, each participant was 
asked to evaluate each object pair for action familiarity (‘How likely are these objects used 
together? 1-5, 1= highly unlikely, 5=highly likely’) after the second session. Furthermore, 
participants indicated for each pair the functional role of each object within a pair (‘The active 
object is the one that must be moved in order to perform the action (e.g., paintbrush), whereas 
the passive object must be held still (e.g., paint pot).’). If there was no agreement between the 
pre-defined functional role (active vs. passive) of each object within a pair and the individual 
participant’s classification, we relabelled the functional role of objects accordingly. This was 
done to exclude possible confounding effects of culture on object use (e.g., the functional role 
of knife and fork is different in Europe and America). The ratings for action familiarity and 
object classification are presented in Table 3.1.  
 
3.3.5 Data analysis 
The MEP data were analysed off-line using a custom Matlab script (MathWorks) and IBM 
SPSS Statistics 21 (SPSS Inc., Chicago, IL). Trial-by-trial background EMG activity was 
calculated by averaging rectified EMG activity across 150 ms prior to the TMS pulse for both 
the FDI and ADM muscles. Any trial which exceeded 0.01 mV was removed. In addition, any 
trial which involved an MEP lower than 0.05 mV for either the FDI or ADM muscle was 
removed. In total, less than 7% of trials were removed. For each condition, the peak-to-peak 
amplitude was measured and averaged. The mean MEP data were examined with repeated-
measures ANOVAs. Interaction effects were evaluated with paired t-tests (p ≤ .05). 
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3.4 Results 
Behavioural data revealed that the overall accuracy during the object detection task was 
94% (SD = 7.33). The number of false alarms was low (1.37%); these trials were excluded 
from the MEP analysis. 
First, we assessed whether the presence of a hand modulated M1 excitability. Next, we 
investigated the effects of action relation, hand alignment, and alignment on M1 excitability. 
Finally, we also assessed whether there was a difference in FDI and ADM muscle activation 
across the different conditions. 
 
3.4.1 Effects of hand presence 
To examine the effect of hand presence on M1 excitability, MEPs for action-oriented trials 
with no hand grip were compared with action-oriented trials with a neutral hand grip. We also 
tested whether there was an interaction between hand presence and muscle involvement. 
Contrary to our hypothesis, the presence of a hand did not modulate M1 excitability and did 
not differently activated FDI and ADM muscles.  
The differences between no hand grip and neutral hand grip were examined with a 2 x 2 x 
2 x 2 (M1 [left, right] x Muscle [FDI, ADM] x Grip [no hand, neutral grip] x Alignment 
[positioned for right-hand action, positioned for left-hand action]) ANOVA with session order 
as between-subject covariate. The mean MEPs are presented in Table 3.2. The main effect of 
session order did not reach significance (p = .793). There was only a reliable four-way 
interaction between M1, muscle, alignment and session order, F(1,16) = 4.89, p = .042, ɳp
2
 = 
.234. This four-way interaction was decomposed by analysing the data separately for the left 
and right M1. For the left M1, there were no reliable main effects or interactions.  
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For the right M1, there were reliable interactions between muscle and alignment, F(1,16) = 
6.28, p = .023, ɳp
2
 = .282, and between muscle, alignment and session order, F(1,16) = 7.80, p 
= .013, ɳp
2
 = .328. The latter interaction was decomposed and revealed a trend towards 
significance for a main effect of muscle (FDI > ADM) when the right M1 was stimulated 
first, F(1,8) = 4.80, p = .060, ɳp
2
 = .375, but not when the left M1 was stimulated first (p = 
.382).  
 
Table 3.2 Mean motor evoked potentials (MEPs) for the effect of hand presence as function of 
whether the right or the left motor cortex was stimulated first 
 
              
   
Session order 1 
 
Session order 2 
Muscle Grip Alignment 
Right motor 
cortex 
(Session 1) 
Left motor 
cortex 
(Session 2) 
  
Right motor 
cortex 
(Session 2) 
Left motor 
cortex 
(Session 1) 
FDI 
No hand 
Right-hand action 0.50 (0.22) 0.46 (0.30) 
 
0.54 (0.44) 0.58 (0.32) 
Left-hand action 0.52 (0.30) 0.45 (0.32) 
 
0.47 (0.36) 0.56 (0.35) 
Neutral grip 
Right-hand action 0.52 (0.26) 0.40 (0.25) 
 
0.52 (0.40) 0.56 (0.34) 
Left-hand action 0.51 (0.27) 0.45 (0.32) 
 
0.53 (0.43) 0.59 (0.37) 
ADM 
No hand 
Right-hand action 0.55 (0.80) 0.38 (0.32) 
 
0.38 (0.31) 0.31 (0.17) 
Left-hand action 0.58 (0.77) 0.34 (0.31) 
 
0.32 (0.25) 0.30 (0.22) 
Neutral grip 
Right-hand action 0.55 (0.80) 0.35 (0.30) 
 
0.35 (0.25) 0.32 (0.25) 
Left-hand action 0.57 (0.78) 0.36 (0.29) 
 
0.39 (0.33) 0.31 (0.17) 
Note. Standard deviation in brackets. 
 
3.4.2 Effects of action relation, hand posture and hand alignment 
We assessed the effects of action relation, hand posture, and hand alignment on M1 
excitability. We also examined whether there were muscle-specific activations. Overall, our 
experimental manipulations only affected right (non-dominant) M1 excitability. The mean 
MEPs for both motor cortices are presented in Figure 3.2. 
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The MEPs were entered into a 2 x 2 x 2 x 2 x 2 (M1 [left, right] x Muscle [FDI, ADM] x 
Action relation [oriented for action, not oriented for action] x Posture [neutral, tilted] x 
Alignment [positioned for right-hand action, positioned for left-hand action]) ANOVA with 
session order as between-subject covariate. There was no main effect of session order (p = 
.835). There were significant three-way interactions between M1, action relation and 
alignment, F(1,16) = 6.37, p = .023, ɳp
2
 = .285, and between M1, posture and alignment, 
F(1,16) = 4.97, p = .040, ɳp
2
 = .237. There was a trend towards significance for a four-way 
interaction between M1, action relation, posture, and alignment, F(1,16) = 3.95, p = .064, ɳp
2
 
= .198, and a five-way interaction between M1, muscle, action relation, posture, and 
alignment, F(1,16) = 3.05, p = .080, ɳp
2
 = .180. To better understand these interactions, we 
analysed the data separately for each M1. For the left M1, there were no reliable main effects 
or interactions (Figure 3.2b).  
For the right (non-dominant) M1 (Figure 3.2a), the interaction between action relation, 
posture and alignment, F(1,17) = 6.88, p = .018, ɳp
2
 = .288, was significant. For action-
oriented objects, there was a main effect of alignment, F(1,17) = 5.49, p = .032, ɳp
2
 = .244, 
with the MEP amplitude being larger when the tool was grasped by a left hand and presented 
on the left side which is associated with right M1 activation compared to right-hand actions. 
A reliable three-way interaction of muscle, action relation and alignment, F(1,17) = 8.46, p = 
.010, ɳp
2
 = .332, showed that the action relation and alignment interaction, F(1,17) = 3.71, p = 
.071, ɳp
2
 = .179, was observed only in the left FDI muscle. FDI MEPs were greater when the 
tool was on the left side and the object was on the right side compared to the opposite tool-
object arrangement, t(17) = 2.24, p = .039.  
For non-action-oriented trials, there was a reliable posture by alignment interaction, 
F(1,17) = 7.69, p = .013, ɳp
2 
= .311. We observed that when the tool was grasped by the right 
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hand (and presented on the left side), MEPs for the neutral posture condition were larger 
compared to the tilted posture condition, t(17) = 2.89, p = .010. No effects were found when 
the tool was gripped with the left hand, t(17) = -.63, p = .538. 
 
 
Figure 3.2. Mean peak-to-peak MEP amplitude for the right (a) and the left (b) motor cortices 
for all conditions. Error bars represent standard errors. Significant differences are indicated by 
asterisks (**p < .01, *p < .05). Abbreviations: AR = action relation; NAR = no action 
relation; FDI = first dorsalis interosseous; ADM = abductor digiti minini. 
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3.5 Discussion 
This is the first study investigating whether viewing functional object pairs in different 
action contexts modulated left and right M1 excitability. The main results can be summarised 
as follows: (1) When objects were positioned for action, an increase in left hand MEP 
amplitude was observed for object pairs aligned for non-dominant (left-hand) compared to 
dominant (right-hand) actions. When objects were not positioned for action, an effect of hand 
posture was observed. Here objects aligned for left-hand actions elicited a lower MEP 
response when the hand posture was tilted compared to when it was neutral; (2) The non-
dominant (right) M1 but not the dominant M1 was sensitive to our experimental 
manipulations; (3) In the presence of two objects positioned for actions, motor resonance 
reflected response to the active object rather than the passive object within the pair; (4) There 
was no difference in MEP amplitude between gripped objects and objects without a hand grip. 
(5) There was no evidence for muscle-specific activations when viewing different hand 
postures. The present results suggest that the right (non-dominant) M1 excitability reflects 
cognitive changes related to the perception and processing of paired-object affordance cues. 
 
3.5.1 Effects of action relation, hand posture, and hand alignment on MEP response 
We investigated whether the action context in which functional object pairs are presented 
affected M1 excitability. To do so, we presented pairs of objects oriented for action or not 
(hands facing each other or hands facing away), grasped with a neutral or a tilted-interactive 
hand posture (assuming that the latter enhances the perceived potential for action), and 
aligned either for left- or right-hand actions (tool grasped with the left vs. the right hand, 
respectively). When objects were positioned for actions, MEP amplitudes were higher when 
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the tool was grasped with the left hand compared to when it was grasped with the right hand, 
irrespective of whether the hand posture was neutral or tilted. Our data fit well with the 
cortical lateralisation of motor dominance: Each hemisphere is specialised for contralateral 
action observation (Kelly et al., 2015) and movement execution (Herve, Zago, Petit, Mazoyer, 
& Tzourio-Mazoyer, 2013) but see for evidence of bilateral activation (Aziz-Zadeh et al., 
2006). 
The results are also in agreement with studies showing contralateral object-hand alignment 
effects in M1 (e.g., Drew et al., 2015; Proverbio et al., 2013; Buccino et al., 2009). Going 
beyond previous studies, our data first showed that when more than one object is presented in 
a scene, motor resonance seems to reflect alignment with the active object (the tool) rather 
than the passive object within correctly positioned objects for action pairs, at least in the non-
dominant hemisphere. This is evident in the effect of hand alignment showing a shift from 
increased MEPs for left-hand than for right-hand actions when objects were action-related to 
increased MEP amplitude for right-handed tilted-interactive than for right-handed neutral 
hand postures when the objects were not action-related (in both cases the tool was always on 
the left side of fixation). In line with previous research, we can further confirm that the tool 
rather than its passive action recipient has a higher attentional weight within an object pair 
(for neuropsychological evidence, see Wulff et al., 2015; Wulff & Humphreys, 2015, 2013; 
Riddoch et al., 2003; for experimental evidence, see Xu et al., 2015; Laverick et al., 2015; 
McNair & Harris, 2014; Roberts & Humphreys, 2010b). Other experimental studies have also 
demonstrated that tools capture attention (e.g., Matheson et al., 2014; Handy et al., 2003). The 
present results indicate for the first time that motor excitability may depend upon contextual 
cues (presence of other objects) and does not seem simply derived from the affordance cues of 
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a single object. However, further studies should evaluate M1 excitability when viewing single 
objects compared to object pairs to clarify the role of contextual cues on M1 excitability.  
Viewing non-action-oriented objects differently affected motor resonance. In contrast to 
action-oriented object pairs, hand posture affected contralateral MEPs, with reduced MEP 
response for right-handed actions when the hand posture was tilted compared to when it was 
neutral. In other words, the tilted hand posture might have emphasised (or increased) the 
perception of the non-action relation potential of the object pair, and thus the contralateral 
response to the active object was stronger compared to when the hand posture was neutral. 
MEPs were enhanced when the tool appeared on the left (vs. the right) side, implying that 
similar to the action-oriented object pair condition, the location of the tool rather than of the 
passive object was important, but only when there was a clear violation of the perceived 
action potential (as in case of tilted-interactive hand postures). This result is counterintuitive 
as we did not anticipate enhanced responses to tools when the objects were presented in a way 
that least afforded a mutual action (in our case the neutral hand posture). We assumed that 
tilted-interactive rather than neutral hand postures would facilitate the perception of a more 
direct action relationship as this posture seemed better to convey an action goal. The present 
results instead suggest that tilted-interactive hand postures potentially have a lower affordance 
due to the conflict between the position of the hands and action recipient (or at least in the 
case of non-action-oriented objects). In other words, when objects are not oriented for action 
and when objects are held with a tilted-interactive posture, the hands and the gripped objects 
are facing away from each other to a greater degree compared to the neutral posture (Figure 
3.1), and this is more visually disruptive and less action potentiating. In contrast, neutral hand 
postures seem to have a higher affordance potential as the afforded bimanual action is easier 
to perceive. We suggest that the effect of hand posture in the non-action-oriented condition 
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reflects the potential for action, with the affordance effect being stronger when the tool is on 
the left side and grasped in a neutral way. Future work is needed to further explore how the 
location of the tool and how the tool is grasped modulates M1 excitability. For example, 
exploring M1 excitability while observing single objects and tools (e.g., right-hand vs. left-
hand grasp; neutral vs. tilted-interactive posture) will enable us to further disentangle the role 
of tools and objects within object pairs.  
Contrary to our hypothesis, we did not find any evidence for a muscle-specific modulation 
of M1 when viewing tilted-interactive and neutral hand postures (see also review by Naish et 
al., 2014). We assume that the non-specific muscle activation for different hand postures is 
related to the coil position which was optimised for FDI. However, we observed an effect of 
hand alignment for action-oriented objects in the FDI but not the ADM muscle. This indicates 
different contributions of each of these muscles for the different hand alignments displayed to 
the participants. Further research is needed to clarify the relation between muscle-specific 
activation and hand alignment. 
Overall, the present results are consistent with behavioural findings, showing improved 
performance for functional pairs oriented for action compared to when they are not oriented 
for action (e.g., McNair & Harris, 2014; Wulff & Humphreys, 2013; Humphreys et al., 2010a; 
Riddoch et al., 2003) as well as previous neuroimaging research demonstrating different pre-
motor and motor cortices activity for action-oriented and non-action-oriented object pairs 
(Wulff et al., 2014). In line with Bestmann and Krakauer (2015), we assume that the observed 
MEPs reflect action preparation processes in motor-related areas which feed into M1 (see 
also, Cisek & Kalaska, 2010; Aziz-Zadeh et al., 2002). Thus, we suggest that M1 represents 
cognitive changes based on the perception and processing of paired objects.  
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3.5.2 Differences between left and right M1 excitability 
To our surprise, we observed a different pattern of excitability for the left and the right M1. 
More specifically, our paradigm revealed that only the non-dominant (right) M1 was 
influenced by the experimental manipulations of action relation, hand alignment and hand 
grip. Based on this result, it is unlikely that the response hand (contralateral to TMS 
stimulation) interfered with motor preparation. If this would be the case, we would expect an 
effect of hand alignment (see above) in both motor cortices. This was not the case in the 
present study. 
It is possible that this hemispheric asymmetry was due to differences in processing uni- vs. 
bimanual actions; note that all our stimuli depicted bimanual actions. This is supported by 
recent research showing that the recruitment of the left or the right M1 depends upon the type 
of movement. For example, the observation of bi- in contrast to unimanual actions led to 
stronger non-dominant M1 activity (Heitger et al., 2012). Moreover, virtual lesions, elicited 
by TMS over the non-dominant pre-motor cortex, disrupted bi- but not unimanual movements 
(van den Berg et al., 2010).  
A second potential explanation for the observed motor excitability asymmetry is the motor 
familiarity with the observed hand-object interaction. Greater excitability of the non-dominant 
M1 compared to the dominant M1 has been previously reported using the TMS stimulus-
response curve technique (Daligadu, Murphy, Brown, Rae, & Yielder, 2013; Semmler & 
Nordstrom, 1998). The authors argued that this asymmetry may be related to differences in 
motor skills, and thus hand use. In everyday life, we commonly observe actions performed 
with the left and the right hand. However, we are less familiar with using the left hand when 
interacting with the active object within a pair (e.g., right-handers will typically hold the 
bottle in their right (but not left) hand when pouring). Similarly, Cross et al. (2012) showed 
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that unfamiliar (robot-like) compared to familiar (human-like) actions enhanced right pre-
motor cortex activity, though opposite results have been also reported (Plata Bello, Modrono, 
Marcano, & Gonzalez-Mora, 2013; Cross, Hamilton, Kraemer, Kelley, & Grafton, 2009). 
Other studies have shown that the less “automated” an action is (e.g., using the left hand), the 
more widespread motor-related activities were evident (e.g., Schluter et al., 2001; Jenkins et 
al., 1994). This effect was specifically observed in the SMA, where unfamiliar but plausible 
functional object pairs elicited more responses than familiar and common action pairs 
(Hoeren et al., 2013). It is interesting to note that behavioural studies typically report a 
performance benefit for objects aligned with the preferred hand compared to not aligned 
objects (e.g., Vankov & Kokinov, 2013; Yoon et al., 2010; Humphreys et al., 2010a), while 
neuroimaging evidence has revealed an inverse effectiveness pattern between motor response 
and the degree of action familiarity. Therefore, it is possible that the level of motor 
excitability reflects the degree of motor familiarity, with greater excitability for the non-
dominant hemisphere when the unfamiliar hand is used or observed.  
A third explanation is that the dominant (left) hemisphere in right-handed participants 
codes both ipsilateral and contralateral movements, while the non-dominant hemisphere is 
only activated by contralateral movements (e.g., Hlustik, Solodkin, Gullapalli, Noll, & Small, 
2002; Schluter et al., 2001; Kim et al., 1993). Recall that in all stimuli used the objects were 
gripped by both the right and the left hand. Accordingly, it could be that the dominant 
hemisphere is equally sensitive to active and passive hand grips (i.e., bimanual actions) 
regardless of familiarity. In line with this idea are the findings of greater hand representations 
(e.g., Volkmann, Schnitzler, Witte, & Freund, 1998; Wassermann, McShane, Hallett, & 
Cohen, 1992) and lower motor threshold (e.g., Macdonell et al., 1991) in the dominant M1 
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compared to the non-dominant M1. Moreover, it has been shown that the left M1 in right-
handers is larger than the right M1 (Amunts et al., 1996).  
We can exclude the possibility that the observed right M1 excitability was due to increased 
TMS intensity compared to the left M1 (stimulus intensity was only marginal higher for the 
right M1 compared to the left M1). However, as it can be seen in Figure 2, the MEPs for the 
right M1 were numerically smaller (M = 0.41) compared to the left M1 (M = 0.50). Thus, it 
could be that the smaller MEPs in the right M1 enabled us to observe differences between 
conditions. A future study should explore the effects of TMS stimulus intensities on left and 
right M1 excitability.  
 
3.5.3 Effects of hand presence on MEP response 
In contrast to previous studies, we did not find an effect of hand presence on M1 
excitability. Enhanced MEP response for grasping movements towards objects compared to 
objects presented in isolation has been previously demonstrated (e.g., Fadiga et al., 1995). The 
reason for this contrasting finding may be due to nature of the stimuli. We presented static 
pictures of objects with or without a hand grip, while participants observed dynamic grasping 
actions and static observation of objects alone in Fadiga et al.’s study (1995). It is also 
possible that our stimuli depicted with and without a hand grip had a similar level of 
affordance; the two conditions were identical with the exception that no or one hand was 
depicted. We suggest that objects with identical visual properties have the same action 
potential, and thus elicit a similar affordance response. This assumption is supported by 
Kumar et al. (2012) who also showed that there was no difference in EEG response between 
single objects alone or congruently gripped objects in frontal motor regions.  
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3.6  Conclusion 
This chapter aimed to further explore the role of M1 in paired-object affordance. We first 
demonstrated that motor excitability is influenced by contextual information (presence of 
other objects), with the perceived affordance modulating M1 excitability. More specifically, 
right (non-dominant) M1 excitability was sensitive to action relation, hand posture and hand 
alignment, with greater MEP responses when the tool was gripped by the non-dominant hand 
and when the objects were oriented for action. The data suggest that M1 likely reflects 
cognitive changes based on the perception of paired objects.  
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CHAPTER 4:  VISUAL RESPONSES TO ACTION BETWEEN UNFAMILIAR 
OBJECT PAIRS MODULATE EXTINCTION
1
 
 
4.1 Abstract 
The next two chapters are concerned with the effects of paired-object affordance on visual 
extinction by manipulating visual-based affordance cues (manipulating familiarity with the 
object pair; Chapter 4) and motor-based affordance cues (manipulating graspability of the 
stimuli; Chapter 5). In both chapters, object identification performance was used as an index 
of attentional allocation, and thus recovery from visual extinction. Previous studies show that 
positioning familiar pairs of objects for action ameliorates visual extinction in 
neuropsychological patients (Riddoch et al., 2003). This effect is stronger when objects are 
viewed from a 1PP and are placed in locations congruent with the patient’s premorbid 
handedness (Humphreys et al., 2010a), consistent with it being modulated by a motor 
response to the stimuli (see also Chapters 2 and 3). There is also some evidence that 
extinction can be reduced with unfamiliar object pairs positioned for action (Riddoch et al., 
2006), but the effects of reference frame and hand-object congruence have not been examined 
with such items. This was investigated in the present chapter. There was greater recovery 
from extinction when objects were action-related compared to when they were not, in line 
with previous studies. In addition, patients benefited more when they saw action-related pairs 
from a 3PP than a 1PP. Interestingly, on trials where extinction occurred, there was a bias 
reporting the active object on the extinguished side – a reversal of the standard pattern of 
                                                 
 
1
 Chapter 4 is an adapted version of Wulff, M. & Humphreys, G. W. (2013). Visual responses to action between 
unfamiliar object pairs modulate extinction. Neuropsychologia, 51, 622-632.  
 doi:10.1016/j.neuropsychologia.2013.01.004 
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extinction – but only when objects were seen from a 1PP. The data show that several factors 
contribute to the effects of action relations on attention, dependent upon the familiarity of the 
object pairs and the reference frame that stimuli have been seen in.  
 
4.2 Introduction 
Visual extinction, a neuropsychological disorder of spatial attention, can disrupt the ability 
of patients to report items in complex, multi-stimulus displays. Extinction is commonly found 
after damage to the (right) posterior parietal cortex and is characterised by the failure to detect 
a contralesional stimulus accompanied simultaneously by an ipsilesional stimulus (e.g., 
Chechlacz, Rotshtein, Demeyere, Bickerton, & Humphreys, 2014; Chechlacz et al., 2013; 
Driver & Vuilleumier, 2001; Karnath, 1988). Several behavioural studies have demonstrated 
that, despite the lack of report, there is evidence that contralesional stimuli are processed. 
Notably, the relations between the contra- and ipsilesional stimuli affect extinction, with 
extinction reduced when these stimuli group together. There is now evidence for a wide 
variety of grouping cues being effective in reducing extinction. Extinction can be modulated 
by grouping on the basis of Gestalt principles such as similarity and contrast polarity (e.g., 
Gilchrist, Humphreys, & Riddoch, 1996), by stored knowledge about familiar shapes (Ward, 
Goodrich, & Driver, 1994) and by lexical identity (Kumada & Humphreys, 2001).  
Patients are also able to overcome their pathological bias to favour the ipsilesional stimulus 
when the stimulus itself affords an action. For example, di Pellegrino et al. (2005) 
demonstrated that patients showed less left visual extinction when the handle of a 
contralesional cup afforded a left-hand rather than a right-hand grasp (cf. Gibson's affordance 
concept, 1979). They proposed that the observation of a handle results in an automatic 
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activation of motor programs to reach and grasp the object that, in turn, biases visual selection 
and stimulus detection. Interestingly, affordance effects in extinction patients have been 
reported not only for single objects (e.g., di Pellegrino et al., 2005) but there is also evidence 
for effects of action relation between objects. For example, Riddoch et al. (2003) first showed 
that positioning objects for action reduced extinction in patients with parietal lesions. Riddoch 
et al. presented two objects (e.g., a paint pot and a paintbrush) either positioned to interact 
with each other (the paintbrush about to dip into the paint pot) or not (the paintbrush facing 
away from the paint pot). Extinction was less severe when objects appeared in the correct 
positions for action, while there was no recovery from extinction when the same objects were 
positioned incorrectly for action. Riddoch et al. proposed that familiar objects co-positioned 
for action were grouped together as a unitary configuration. The objects could then be 
selected as a single perpetual unit even when one fell in the contralesional field and would be 
otherwise subject to extinction. Consistent with this argument for configural coding of action-
related stimuli, Riddoch et al. (2011) reported that the effects of action relations were 
disrupted if manipulations were introduced to disturb configural coding, such as inverting the 
stimuli or alternating their relative sizes. In addition, the effects were not semantic in nature, 
because no benefits on extinction were found with pairs of objects that were associatively 
related (e.g., tin and can) rather than action-related (Riddoch et al., 2003).  
One other interesting result reported by Riddoch et al. (2003) concerned performance on 
extinction trials, when patients only reported one of the two object presented. Standardly 
patients are biased to report the ipsilesional stimulus on these trials. Riddoch et al. found an 
exception to this, when objects were positioned to interact together. With these stimuli 
Riddoch et al. found a preferential report of the active member of the pair (the object that 
would be used on the other item), irrespective of whether it fell in the contra- or ipsilesional 
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field. Thus, on trials where the active object fell in the contralesional field, patients reported 
the contralesional stimulus more often than the ipsilesional stimulus – that is; there was a 
reversal of the standard spatial extinction effect. Riddoch et al. suggested that patients could 
implicitly code the presence of an interacting pair of objects and with some stimuli, attention 
was cued first to the active member of the pair. This led to this item being preferentially 
reported on trials where extinction occurred. Converging evidence for attention being drawn 
to the active member of an interacting pair comes from Roberts and Humphreys (2010b) who 
used a measure of “prior entry” on temporal order judgements. 
These results with interacting objects are of considerable interest since they indicate that 
visual attention is sensitive not only to low-level perceptual regularities (e.g., collinearity 
between edges) but also to higher-level regularities based on the co-occurrence of objects in 
action (see Riddoch et al., 2011). However, the underlying factors and processing 
mechanisms that determine these effects remain poorly understood. For example, are the 
effects based on the perceptual familiarity of object pairs, on perceptual coding of action or on 
associated motor responses that may be evoked by pairs of interacting objects? 
There is evidence that the perceptual familiarity of the object pairs themselves is not 
critical. Riddoch et al. (2006) used pairs of objects with a low frequency of co-occurrence but 
which were positioned to interact together. They again found recovery from extinction. The 
presence of the action relation alone seemed important here. Evidence for perceptual 
sensitivity to these action relations comes from Roberts and Humphreys (2010a), who 
examined brain activity when participants viewed objects co-located or not co-located for 
action. These investigators found enhanced activity in visual cortical regions (e.g., the LOC 
and the FFG) when objects were co-located for action compared with when they were not co-
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located for action. The results are consistent with action-related objects yielding an enhanced 
perceptual response. 
On the other hand, there is also evidence for motor-related responses in relation to action-
based properties of images. For instance, Kumar et al. (2012) reported early activity over 
motor cortex (N1 component) when participants viewed images of objects being grasped 
correctly relative to when they were grasped incorrectly for action. Neuropsychological 
evidence comes from Humphreys et al. (2010a) who presented familiar pairs of objects to 
patients showing visual extinction. The objects were either positioned correctly for action or 
reflected so that they were positioned incorrectly. In addition, the active member of the pair 
could be aligned with the patient’s premorbidly dominant hand or not, and the stimuli were 
depicted either from a 1PP (in the patient’s own reference frame) or from a 3PP (as if seen 
from the opposite side of a table). Humphreys et al. found that recovery from extinction was 
stronger when the objects were held in hands congruent with the premorbidly dominant hand 
for the patient and this effect was enhanced when the objects were seen from a 1PP compared 
to a 3PP. The effect of hand alignment suggests that action-related objects may evoke a 
stronger motor response than action-unrelated objects. This response may be particularly 
potent when the stimuli are presented in a 1PP, consistent with vasomotor coupling driving 
attention to action-related objects (cf. Humphreys et al., 2010b; see also Valyear, Gallivan, 
McLean, & Culham, 2012, for fMRI evidence). 
In the present chapter we extended this prior result by examining whether these visuomotor 
responses are sensitive only to the implied action, when objects are co-located for action, or 
also to the visual familiarity of the object pairs. To do this, we replicated the procedure of 
Humphreys et al. (2010a), but this time used pairs of objects not normally used together and 
so not familiar as a pair. Is the mere presence of an action, between objects paired for action, 
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sufficient to alleviate the contralesional attentional deficit in extinction patients, even if the 
objects are not usually used together? Based on a previous study using unfamiliar object pairs 
(Riddoch et al., 2006), we expected that there would be recovery from extinction when 
objects are oriented for action compared to when they are not oriented for action. More 
importantly, we asked if recovery from extinction occurred, is it visual- or motor-related (e.g., 
is there a visual-based affordance effect of the reference frame or a motor-based affordance 
effect determined by whether the objects align with the patient’s premorbidly dominant 
hand)? We assessed whether these factors modulated the ability of the patients to report both 
objects, on a two-object trial, and also whether they influenced attention to objects within a 
pair, on extinction trials (cf. Riddoch et al., 2003). We expected a preferential report of the 
active member of the pair. To maximise the action effects, we showed objects grasped by a 
hand that was congruent with the action normally performed with the object, extending 
Gibson’s affordance concept (1979). Previous studies have shown that the presence of the 
hand grasp maximises affordance-based responses to objects (e.g., Kumar et al., 2012).  
 
4.3 Methods 
 
4.3.1 Patients 
Ten brain-damaged patients with visual extinction, comprising 2 females and 8 males from 
39 to 78 years of age (M = 67.70; SD = 11.63), were recruited from the volunteer panel at the 
School of Psychology, University of Birmingham. Five patients (JB, MC, MP, TH, and TM) 
had right unilateral lesions, three (DT, PH, and RH) had left unilateral lesions, and two (PF, 
and PM) had bilateral lesions (clinical details are given in Table 4.1, and lesion 
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reconstructions are shown in Figure 4.1). Seven patients showed left visual extinction, and the 
remaining (DT, PH, and RH) showed right visual extinction. Since the terms “ipsilesional” 
and “contralesional” are misleading in the case of bilateral lesions, we instead use the terms 
“non-extinguished” and “extinguished”, respectively. Patients did not have visual field defects 
on visual confrontation testing. None of those patients suffered from optic ataxia. Four 
patients (JB, PF, PM, and RH) had a clinically defined problem in either gesture recognition 
(1 patient), gesture production (2 patients) or imitation (2 patients) on the BCoS Cognitive 
Screen (Humphreys, Bickerton, Samson, & Riddoch, 2012). However, the extinction data for 
these patients were not obviously different from the results of the other patients. All except 
four (JB, MP, RH, and TH) were right-handed as tested by the Edinburgh Handedness 
Inventory (Oldfield, 1971). All reported normal or corrected-to-normal vision. Informed 
consent was obtained from all patients and the study was approved by a national NHS 
research ethics committee. The experiment was conducted over a period from November 2009 
to March 2012. Each patient’s performance was relatively stable across this period. 
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Table 4.1 Demographic and clinical data of the patients 
 
Patient  Sex / age / 
handedness 
Main lesion site Major clinical 
symptoms 
Aetiology Time since 
lesion (years) 
DT M / 70 / R 
Left lingual and fusiform 
gyrus 
Right extinction  Stroke 5 
JB F / 76 / L Right parietal (angular and 
supramarginal gyri, inferior 
parietal lobe), temporal 
(inferior, middle and superior 
temporal gyri) and frontal 
(inferior and middle frontal 
gyri) cortex; left inferior 
occipital, lingual and 
parahippocampal gyrus 
Left extinction; 
neglect in reading 
and writing 
Stroke 13 
MC M / 78 / R Right occipito-parieto-
temporal cortex extending to 
the inferior frontal gyrus 
Left neglect; left 
extinction 
Stroke 5 
MP M / 64 / L Right fronto-temporal-
parietal regions (inferior and 
middle frontal gyrus, middle 
and superior temporal gyrus, 
supramarginal gyrus and 
inferior parietal lobe) 
Left neglect and 
extinction; mild left 
hemiplegia; 
dyscalculia 
Aneurism 20 
PF F / 63 / R Bilateral lesions to the 
posterior parietal cortices 
(inferior and superior parietal 
lobe, the intraparietal sulcus 
and angular gyrus) extending 
more inferiorly in the left 
hemisphere 
Left extinction; 
dysgraphia 
Stroke 11 
PH M / 39 / R Left medial and superior 
temporal lobe, left inferior 
and middle frontal gyri 
Right extinction; 
right hemiplegia; 
aphasia 
Stroke 12 
PM M / 70 / R Bilateral parietal cortices Left extinction Stroke 8 
RH M / 78 / L Left inferior parietal 
(supramarginal and angular 
gyrus) and superior temporal 
gyrus  
Right extinction; 
neglect in reading 
Stroke 13 
TH M / 64 / L Right parietal cortex Left extinction  Stroke 4 
TM M / 75 / R Right inferior parietal cortex 
(angular gyrus and inferior 
parietal lobe), superior 
temporal and inferior frontal 
cortex 
Left neglect; left 
extinction; dense 
left hemiplegia 
Stroke 11 
Note. M = male; F = female; R = right; L = left. 
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Figure 4.1. Anatomical location of patients’ lesions. The figure depicts T1 structural scans 
(taken at 3T, with a 1-mm isotropic resolution). Grey matter (dark grey) and white matter 
(light areas) lesions for each patient were identified using voxel-based morphometry (VBM) 
in SPM5 (http://www.fil.ion.ucl.ac.uk/spm/software/spm5/) by comparing patients relative to 
healthy controls (N=140) aged 40 years or older with no history of brain lesions. The lesions 
were then overlaid on a standard multi-slice template in MRIcron 
(http://www.sph.sc.edu/comd/rorden/mricron/). The analyses are based on one-sample t-tests 
with three covariates: healthy grey-white matter versus patient grey-white matter, age, and 
sex, with a family-wise error correction (FWE) of p < .05) and a minimum cluster size of 100 
voxels. 
JB
S 
TM 
MP 
PF 
RH 
PH 
TH 
PM 
D
TS 
MC
S 
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4.3.2 Apparatus and stimuli 
Thirty-two coloured photographs of common objects the same as those in Humphreys et al. 
(2010a) were used. Each item was depicted grasped by a hand and held above a table, 
photographed from a 1PP and from a 3PP. The individual items for each perspective were 
combined into 16 object pairs that were not commonly used together (e.g., paint pot and bottle 
opener; see Figure 4.2a and Figure 4.2b for the 1PP and the 3PP, respectively). All object 
pairs are listed in Appendix 1. Each object pair was presented simultaneously, one stimulus to 
the right and the other stimulus to the left side of fixation. The stimuli appeared on a black 
background.  
Following the classification of active and passive objects by Riddoch et al. (2003) each 
object pair was divided into: (i) an active object (e.g., a bottle opener) grasped by a right hand 
and a passive object (e.g., the paint pot) held by a left hand, or (ii) an active object grasped by 
a left hand and a passive object held by a right hand (see Appendix 1). Note that these 
conditions were evaluated relative to the patient’s own handedness, e.g., for a right-handed 
person represents (i) a “congruent” grasp condition and (ii) an “incongruent” grasp condition. 
These two conditions were depicted with the items arranged either to afford a mutual action or 
not (referred to as correct action relation or incorrect action relation, respectively). This 
resulted in four two-item conditions [action-relation (correct/incorrect) x grasp 
(congruent/incongruent)] for each perspective. 
One-item trials were intermingled with the two-item trials. Here, an item in the left or right 
hemifield was paired with a blank table on the other side of fixation (to maintain approximate 
levels of visual stimulation), and it was presented at the same location and for the same 
duration as it appeared on bilateral trials. 
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The stimuli were presented with E-prime software (Version 2.1; Psychology Software 
Tools, 2006). Visual stimuli were displayed on a 19-inch monitor at a viewing distance of 
approximately 50 cm. The monitor provided a frame refresh rate of 75 Hz with a spatial 
resolution of 1024 x 768 pixels. The stimuli subtended 10.29° x 8.56° of visual angle and 
were located 0.86° either to the left or right side of central fixation. 
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Figure 4.2. Examples of two-item stimuli presented either from a first-person perspective (a) 
or from a third-person perspective (b). The stimuli are shown in the correct co-locations for 
action (left panels) and the incorrect co-locations for action (right panels). The active object 
(the bottle opener) is grasped either by the right hand (upper panels) or the left hand (lower 
panels). 
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4.3.3 Design and procedure 
A similar design to Humphreys et al. (2010a) was used. The experiment consisted of two 
perspective conditions (1PP vs. 3PP) which were administered to each patient in an ABBA 
order. The order of the perspectives was counterbalanced across patients. Each perspective 
condition consisted of four bilateral conditions [action relation (correct/incorrect) × grasp 
(congruent/incongruent)] and four unilateral conditions [stimulus type (object/tool) x side of 
stimulus (non-extinguished/extinguished)]. 
There were 768 trials, 384 for each perspective, and the stimuli were presented in 24 
blocks of 32 trials; 48 trials for each condition. Each patient participated in six sessions which 
were at least one week apart. Each session consisted of four blocks. Across the four blocks the 
conditions were fully randomised and the order of the blocks was counterbalanced across 
patients. The items were repeated in different conditions across the four blocks.  
Patients were tested individually in a quiet room. Before each session, pictures of the 
stimuli were presented individually on a monitor to each patient to ensure that the patients 
could recognise and correctly identify the items. Additionally, patients were given at least two 
training blocks of 16 trials to ensure adequate performance with the task; these results were 
not included in the data analysis. The stimuli on practice trials were different from those 
employed in the experimental trials to avoid carry-over effects. Stimulus exposure time was 
adjusted to ensure that each patient achieved a performance level of roughly 70-90% correct 
for single items presented in the extinguished hemifield (Table 4.2). Four age-matched 
controls tested on the fastest exposure duration as for patient PF (150 ms) performed at 
ceiling. 
Patients had to identify and name the item(s) on each trial by verbal report. Responses 
were manually recorded by the experimenter, and after that the next trial was initiated. As is 
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typical in studies of extinction, our emphasis was on the accuracy rather than the speed of 
response. Note that reaction time (RT) cannot be recorded to extinguished stimuli
1
. The 
patients were instructed to maintain fixation throughout the experiment and to respond as 
accurately as possible. Fixation was monitored by the experimenter. Each trial began with a 
white central fixation cross presented on a black background for 2000 ms. This was replaced 
by a red fixation cross for 500 ms to inform patients that the stimulus was about to appear. 
Next, a single object or an object pair was presented. For patient PF only a 100 ms mask 
followed the object(s) in order to maintain the same level of task difficulty across patients.  
 
Table 4.2 Stimulus exposure times for the first-person and the third-person perspective 
Patient First-person perspective  Third-person perspective 
DT 500 ms 500 ms 
JB 
M=517 ms (Session 1: 500 ms, Session 
2: 500 ms, Session 3: 550 ms) 
500 ms 
MC 1000 ms 
M= 433ms (Session 1: 500 ms, Session 
2: 400 ms, Session 3: 400 ms) 
MP 5000 ms 
M=4333ms (Session 1: 5000 ms, 
Session 2: 4000 ms, Session 3: 4000 ms) 
PF 150 ms 150 ms 
PH 200 ms 
M=183 ms (Session 1: 150 ms, Session 
2: 200 ms, Session 3: 200 ms) 
PM 
M=325 ms (Session 1: 300 ms, Session 
2: 325 ms, Session 3: 350 ms) 
500 ms 
RH 500 ms 500 ms 
TH 200 ms 200 ms 
TM 
M=1125 ms (Session 1: 1000 ms, 
Session 2: 1375 ms, Session 3: 1000 ms) 
1500 ms 
Note. M = Mean. 
                                                 
 
1
 We acknowledge that it would have been interesting to record RTs. 
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4.4 Results  
The analyses were conducted across both perspective conditions. First, we assessed 
whether there was a spatial extinction effect. Next, we investigated the effects of action 
relation on two-item report. Finally, we assessed whether there was a difference in reporting 
the active and passive member within each object pair on two-item trials, when only one item 
was correctly reported (referred to as error trials).  
For statistical analysis of the accuracy data, a repeated-measures ANOVA was adopted 
using SPSS for windows 19.0 software (SPSS Inc., Chicago, IL). Significant differences 
between conditions were further assessed with paired t-tests. The significance level was set at 
p ≤ .05. 
 
4.4.1 The presence of extinction 
Extinction was diagnosed by comparing performance on one-item trials with performance 
on two-item trials. Extinction was present if the patient’s identification performance was 
better on one-item than on two-item trials. The two-item trials were taken from the unrelated 
condition (i.e., incorrectly positioned object pairs) only, as this provided a baseline for 
extinction (cf. Humphreys et al., 2010a; see also Rees et al., 2000).  
The accuracy data from one-item and incorrectly positioned two-item trials were entered 
into a four-factor mixed design ANOVA, with the within-subject factors being perspective 
(1PP vs. 3PP), number of objects (one-item trials vs. incorrectly positioned two-item trials) 
and side of item being reported (non-extinguished vs. extinguished); patient was treated as a 
between-subject factor. Each testing session was entered as a participant nested within the 
patient factor. 
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Performance on one-item trials was generally better than on two-item trials, confirming 
that visual extinction was present. The main effect of perspective was significant, 
F(1,20) = 4.60, p = .045. The main effects of number of objects, F(1,20) = 684.55, p < .001, 
and patient, F(9,20) = 5.08, p < .01, were also significant. Identification performance was 
better on one-item than on incorrectly positioned two-item trials; it was better for 3PP than for 
1PP stimuli, and overall performance varied across patients. The interaction between 
perspective and number of objects reached significance, F(1,20) = 14.45, p < .01 (Figure 4.3). 
The extinction effect was larger in the 1PP compared to the 3PP, though it was reliable for 
both, t(29) = 13.62, t(29) = 9.22, both p < .001, respectively (the advantage for one- over two-
item trials was 41% for the 1PP and 33% for the 3PP). There were also interactions between 
the number of objects and patient, F(9,20) = 10.77, p < .001, and between perspective, 
number of objects and patient, F (9,20) = 4.64, p < .01. Although the extinction effect was 
apparent in all patients, the magnitude of the effect varied across patients and perspectives. 
The variations across patients are shown in Figure 4.4. No other main effects or interactions 
were significant (p > .05).  
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Figure 4.3. The relations between number of objects (one- vs. unrelated two-items) and side 
(non-extinguished vs. extinguished) as function of the perspective (mean accuracies). Bars 
indicate standard errors. 
 
 
Figure 4.4. Mean patient accuracies (with standard errors) on one-item and incorrect 
(unrelated) two-item trials for the first-person perspective (a) and for the third-person 
perspective (b). 
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4.4.2 Effects of action relation on two-item report 
We examined whether there was recovery from extinction when objects were oriented for 
action compared to when they were not oriented for action and whether this effect was 
modulated by which hand is holding the objects and in which perspective the objects were 
presented in. The accuracy data for two-item trials were also analysed in a four-factor mixed 
design ANOVA, with the within-subject factors being perspective (1PP vs. 3PP), co-location 
for action (correct vs. incorrect) and grasp (congruent vs. incongruent); patient was treated as 
a between-subjects factor. As before, each session was entered as a participant nested within 
the patient factor.  
There was a main effect of perspective, F(1,20) = 8.11, p < .05. Accuracy was higher when 
object pairs were presented from a 3PP relative to a 1PP. There was a main effect of co-
location for action, F(1,20) = 98.98, p < .001 (see Figure 4.5), with better performance when 
objects were arranged in the correct co-locations for action compared to when they were not 
correctly located for action. There was a main effect of patient, F(9,20) = 9.41, p < .001, 
indicating that performance varied across patients. There was a significant interaction 
between co-location for action and patient, F(9,20) = 8.94, p < .001. The effect of action 
relation was apparent in all patients tested, though the magnitude varied across the patients 
(see Figure 4.6). The interaction between co-location for action and grasp was also reliable, 
F(1,20) = 10.32, p < .01. The effect of action relation was greater in the incongruent than in 
congruent grasp conditions, t(29) = 5.73, p< .001, t(29) = 3.79, p< .01, respectively. The 
three-way interaction (co-location for action x grasp x patient) also reached significance, 
F(9,20) = 3.27, p < .05. Thus, patients differed in the degree to which they showed a greater 
effect of action relation with incongruent relative to congruent hand assignments. In addition, 
the four-way interaction (perspective x co-location for action x grasp x patient) was reliable, 
 96 
 
F(9,20) = 2.92, p < .05, indicating that the effect of action relation varied according to the 
grasp and perspective as noted above, but the magnitude of this effect varied across patients 
(Figure 4.6).  
 
 
Figure 4.5. Mean accuracy of performance on correctly and incorrectly positioned two-item 
trials for first-person perspective (a) and third-person perspective (b), with error bars 
indicating standard error. 
 
 
Figure 4.6. Effects of action relation on two-item trials for first-person perspective (a) and 
third-person perspective (b), with error bars indicating standard error. 
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4.4.3 Effects of action relation on identification errors on two-item trials  
The error data from two-item trials when only one item of an object pair was correctly 
reported were entered into a log-linear analysis, with the factors being perspective (1PP vs. 
3PP), co-location for action (correct vs. incorrect), side of active partner (active partner either 
on the non-extinguished or on the extinguished side) and side of reported item (either on the 
non-extinguished or on the extinguished side).  
The final model showed that the highest-order interaction (the perspective x co-location for 
action x side of active partner x side of reported item interaction) was significant, 
χ2(1) = 10.88, p < .001. The likelihood ratio of this model was, χ2(0) = 0, p = 1. Performance 
was then analysed separately as a function of whether the object pair was correctly or 
incorrectly positioned for action, with the factors being perspective, side of active partner and 
side of reported item. When the object pair was correctly positioned for action, there was a 
reliable three-way interaction between perspective, side of active partner and side of reported 
item, χ2(1) = 112.54, p < .001, and the likelihood ratio of the model was, χ2(0) = 0, p = 1. 
When the object pair was incorrectly positioned for action, there was again a three-way 
interaction between perspective, side of active partner and side of reported item, 
χ2(1) = 47.44, p < .001.  
To break down these two three-way interactions, separate log-linear analyses were 
conducted across performance where, for the correct and incorrect co-locations conditions, the 
active partner appeared on the non-extinguished or extinguished side. The factors were 
perspective and side of reported item. The results are presented in Figure 4.7 and Figure 4.8. 
There were four analyses. 
1. Correct co-location for action condition when the active partner is on the non-
extinguished side. There was a final model in which there were only significant main 
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effects of perspective, χ2(1) = 4.38, p < .05, and side of reported item, χ2(1) = 63.94, 
p < .001. The likelihood ratio of the model was, χ2(1) = 3.75, p = .053. There was 
better performance in reporting non-extinguished (active) compared with extinguished 
(passive) items and there were more single item reports when the stimuli appeared in 
the 1PP compared to the 3PP.  
2. Correct co-location for action condition when the active partner is on the extinguished 
side. The final model showed a reliable interaction between perspective and side of 
reported item, χ2(1) = 192.20, p < .001, and the likelihood ratio of the model was, 
χ2(0) = 0, p = 1. Patients reported more non-extinguished than extinguished items, but 
this held only for the third-person perspective. In contrast, there were more reports of 
the extinguished (active) than the non-extinguished (passive) item when the stimuli 
were seen from a 1PP.  
3. Incorrect co-location for action condition when the active partner is on the non-
extinguished side. There was an interaction between the perspective and the side of the 
reported item, χ2(1) = 23.39, p < .001; the likelihood ratio of the model was, χ2(0) = 0, 
p = 1. There was better reporting of the non-extinguished than the extinguished item, 
and there were more reports of single items in the 1PP than in the 3PP.  
4. Incorrect co-location for action condition when the active partner is on the 
extinguished side. There was a final model with a likelihood ratio of, χ2(0) = 0, p = 1. 
There was a reliable interaction between the perspective and the side of the reported 
item, χ2(1) = 24.11, p < .001. In this case the interaction arose because the difference 
between reporting the non-extinguished and extinguished stimuli was greater when the 
stimuli were seen in the third-person compared to the 1PP; there were relatively more 
reports of the extinguished (active) item in the 1PP compared to the 3PP. 
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Figure 4.7. Number of correct responses for two-item trials when only one item of an object 
pair was reported (either on the non-extinguished or on the extinguished side) as a function of 
the position of the active partner of the pair (either on the non-extinguished or on the 
extinguished side) and whether the (a) objects were correctly or (b) incorrectly co-located for 
action. 
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Figure 4.8. Individual performance when only one item of an object pair was correctly 
reported, for the correct (a) and incorrect (b) co-location for action conditions, as a function of 
whether the active item appeared on the non-extinguished or on the extinguished side. 
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4.5 Discussion 
The present chapter extended the behavioural findings of Riddoch et al. (2003) and 
Humphreys et al. (2010a) who established that visual extinction is less severe when familiar 
objects were arranged in the correct co-locations for action relative to when they were 
incorrectly positioned for action. Here we investigated whether the effects of positioning 
objects for action extended to objects that were not typically used together. 
The main results of this chapter can be summarised as follows: Firstly, patients were better 
at identifying two objects which were correctly positioned for action relative to those which 
were incorrectly positioned. This finding confirms that patients did benefit from the action 
relation between the objects and thus, recovered from extinction. Moreover, this replicates the 
basic finding by Riddoch et al. (2003) and confirms that the effects of action relation are 
found even with object pairs that are unfamiliar together (see also Riddoch et al., 2006, for 
prior patient data, and Roberts & Humphreys, 2011, for results from normal participants). The 
fact that unfamiliar pairs of objects reduced extinction suggests that the “potential for action” 
(visual affordance offered by the functional relationship) rather than learned knowledge about 
the object pair is important for the effect (Humphreys & Riddoch, 2007; Riddoch et al., 
2006). This proposal is consistent with the affordance account provided by Gibson (1979) 
who claims that our perception is influenced by the visual affordances offered by the 
environment. In other words, there is a direct link between the perceptual properties of an 
object and the action that might be performed on it, regardless of the observer’s intention to 
act. Secondly, the benefit for correctly positioned object pairs was apparent in both the 1PP 
and the 3PP, replicating the results by Humphreys et al. (2010a). However, in this case the 
recovery from extinction was greatest when the objects were depicted from a 3PP relative to a 
1PP, irrespective of whether the objects were grasped by hands congruent or incongruent with 
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those the patient would use to perform the action. This differs from the pattern found with 
familiar object pairs: For familiar pairs there was less extinction when objects appeared from 
a 1PP than a 3PP, and when the objects were grasped by hands congruent with those used by 
the patient (Humphreys et al., 2010a).  
The 3PP advantage for pairs of unfamiliar objects is surprising as we might expect that our 
visual experience is greatest when objects are seen from a 1PP rather than from a 3PP (the 
biologically realistic posture of the stimuli here which corresponded well with the patient’s 
1PP). Both the familiarity of the view, and the matching of the participant’s own action, 
would be expected to enhance the report. So why did patients perform better when objects 
appeared from a 3PP compared to a 1PP? The analysis of the error trials, where only one item 
of the object pair was reported, might help to explain this finding. One possibility is that the 
1PP condition biased attention to the active object in the pair. When the active object fell on 
the non-extinguished side, this could increase the pathological bias to favour the non-
extinguished side and could lead to delayed or no identification response to stimuli on the 
opposite side, resulting in extinction particularly when the objects were not related to action. 
Similarly if attention was cued to an active object on the extinguished side (as suggested by 
the error analysis with action related pairs; see below), then extinction could increase because 
the identification of the extinguished item takes significantly longer before attention can be 
switched towards the non-extinguished item. In addition, the report of the item on the non-
extinguished side might suffer due to an overall pathological decrease in processing capacity 
(Robertson & Frasca, 1992).  
These arguments about attention being cued to the active object fit with perhaps the most 
striking present results, those in the error analysis. When objects were (i) co-located for 
action, (ii) seen from a 1PP and (iii) the active object was on the extinguished side, there was 
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better report of the extinguished than non-extinguished item – a reversal of the standard 
pattern of extinction. This noteworthy finding replicates the results by Riddoch et al. (2003). 
A similar but weaker pattern was observed when objects were not co-located for action. The 
advantage for reporting the active object is consistent with the suggestion by Handy et al. 
(Handy & Tipper, 2007; Handy et al., 2003) that tools bias spatial attention to their locations. 
This might be the case in the present study and in Riddoch et al.’s study (2003). When the 
objects were co-located for action, patients even reported more extinguished tools (the active 
partner) than non-extinguished objects (the passive partner) in error trials. This implies that 
action relations influence perception even when patients were not aware of the simultaneous 
stimulus presentation since, on these error trials, patients only reported the presence of one 
object.  
The bias for reporting the tool is in general accord with the proposal that tools are a special 
category of object. Several studies have shown that the mere viewing of tools relative to other 
objects (animals, faces, houses, and shapes) automatically activates action representations 
associated with tool use or that are afforded by their visual properties such as orientation or 
graspability, even when no response is required (e.g., Gallivan, McLean, & Culham, 2011; 
Chouinard & Goodale, 2010; Vingerhoets et al., 2009; di Pellegrino et al., 2005; Phillips & 
Ward, 2002; Chao & Martin, 2000; Tucker & Ellis, 1998). This indicates that the visual 
properties of the tool are particularly effective in potentiating actions and, in turn, influencing 
visual selection (cf. Gibson, 1979). 
The tendency for active objects being more reported fits also well with temporal order 
judgement studies. Participants were faster in detecting the active object when the objects 
were action-related compared to when they were not (Roberts & Humphreys, 2010b; see also 
Roberts & Humphreys, 2011a). This temporal order bias would follow from attention being 
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drawn to the active object in action-related pairs. That the present result arose primarily only 
for correctly co-located object pairings, and only when objects were seen from a 1PP, is also 
important. It suggests that the combination of co-locating objects for action and viewpoint is 
what is critical for the attentional bias to emerge. The attention system responds to 
encountering an action unit based on objects co-located for the participant’s own action. 
On top of these effects of relatedness and perspective, there was an effect of object-hand 
congruence. Surprisingly, the effects of action relation were stronger for some patients when 
the objects were incongruently aligned with the patient’s handedness. This result goes against 
the motor-based affordance account of performance (Humphreys et al., 2010b). According to 
this account, report should be better when objects are held in a manner congruent rather than 
incongruent with the patient’s habitual action. It may be, however, that object-hand 
congruence biased the patient’s attention to the matching (usually right) side, and this 
disrupted report – at least when the objects did not form a sufficiently familiar pair to counter-
act such a bias. Whereas any effects of hand congruence here were weak, Humphreys et al. 
(2010a) reported strong effects with familiar object pairs. Such a contrast suggests that motor-
based affordance responses are more likely with familiar objects, while visual familiarity with 
the participant’s own reference frame may operate for unfamiliar as well as familiar objects 
positioned for action. 
 
4.6 Conclusion 
The results of the present chapter indicate that unfamiliar action relations between objects 
ameliorate visual extinction. With unfamiliar object pairs, the effects of perspective and 
object-hand congruence are less pronounced (or even opposite to) the effects found with 
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familiar objects, suggesting that affordances (indexed by the perspective and object-hand 
congruence effects) are stronger with familiar objects. In addition, with object pairs 
positioned for action and seen from a 1PP, attention was biased to the active member of the 
pair (the tool), even if it fell on the extinguished side. The results indicate that the effects of 
action relations on attention may reflect several factors, determined by the familiarity of the 
object pairs, the viewpoint and whether objects are co-located for action.   
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CHAPTER 5:  EFFECTS OF BROKEN AFFORDANCE ON VISUAL EXTINCTION1 
 
5.1 Abstract 
Previous studies (including Chapter 4) have shown that visual extinction can be reduced if 
two objects are positioned to afford an action. In this chapter it was tested if this affordance 
effect was disrupted by “breaking” the affordance, i.e., if one of the objects actively used in 
the action had a broken handle. We tested eight patients with right hemisphere lesions and 
left-sided extinction. Patients viewed object pairs that were or were not commonly used 
together and that were positioned for left- or right-hand actions. In the unrelated pair 
conditions, either two tools or two objects were presented. In line with previous research (e.g., 
Riddoch et al., 2006), extinction was reduced when action-related object pairs and when 
unrelated tool pairs were presented compared to unrelated object pairs. There was no 
significant difference in recovery rate between action-related (object-tool) and unrelated tool 
pairs. In addition, performance with action-related objects decreased when the tool appeared 
on the ipsilesional side compared to when it was on the contralesional side, but only when the 
tool handle was intact. There were minimal effects of breaking the handle of an object rather 
than a tool, and there was no effect of breaking the handle on either tools or objects on single 
item trials. The data suggest that breaking the handle of a tool lessens the degree to which it 
captures attention, with this attentional capture being strongest when the tool appears on the 
ipsilesional side. The capture of attention by the ipsilesional item then reduces the chance of 
                                                 
 
1
 Chapter 5 is an adapted version of Wulff, M., & Humphreys, G. W. (2015). Effects of broken affordance on 
visual extinction. Front Hum. Neurosci., 9, 515. doi:10.3389/fnhum.2015.00515. 
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detecting the contralesional stimulus. This attentional capture effect is mediated by the 
affordance to the intact tool. 
 
5.2 Introduction 
Previous studies have shown that the perceptual properties of single objects afford certain 
actions, and this in turn influences visual attention and perception. This affordance effect 
(Gibson, 1979) reflects the action possibilities offered by the environment to the observer, 
depending upon the observer’s current goal and his/her action capabilities. For example, a cup 
will strongly afford a drinking action when we are thirsty and are able to grasp it, but not if 
we just have quenched our thirst and the cup is positioned inappropriately for the action (e.g., 
Humphreys & Riddoch, 2001). Such affordances are determined by the perceptual properties 
of the object such as the size and orientation of the cup. Thus for a right-handed person a cup 
is more likely to afford an action when its handle is oriented to the right than when it is 
oriented to the left, even though the object can be recognised equally efficiently in the 
different orientations (Riddoch, Edwards, Humphreys, West, & Heafield, 1998). 
The affordance effect is of particular relevance for patients showing visual extinction, a 
neuropsychological disorder commonly observed following damage to the right posterior 
parietal cortex (Chechlacz et al., 2014; Karnath et al., 2003). Extinction patients are able to 
detect a single contralesional stimulus presented in isolation but frequently fail to detect a 
contralesional stimulus when an ipsilesional stimulus appears simultaneously. Several 
behavioural studies have demonstrated that extinction can be modulated by grouping on the 
basis of Gestalt principles such as similarity and collinearity (e.g., Gilchrist et al., 1996). 
There are also higher-order influences on extinction which act even in the absence of Gestalt 
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grouping factors. For example, extinction can be reduced when patients view pictures 
displaying objects oriented for left-hand or right-hand actions. Di Pellegrino et al. (2005) first 
showed that the orientation of an object handle influenced stimulus detection, with less 
extinction when the contralesional object afforded a left-hand rather than a right-hand grasp. 
Di Pellegrino et al. (2005) suggested that affording an action to the left reduced extinction. 
Apparently similar affordance effects on extinction can be observed with pairs of objects. 
Riddoch et al. (2003) presented pictures of objects either positioned to interact with each other 
or not. There was less extinction when objects appeared in the correct co-locations for action 
(a fork and knife facing each other) relative to when the same objects were positioned 
incorrectly for action (a knife facing away from a fork). Riddoch et al. (2003) concluded that 
interacting objects offer an affordance which groups the objects for attentional selection, 
enabling the constituent stimuli to be selected as a single unit. As a result, the perceptual 
report of both stimuli is improved and extinction is less severe. Several studies have reported 
similar results with healthy participants, with performance improving when objects are action-
related compared to when they are unrelated (Borghi et al., 2012; McNair & Harris, 2012; 
Roberts & Humphreys, 2011a; Roberts & Humphreys, 2011b; Adamo & Ferber, 2009; Green 
& Hummel, 2006). For example, Roberts and Humphreys (2011a) showed healthy 
participants briefly presented objects and found improved identification performance when 
objects were in correct relative to incorrect co-locations for action.  
Several behavioural studies have demonstrated that affordance effects for single 
(graspable) objects can be manipulated by factors such as object size (e.g., Tucker & Ellis, 
2001), object location in space (e.g., Costantini et al., 2010), object orientation (e.g., Goslin et 
al., 2012; Tucker & Ellis, 1998), and hand-object congruence (e.g., Girardi, Lindemann, & 
Bekkering, 2010). However, it seems that the position and graspability of the object handle is 
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particularly important for affordance effects (cf. Matheson et al., 2014; Symes et al., 2007). 
Notably, the spatial location of the handle influences stimulus identification as demonstrated 
in neglect patients (Humphreys & Riddoch, 2001), extinction patients (di Pellegrino et al., 
2005), and healthy participants (e.g., Tucker & Ellis, 1998). In addition, performance can also 
be affected by disrupting graspability by breaking the handle of an object. Buccino et al. 
(2009) applied TMS over the left motor area in healthy participants. Participants viewed 
pictures of objects with an intact and a broken handle oriented to the right and the left side. 
Objects with an intact right oriented handle evoked a larger motor response compared to 
objects with a broken right oriented handle. The decrease in the motor response with broken 
handles relative to intact handles suggests that not only the handle orientation but also 
whether it is intact or not is crucial for the perception of affordance. Buccino et al. (2009) 
proposed that the graspability of an object may be processed in the motor cortex. Objects with 
an intact handle will be processed as being graspable and the corresponding motor 
representations will be automatically activated, whereas objects with a broken handle will be 
coded as less graspable and thus there will be reduced activation of the motor cortex. 
Graspability also influenced responses in a probe detection task (Garrido-Vasquez & 
Schuboe, 2014), with faster probe detection times when the cued object was graspable (cup) 
compared to when the cued object was non-graspable (cactus). Whether such effects also 
occur in extinction patients has not been examined, nor is it clear whether effects of breaking 
a handle modulate how we attend to objects. It is possible that the coding of action-related 
pairs of objects operates using relatively coarsely coded visual representations, where the 
graspability of individual objects (and the presence of a broken handle) is less critical. Here 
we might expect a broken handle to reduce attentional responses to paired, action-related 
objects. 
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There are also data indicating that attention can be biased within pairs of action-related 
objects. Notably, when only one member of an object pair is reported by patients showing 
extinction, this tends to be the object that was active in an action (typically the tool that was 
used to act on the other object; Wulff & Humphreys, 2013; Riddoch et al., 2003). This bias 
can occur even when the active object falls in the contralesional field. In addition, normal 
participants tend to judge that the active member of an action-related pair appears first, when 
asked to make temporal order judgements (Roberts & Humphreys, 2010b). Both findings are 
consistent with attention being attracted to the active tool, within an action-related pair. The 
preferential report for tools has subsequently been replicated with healthy participants using 
various experimental paradigms (Wulff et al., 2015; Laverick et al., 2015; Xu et al., 2015; 
McNair & Harris, 2014; Roberts & Humphreys, 2011a; Roberts & Humphreys, 2010b). Thus, 
breaking the handle of the tool may have a greater effect on report than breaking the handle of 
the passive, action recipient. For example, the attentional bias to the active tool may be 
reduced.  
In the present chapter, we assessed the impact of a broken handle on the effects of 
affordance on extinction. To do this, we evaluated whether the effect of action relations on 
visual extinction holds when object pairs appear and one of the stimuli has a broken handle. In 
contrast to other studies (e.g., Humphreys et al., 2010a), we only presented pairs of objects in 
correct co-locations for action. We predicted that the affordance effect is stronger for familiar 
(action-related) rather than for unfamiliar (unrelated) pairs of objects (cf. Riddoch et al., 
2006). Also, if the graspability of individual objects is important, we expected that the 
affordance effect would be reduced with broken object pairs compared to intact object pairs as 
previous studies have shown that viewing non-graspable (broken-handled) objects can 
eliminate motor-based affordance effects (Buccino et al., 2009). We further predicted 
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differences according to whether a tool or an acted-upon object had a broken handle (cf. 
Wulff & Humphreys, 2013; Riddoch et al., 2003). Breaking the handle of a tool should be 
more disruptive to performance than breaking the handle of a passive object, in an action-
related pair.  
 
5.3 Methods 
 
5.3.1 Patients 
Eight patients with visual extinction from 55 to 78 years of age (2 females, M = 66.88; 
SD = 8.15) were recruited from the volunteer panel at the University of Birmingham. Six 
patients had right unilateral lesions and two had bilateral lesions (clinical details are given in 
Table 5.1). All the patients showed left visual extinction on the BCoS Cognitive Screen 
(Humphreys et al., 2012)
i
. The patients did not have visual field defects on visual 
confrontation testing or suffered from optic ataxia. Three patients (P1, P3, and P6) showed 
mild apraxia on the BCoS (see Table 5.1). However, the extinction data for these patients 
were not clearly different from the results of the other patients; similarly there were no 
differences between the extinction results for the unilateral and bilateral cases. All reported 
normal or corrected-to-normal vision. Informed consent was obtained from all patients and 
the study was approved by a national NHS research ethics committee. 
 
 
 
 
 113 
 
Table 5.1 Demographic and clinical data of the patients 
 
        
Patient 
Sex / age / 
handedness 
Main lesion site Major clinical symptoms 
Time 
since 
lesion 
(years) 
P1 F / 76 / L Right parieto-temporo-frontal 
cortex; left occipital cortex 
Left extinction; neglect in 
reading and writing; problems 
with gesture recognition, 
gesture production and gesture 
imitation 
 
13 
P2 M / 78 / R Right occipito-parieto-
temporal cortex extending to 
the inferior frontal gyrus 
 
Left neglect; left extinction
 
5 
P3 F / 63 / R Bilateral lesions to the 
posterior parietal cortices 
extending more inferiorly in 
the left hemisphere 
Left extinction; dysgraphia; 
problems with gesture 
imitation 
 
 
> 10 
P4 M / 70 / R Bilateral parietal cortices and 
right superior temporal gyrus 
 
Left extinction 
 
> 4 
P5 M / 58 / R Right fronto-parieto-temporal 
cortex (middle frontal gyrus, 
angular gyrus, supramarginal 
gyrus, middle and superior 
temporal gyrus) 
 
Left extinction 4 
P6 M / 70 / R Right fronto-temporal cortex 
extending to the parietal 
cortex (inferior parietal gyrus, 
angular gyrus, supramarginal 
gyrus) 
 
Left extinction; problems with 
gesture imitation 
5 
P7 M / 55 / R Right parieto-temporo-frontal 
cortex 
 
Left extinction 1 
P8 M / 65 / L Right parietal cortex and 
bilateral subcortical regions 
(putamen, pallidum) 
Left extinction 3 
Note. M = male; F = female; R = right; L = left. 
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5.3.2 Apparatus and stimuli 
Four coloured photographs of common drinking containers were used (flask, teapot, cup, 
and beaker). Each item was photographed on a table with the handle orienting to the right, and 
then flipped within the horizontal plane in Microsoft Office Picture Manager (Version 12) to 
create a mirror image of each item. Thus, an item with a right-oriented handle was turned into 
an item with a left-oriented handle. A second set of images in which each item had a broken 
handle was created using Paint.NET (Version 3.5.10). This resulted in 2 (handle: intact, 
broken) x 2 (handle orientation: right, left) x 2 (stimulus type: object, tool) images. The tools 
and non-tool objects were not matched for size as this manipulation might have disrupted the 
effect of action relation (cf. Riddoch et al., 2011). However, variations across the individual 
stimuli should not have been critical as items were counter-balanced across conditions. 
The individual items were organised into pairs with the items positioned to interact with 
each other with their handles facing outwards. There were three object pair conditions with 
each object pair either familiar or unfamiliar to the patient (see Figure 5.1). The objects were: 
(i) action-related: a tool and an object that were commonly used together (teapot and cup; 
beaker and flask); (ii) an unrelated pair in which two tools were presented (teapot and flask) 
and (iii) an unrelated pair in which two objects were presented (beaker and cup). Note that in 
this study action relation relates to the familiarity with the object pair rather than to the co-
location for action. For the action-related pair, each object within the pair was classified as 
being either the active or the passive member of the pair (cf. Riddoch et al., 2003). In the 
“intact handle condition”, all the objects had an intact handle, while in the “broken handle 
condition” one item within the pair had a broken handle. This was the active tool for half of 
the stimuli, and the passive object for the other half. The items were arranged either with (i) 
the tool on the right side and the object on the left side or with (ii) the tool on the left side and 
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the object on the right side. Note that the side of extinction could correspond to the side of the 
tool or not. Each item pair was presented simultaneously, one item to the right and the other 
item to the left side of fixation. The stimuli appeared on a black background. 
One-item trials were randomly intermingled with the two-item trials. Here, an item (either 
with an intact or a broken handle) was paired with a blank table on the other side of fixation 
(to maintain approximate levels of visual stimulation), and it was presented at the same 
location and for the same duration as it appeared on two-item trials. 
Items were displayed on a 19-inch monitor at a viewing distance of approximately 50 cm. 
The monitor provided a frame refresh rate of 60 Hz with a spatial resolution of 1024 x 768 
pixels. The stimuli subtended 10.29° x 8.56° of visual angle and were located 0.86° either to 
the left or right side of central fixation. We positioned the items very centrally to imply a joint 
action between the two objects in the action-related condition. The average distance between 
the centre of both items was 12 cm (see also Ptak, Valenza, & Schnider, 2002; di Pellegrino & 
De Renzi, 1995). 
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Figure 5.1. Examples of two-item stimuli presented either as action-related pairs (object-tool 
pair) (a), unrelated tool-tool pairs (b) or as unrelated object-object pairs (c). The stimuli are 
shown with a broken handle on the contralesional side (left panels) or with a broken handle on 
the ipsilesional side (right panels). 
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5.3.3 Design and procedure 
A similar design to Humphreys et al. (2010a) and Wulff and Humphreys (2013) was used. 
The experiment consisted of two conditions (Intact objects and Broken objects), which were 
administered to each patient in an ABAB order across three sessions, with at least one week 
apart. The order of the conditions was counterbalanced across patients. 
The two conditions were identical with the exception that in the Broken handle condition, 
one member of the pair had a broken handle, whereas in the Intact handle condition the 
handles of both stimuli were intact. The Broken handle condition consisted of eight bilateral 
conditions [condition (action-related, unrelated tool, unrelated object) x handle (tool broken, 
object broken) x side of tool (contralesional, ipsilesional)] and eight unilateral conditions 
[stimulus type (object, tool) x handle (tool broken, object broken) x side (ipsilesional, 
contralesional)]. There were 768 trials which were presented in 12 blocks of 64 trials; 48 trials 
for each condition. The Intact condition consisted of six bilateral conditions [condition 
(action-related, unrelated tool, unrelated object) x side of tool (contralesional, ipsilesional)] 
and four unilateral conditions [stimulus type (object, tool) x side (ipsilesional, 
contralesional)]. There were 384 trials which were presented in six blocks of 64 trials; 48 
trials for each condition. Each stimulus was repeated eight times within one block. In prior 
studies of the effects of affordance on extinction only a small number of items have been used 
(e.g., di Pellegrino et al., 2005) in order to allow a clear and controlled manipulation of the 
main factors of interest. In both the Intact and the Broken handle conditions one-item and 
two-item trials were fully randomised.  
Patients had to identify and name the item(s) on each trial by verbal report. Patients were 
tested individually in a quiet room. Responses were recorded as correct if either the single 
item was correctly named, or if both items were correctly named on bilateral trials. It was also 
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noted whether one item on two-item trials was correctly reported, while we did not separately 
record (i) whether patients reported the presence of a second item which they could not name 
or (ii) named the second item incorrectly, or (iii) whether they thought only one item was 
present. However, we also recorded whether any item on two-item trials was reported. Before 
each session, pictures of the stimuli were presented individually on a monitor to each patient 
to ensure that the patients could recognise and correctly identify the items. Additionally, 
patients were given at least 14 practice trials to ensure adequate performance in the task and 
the stimuli on these practice trials were different from those employed in the experimental 
trials to avoid carry-over effects. During these practice trials, stimulus exposure time was 
adjusted to ensure that each patient achieved a performance level of roughly 70-90% correct 
for single items in the contralesional hemifield (Table 5.2) before the experimental trials 
began. The practice trials were repeated until this level was achieved across a block of 14 
trials; the exposure duration was then fixed for a patient for each session. 
Each trial began with a white central fixation cross presented on a black background for 
2000 ms, which was replaced by a red fixation cross for 500 ms to inform patients that the 
stimulus was about to appear. Next a single object or an object pair was presented. For all 
patients (except P1, P6, and P7) a 100 ms mask followed the object(s) to maintain the same 
level of task difficulty across patients. Responses were manually recorded by the 
experimenter, and after that the next trial was initiated. 
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Table 5.2 Stimulus exposure times for the Intact (unbroken handles) and the Broken handle 
condition 
 
Patient Intact (unbroken handles) condition (ms) Broken handle condition (ms) 
P1 
M = 267 (Session 1: 300, Session 2: 200, 
Session 3: 300) 
M = 267 (Session 1: 300, Session 2: 
200, Session 3: 300) 
P2 100 + 100 Mask 
M = 167 + 100 Mask (Session 1: 150 
+ 100 Mask, Session 2: 100 + 100 
Mask, Session 3: 100 + 100 Mask) 
 
P3 
M = 133 + 100 Mask (Session 1: 100 + 100 
Mask, Session 2: 150 + 100 Mask, Session 3: 
100 + 100 Mask) 
M = 133 + 100 Mask (Session 1: 150 
+ 100 Mask, Session 2: 100 + 100 
Mask, Session 3: 150 + 100 Mask) 
 
P4 200 + 100 Mask 
200 + 100 Mask 
 
P5 
M = 92 + 100 Mask (Session 1: 100 + 100 
Mask, Session 2: 75 + 100 Mask, Session 3: 
100 + 100 Mask) 
M = 83 + 100 Mask (Session 1: 100 + 
100 Mask, Session 2: 75 + 100 Mask, 
Session 3: 75 + 100 Mask) 
 
P6 150 
M = 167 (Session 1: 200, Session 2: 
150, Session 3: 150) 
 
P7 
M = 767 (Session 1: 1400, Session 2: 500, 
Session 3: 400) 
M = 583 (Session 1: 1100, Session 2: 
250, Session 3: 400) 
 
P8 
M = 167 + 100 Mask (Session 1: 150 + 100 
Mask, Session 2: 150 + 100 Mask, Session 3: 
200 + 100 Mask) 
M = 233 + 100 Mask (Session 1: 200 
+ 100 Mask, Session 2: 200 + 100 
Mask, Session 3: 300 + 100 Mask) 
Note. M = Mean. 
 
5.4 Results 
We analysed accuracy data as well as error data. Accuracy data reflect correct naming of a 
single item in unilateral and of two items in bilateral trials. These data were used to contrast 
report on one- and two-item trials, and thus to assess whether extinction occurred. For two-
item trials, error data were then computed by counting how many times only one of two items 
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was correctly named (either on the left or right visual field), or no item was reported and 
whether the reported item fell on the ipsi- or contralesional side
1
. This was done to examine 
whether there was a preferential report of the tool. Note that errors when only one item was 
reported included three different response types: identification of one item and not reporting 
the second, identification of one item and reporting the presence of the second item which 
could not be named, and incorrect identification of the second item; cf. method section
2
. On 
average, patients made errors on 40% of the two-item trials, of which 38% were errors when 
patients only named one item correctly, while on just 2% of the trials patients failed to report 
any item. The former error type was used for all subsequent analyses. We report the results in 
several sections.  
1. We assessed whether there was a spatial extinction effect by testing performance 
overall on two-item vs. one-item trials, separately for the intact and the broken handle 
conditions.  
2. We investigated the effects of action relation on two-item report, comparing action-
related (familiar) and unrelated (unfamiliar) object pairs when the handles were intact. 
This attempts to replicate prior work (cf. Riddoch et al., 2003). We also explored 
whether there are differences between the three types of object pairs in their error 
pattern, i.e., when only one item was correctly reported.  
3. We examined the role of broken handles on two-item trial performance. This was done 
in three stages: (i) We evaluated the effects of having a broken handle on performance 
only with action-related objects: first when the tool handle was broken and then when 
                                                 
 
1
 Note that the accuracy data could not be used since these data failed to distinguish which item was reported on 
an error trial. 
2
 Unfortunately we failed to record the type of error when only a single item was reported. However it should be 
noted that by far the majority of such errors involved patients reporting one item and making no response to the 
other. 
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the object handle was broken. (ii) We assessed the contrast between action-related 
objects and unrelated tools when the tool handle was broken. (iii) We examined the 
contrast between action-related objects and unrelated objects when the object handle 
was broken. These latter two contrasts are the same as comparison (2) above, except 
that one of the stimuli had a broken handle here, whereas the handles were intact in 
comparison (2). (iv) We also explored whether patients tended to report more tools or 
objects on error trials when only one item was correctly named, in the action-related 
condition (when tools and objects were paired together). 
4. Finally, we assessed whether there were differences in reporting unilateral tools vs. 
unilateral objects.  
 
In all analyses, we included patient as a between-subject factor (with sessions as subjects) 
to test whether there are variations in the size of the effects across patients. Greenhouse-
Geisser correction for degrees of freedom was used when the assumption of sphericity was 
not met. Significant differences between conditions were further assessed with paired t-tests 
(p < .05). 
 
5.4.1 The presence of extinction 
We compared performance on one-item trials with performance on two-item trials to 
confirm that patients suffered from extinction, with extinction being present when patients’ 
identification performance was significantly better on one-item than on two-item trials. The 
accuracy data from one-item trials and from the different two-item conditions (pooled across 
conditions), based on the number of items correctly reported on the ipsilesional or 
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contralesional side, were entered into an ANOVA with the within-subject factors being 
number of objects (one-item, two-items) and side of item being reported (ipsilesional, 
contralesional); patient was treated as a between-subject factor.  
 Intact condition. Performance on one-item trials was significantly better than performance 
on two-item trials, confirming that visual extinction was present, F(1,16) = 674.86, p < .001, 
ɳp
2
 = .977. The main effects of side, F(1,16) = 55.10, p < .001, ɳp
2
 = .775 (ipsilesional > 
contralesional stimuli) and patient, F(7,16) = 9.33, p < .001, ɳp
2
 = .803, were significant. The 
number of objects by side interaction, F(1,16) = 6.64, p = .020, ɳp
2
 = .293, reached 
significance. The side effect was slightly larger in the two-item trial conditions compared to 
the one-item trial conditions, though it was reliable for both, t(23) = 4.96, t(23) = 4.63, both 
p < .001, respectively (see Figure 5.2a). There were also significant interactions between the 
number of objects and patient, F(7,16) = 3.70, p = .014, ɳp
2
 = .618, between side and patient, 
F(7,16) = 3.44, p = .019, ɳp
2
 = .601, and between number of objects, side and patient, 
F(7,16) = 14.87, p < .001, ɳp
2
 = .867 (Figure 5.2b). These interactions indicate that the 
extinction effect was larger for some patients than for others, though all patients showed 
extinction and patients’ performance varied as a function of the side of stimulus. 
Broken handle condition. The same ANOVA was conducted with broken object pairs. As 
with intact object pairs, identification performance was significantly better on one-item than 
on two-item trials, F(1,16) = 1395.25, p < .001, ɳp
2
 = .989 (Figure 5.2c). There were 
significant main effects of side, F(1,16) = 75.21, p < .001, ɳp
2
 = .825 (ipsilesional > 
contralesional stimuli) and patient, F(7,16) = 8.34, p < .001, ɳp
2 
= .785. The number of objects 
by side interaction, F(1,16) = 4.81, p = .043, ɳp
2
 = .231, was also significant. As before, the 
side effect was slightly larger in the two-item trial conditions compared to the one-item 
conditions, t(23) = 4.74, t(23) = 4.17, both p < .001, respectively. There were also significant 
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interactions between the number of objects and patient, F(7,16) = 3.55, p = .017, ɳp
2
 = .608, 
between side and patient, F(7,16) = 6.55, p = .001, ɳp
2
 = .741, and between number of objects, 
side and patient, F(7,16) = 11.50, p < .001, ɳp
2
 = .834. The variations across patients are 
shown in Figure 5.2d; however the one item advantage was present for all patients. 
 
 
Figure 5.2. Data for one-item and two-item trials in the Intact (unbroken handles) condition 
and in the Broken handle condition as a function of side of stimulus. Mean accuracy of 
performance (a, c) and mean patient accuracies (b, d) with error bars indicating standard error 
(SE). 
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5.4.2 Effects of object pair type on two-item report (intact handles) 
Accuracy data. To investigate whether the type of object pair affected identification 
performance when both handles were intact, the data from action-related (object-tool) pairs 
were compared with unrelated tool-tool and with unrelated object-object pairs. Figure 5.3a 
shows the mean performance for each object pair condition. The main effect of condition, 
F(1.9,30.3) = 65.64, p < .001, ɳp
2
 = .804, reached significance. Bonferroni corrected multiple 
comparisons showed that accuracy was significantly higher for action-related objects and for 
unrelated tools than for unrelated object pairs (both p < .001), whereas there was no 
difference between the report of action-related objects and unrelated tool pairs. The benefit 
for the related (object-tool) pair condition over the unrelated object-object pair condition 
indicates that the presence of the tool (in the action-related object-tool condition) benefitted 
report of the other (non-tool) object, and that action relatedness can benefit report (cf. 
Riddoch et al., 2003). There was also a benefit for two tools compared with two objects, 
indicating a general advantage for reporting tools. There was a significant main effect of 
patient, F(7,16) = 5.19, p = .003, ɳp
2
 = .694. The interaction between condition and patient, 
F(13.3,30.3) = 9.00, p < .001, ɳp
2
 = .797 (see Figure 5.3a), was reliable. This indicates that the 
magnitude of the effect of condition varied across individuals, but all patients showed the 
effect. 
Error data. We compared the error data from these two-item trials when only one item of 
an object pair was correctly reported based on the side of the reported item (either on the 
ipsilesional or the contralesional side). A chi-square test indicated that the type of the object 
pair modulated the side of the reported item, χ2(2) = 7.203, p = .027, Cramer’s V = .127. As 
can be seen in Figure 5.3b, the number of reported items on the ipsilesional relative to the 
contralesional side was higher for unrelated objects compared to action-related pairs and 
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unrelated tools. This suggests that there is more “weight” placed during selection on the 
spatial position of the target when two objects are present relative to when one of the stimuli 
is a tool.  
 
 
Figure 5.3. Intact handles only. (a) Mean patient accuracies and (b) number of correct 
responses for two-item trials when only one item of an object pair was reported (either on the 
ipsilesional or on the contralesional side) as function of object pair condition when both 
handles were intact. Error bars denote SE. 
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5.4.3 Role of broken handles on two-item trial performance 
To assess whether a broken handle affected two-item trial performance, several separate 
ANOVAs were conducted with the factors being handle (both handles intact/one handle 
broken) and side of broken handle (contra- vs. ipsilesional); patient was treated as between-
subject factor. Separate ANOVAs were conducted because the make-up of the conditions 
(e.g., two objects, two tools, object-tool – each sometimes having a broken handle) meant that 
the factors could not be nested in a single ANOVA. 
 
(i) Effects with action-related objects only  
First we assessed effects of having a broken tool handle; then we assessed effects of having 
a broken object handle. Finally, we analysed error trials to examine whether tools or objects 
are reported more often in error trials when only one item was correctly reported. 
Tool handle broken (Figure 5.1a (i) vs. Figure 5.1a (iii)). There were reliable main effects 
of side of tool, F(1,16) = 9.33 , p = .008, ɳp
2
 = .368 (ipsilesional > contralesional) and patient, 
F(7,16) = 6.08 , p = .001, ɳp
2
 = .727. The interaction between intact/broken handle and side of 
tool was reliable, F(1,16) = 12.90, p = .002, ɳp
2 
= .446. When both handles were intact, there 
was better performance when the tool was presented on the contralesional side relative to 
when it was presented on the ipsilesional side, t(23) = 3.84, p = .001 (Figure 5.4a), while there 
was no reliable effect of the positioning of the tool when the tool handle was broken. The side 
of tool by patient interaction, F(7,16) = 2.84, p = .040, ɳp
2
 = .554, was also significant (Figure 
5.4b). Patients differed in the degree to which they reported more stimuli when the tool was 
on the ipsilesional compared to when the tool was on the contralesional side; these effects 
were present for all but one patient (P1). 
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Object handle broken (Figure 5.1a (ii) vs. Figure 5.1a (iii)). There were significant main 
effects of intact/broken handle, F(1,16) = 4.90, p = .042, ɳp
2
 = .234 (broke > intact), side of 
broken handle, F(1,16) = 38.72, p < .001, ɳp
2
 = .708 (ipsilesional > contralesional) and 
patient, F(7,16) = 5.36 , p = .003, ɳp
2
 = .701. The effects of having a broken object handle and 
the side of the broken object handle were additive, F(1,16) = .634 , p = .438, ɳp
2
 = .038 (see 
Figure 5.4c). Note that the effect of the side of the broken object handle here fits with the 
effect of the tool position (above). Performance was better when the broken object handle was 
on the ipsilesional side (and the tool was on the contralesional side in the action-related pair) 
than when the broken object was on the contralesional side (and the tool was on the 
ipsilesional side). The interaction between the side of the broken object and patient was also 
reliable, F(7,16) = 5.04, p = .004, ɳp
2
 = .688 (Figure 5.4d). The effect of whether the broken 
object handle was on the ipsi- or contralesional side varied across patients but was present in 
all except in one patient (P1). 
These analyses indicate that the report of action-related pairs changed as a function of the 
position of the tool when the tool handle was intact, with performance generally being worse 
when the tool was on the ipsilesional side relative to when it fell in the contralesional field. 
This effect of tool position was eliminated when the tool handle was broken. This 
interpretation is supported by the error data (Figure 5.5, see below). 
Error data. The error data from two-item trials when only one item of an object pair was 
correctly reported were entered into a log-linear analysis, with the factors being handle 
(intact/broken), side of tool (either on the ipsilesional or contralesional side) and side of 
reported item (either on the contralesional or on the ipsilesional side). The analysis produced a 
final model with the highest order interaction (handle x side of tool) and a main effect of 
reported item, χ2(3) = 3.508, p = .320. There was similar performance in reporting ipsilesional 
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and contralesional stimuli (tools, objects), but this held only for the broken tool condition. In 
contrast, there were more reports of the tool occurring on the ipsilesional than the 
contralesional side when the tool was intact. Overall, there was better performance in 
reporting tools compared to objects, and the report was better for ipsilesional compared with 
contralesional tools (Figure 5.5).  
 
 
Figure 5.4. Action-related objects only. Effects of breaking the handle of the tool (a, b) or the 
object (c, d). Mean accuracies for action-related objects as a function of whether the tool 
handle (a) or the object handle (c) was broken compared to when both handles were intact. 
Mean patient accuracies (b, d) with error bars denote SE. Asterisks denote significance 
(**p < .01). 
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Figure 5.5. Action-related objects only. Number of correct responses for two-item trials when 
only one item of an object pair was reported (either on the ipsilesional or on the contralesional 
side) as function of whether the tool handle was intact (a) or broken (b). 
 
(ii) Action-related objects vs. unrelated tools (with broken tool handle; Figure 5.1a (i) vs. 
Figure 5.1b (i)) 
The within-subject factors were condition (action-related objects vs. unrelated tools) and 
location of the broken tool (contralesional vs. ipsilesional field). Patient was treated as a 
between-subject factor. The only reliable effects were the main effect of patient, 
F(7,16) = 9.57, p < .001, ɳp
2
 = .807, and the interaction between condition and patient, 
F(7,16) = 6.96, p = .001, ɳp
2
 = .753. The difference in overall report between action-related 
pairs and tool pairs varied unsystematically across patients (Figure 5.6). The effects of 
breaking the handle of the tool were the same for action-related pairs and unrelated tools, 
consistent with the effect of breaking the handle being largely driven by the tool, in action-
related pairs. 
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Figure 5.6. Action-related objects vs. unrelated tools, with a broken tool handle. Mean patient 
accuracies as a function of the pair condition, averaged across the side of the broken tool. 
Error bars denote SE.  
 
(iii) Action-related objects vs. unrelated objects (with broken object handle; Figure 5.1a (i) 
vs. Figure 5.1c (i)) 
The within-subject factors were condition (action-related objects vs. unrelated objects) and 
location of the broken object (contralesional vs. ipsilesional). Patient was treated as a 
between-subject factor. The main effects of condition, F(1,16) = 133.36, p < .001, ɳp
2
 = .893 
(action-related objects > unrelated objects), side of broken object, F(1,16) = 9.22, p = .008, 
ɳp
2
= .365 (ipsilesional > contralesional stimuli), and patient, F(7,16) = 3.77, p = .013, ɳp
2
 
= .623, were reliable. There was a significant interaction between condition and side of 
broken object, F(1,16) = 12.46, p = .003, ɳp
2
 = .438 (Figure 5.7a). In the action-related 
condition, performance was increased when the broken object was on the ipsilesional side and 
the intact tool was on the contralesional side compared to when the stimuli were in the 
opposite positions, t(23) = 3.14, p = .005. In contrast, there was no reliable effect of the side 
of the broken object with unrelated object pairs. There were also interactions between 
condition and patient, F(7,16) = 7.57, p < .001, ɳp
2
 = .768 (Figure 5.7b), and side of broken 
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object and patient, F(7,16) = 2.63, p = .051, ɳp
2
 = .535 (Figure 5.7c). There was an overall 
advantage for action-related pairs over unrelated object pairs and for intact tools/broken 
object handles on the contralesional compared with the ipsilesional side, but these effects 
varied in size although in the same direction across patients.  
 
 
Figure 5.7 Action-related objects vs. unrelated objects, with a broken object handle. (a) Mean 
accuracy of performance for action-related and unrelated object pairs as function of whether 
the broken object handle was on the contralesional or on the ipsilesional side. (b) Mean 
patient accuracies as function of condition (b) and side of broken object (c) with error bars 
indicating SE. Asterisks denote significance (** p < .01). 
 132 
 
5.4.4 Effect of stimulus type on one-item report 
The accuracy data from unilateral trials were also analysed in order to assess whether there 
were any differences between the report of tools and other objects when presented in isolation 
(equivalent to the active and passive members within an object pair; see Methods). The 
within-subject factors were stimulus type (object, tool), side of stimulus (contra- vs. 
ipsilesional) and handle (broken, intact); patient was treated as a between-subject factor. 
There were significant main effects of stimulus type, F(1,16) = 24.44, p < .001, ɳp
2
 = .604 
(tools > objects), side of stimulus, F(1,16) = 38.92, p < .001, ɳp
2
 = .709 (ipsilesional > 
contralesional stimuli), and patient, F(7,16) = 4.67, p = .005, ɳp
2
 = .671. There was also an 
interaction between stimulus type and side of stimulus, F(1,16) = 6.35, p = .023, ɳp
2
 = .284. 
Patients tended to report more stimuli on the ipsilesional than the contralesional side (tools, 
t(23) = 4.17, p < .001; objects, t(23) = 3.77, p = .001 (Figure 5.8a). In addition, the interaction 
between side of stimulus and patient was also significant, F(6,16) = 5.09, p = .003, ɳp
2
 = .690 
(Figure 5.8b); patients varied in the magnitude of the side effect but they all showed the same 
direction. This analysis indicates that the effect of having a broken handle had little effect 
when single objects were presented (i.e., when there was no spatial competition for selection). 
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Figure 5.8 The relation between stimulus type (tool, object) and side of stimulus 
(contralesional, ipsilesional) on unilateral trials. Mean accuracy (a) and mean patient 
accuracies (b) as function of side of stimulus. Error bars denote SE. Asterisks denote 
significance (*** p < .001, ** p < .01). 
 
5.5 Discussion 
It is well-established that positioning familiar objects for action promotes recovery from 
visual extinction (Riddoch et al., 2003). Similarly, extinction can be affected by the position 
of the action-related part of a single object (di Pellegrino et al., 2005). Also, within pairs of 
action-related objects, attention tends to be drawn to the object that would be grasped to 
perform the action (the active tool), rather than the passive object (Riddoch et al., 2003). 
These effects have been attributed to the affordance offered by the objects, which helps to 
draw attention to the contralesional side (for recent reviews, see Humphreys et al., 2013; 
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Humphreys et al., 2010b) and to the active object in a pair (Roberts & Humphreys, 2010b). 
The present chapter investigated whether recovery from extinction held on trials when the 
affordance was disrupted by presenting objects with a broken handle, and whether the 
presence of the broken handle altered any bias to attend to the active object in a pair. There 
were several effects to note, some of which did not relate to the presence of a broken handle 
and some of which did. 
 
5.5.1 Effects independent of the broken handle 
We will initially consider effects that were assessed independent of the presence of a 
broken handle. Firstly, there was an overall effect of extinction. Patients were able to report 
more items on one-item trials than on two-item trials. Secondly, patients did benefit overall 
more when action-related (object-tool) stimuli were presented relative to when unrelated 
object-object pairs were presented. This is in line with previous studies showing that 
extinction patients are better at attending to object pairs which have the potential to interact 
with each other (object-tool pairs here) compared to when this is unlikely (with unrelated 
objects; e.g., Wulff & Humphreys, 2013; Riddoch et al., 2006). Interestingly, there was no 
advantage for action-related (object-tool) pairs compared to when two tools were presented. 
Contrary to our expectation, however, it might be that the two tools themselves afforded a 
common action together, even though they were unfamiliar as a pair. Familiarity does not 
appear to be critical here. This interpretation matches the results from the error trials, where 
only one item of the object pair was reported. There was better report of ipsilesional items for 
unrelated objects compared to ipsilesional stimuli presented with action-related and unrelated 
tool pairs. Based on this result, we cannot exclude the possibility that the presence of a tool 
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rather than its relationship to the other non-tool object in a pair is what matters for the 
affordance effect. This argument seems plausible as the error data revealed that patients 
overall reported tools over objects (Figure 5.5). In addition, with intact handles, performance 
was better when the tool was on the contralesional relative to the ipsilesional side (Figure 
5.4a). We speculate that either that the presence of the tool helped to cue attention to the 
contralesional field (cf. di Pellegrino et al., 2005) or that presenting the tool on the ipsilesional 
side tended to attract attention and led to attentional capture, ipsilesional, and thus increased 
extinction (e.g., Shalev & Humphreys, 2000). We consider this further below. 
 
5.5.2 Effects when a handle was broken 
When the handle of one of the objects was broken, some of the results changed. Notably, 
when the tool handle was broken, there was now no longer an effect of the position of the tool 
for action-related objects (Figure 5.4a). The direction of this effect was that performance 
improved relative to when the tool handle was intact and when the tool fell on the ipsilesional 
side (Figure 5.4a). This is consistent with an account of attentional capture by an ipsilesional 
tool with an intact handle – reducing this capture by breaking the handle of the ipsilesional 
tool led to better report of both items (see above). This argument about attentional capture fits 
well with the results from the error analysis. Here we observed that patients reported more 
ipsilesional tools, regardless of whether the tool was broken or not (Figure 5.5).  
When the handle of the object (rather than of the tool) was broken, there was no interaction 
with whether action-related objects or unrelated objects were presented, and the advantage for 
action-related (object-tool) pairs was maintained (Figure 5.7a). This suggests that breaking the 
handle of the object has a weaker effect on any affordance-based response to the stimuli, so 
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that the effect of action relatedness is maintained even when a handle is broken. There were 
also effects of whether the broken handled object appeared on the contralesional or 
ipsilesional side (better report when it fell on the ipsilesional side, in action-related pairs; 
Figure 5.4c). However, this result can also be explained in terms of the location of the intact 
tool, which fell in the contralesional field in the former case (broken handled object in the 
ipsilesional field). Presenting a tool on the ipsilesional side disrupted performance relative to 
when the tool fell in the contralesional field, in line with the error analysis (Figure 5.5a). 
However, if there was only a detrimental effect of presenting an intact tool on the 
ipsilesional side, we would not expect to see the overall advantage for action-related objects 
compared to the unrelated baseline (unrelated tools, unrelated objects) since the tool, in the 
action-related trials, would disrupt performance. Instead, we suggest that, on top of any 
attentional capture by the tool, the report of both items was enhanced by coding an action 
relation between the stimuli, which facilitated attention across both presented items. 
Riddoch et al. (2003) and Wulff and Humphreys (2013) both noted that, on trials where 
patients only reported one item in an interacting pair, the tool was typically identified. Roberts 
and Humphreys (2010b) also showed that, in normal participants, there is a “prior entry” 
effect for tools over objects; when the stimuli are presented in co-locations for action, 
participants tend to identify the tool as appearing before the object (cf. Rorden, Mattingley, 
Karnath, & Driver, 1997; see also Wulff et al., 2015; Laverick et al., 2015). This is consistent 
with attention being biased towards the tool (Matheson et al., 2014; Handy et al., 2003). We 
speculate that, in the present study, this biasing of attention would be exacerbated when the 
tool falls in the ipsilesional (attended) field and allocating attention to the ipsilesional tool can 
then disrupt the report of the contralesional object. The interesting result here was that the 
effect of position of the tool was eliminated when the tool handle was broken but not when 
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the object handle was broken. This observed result for broken tools in our study fits well with 
the TMS results from healthy participants using single objects. Buccino et al. (2009) 
presented pictures of intact tools and tools with a broken handle and found that only intact 
stimuli evoked a motor response. We found a similar pattern with intact paired objects, but 
not when the handle of one object was broken. This result confirms that viewing non-
graspable objects can eliminate motor-based affordance effects. The data further support the 
assumption that the active tool, rather than the passive recipient of the action has a higher 
weight within a pair (see e.g., Xu et al., 2015; Wulff & Humphreys, 2013; Riddoch et al., 
2003). Taken together, the results indicate that the response to an affordance is modulated by 
the graspability of the object (the tool in case of action-related object pairs). 
In addition to these effects on two-item trials, we found an advantage for reporting single 
tools over single objects. However, and perhaps in contrast with the study by Buccino et al. 
(2009), this result was unaffected by whether the tool handle was broken. In the present study, 
the major constraint on perceptual report was on whether there was competition for attention 
from an ipsilesional item on the selection of a contralesional stimulus, and this was mediated 
by whether the tool handle was broken. However, the effects of breaking the handle on 
attentional competition should be lessened with single objects, as we observed. The data do 
suggest though that individual items were equally identifiable irrespective of whether or not 
the handle was broken, and this was not a major factor on report (for a similar result using a 
spatial stimulus-response compatibility paradigm, see Ambrosecchia, Marino, Gawryszewski, 
& Riggio, 2015). Thus, the results on two-item trials may more clearly reflect whether tools 
capture attention, and the effects of attentional capture by tools appear to be lessened when 
the handle is broken. 
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Interestingly, there was also a suggestion in the data that the effect of the tool could also 
have been moderated by the handedness of the patients. P1 and P8 were formerly left-handed. 
These patients tended to show weaker effects of whether the tool was positioned on the 
contralesional or ipsilesional side, relative to the other patients (see Figure 5.4b and Figure 
5.4d). We may speculate that the drive to attend to the tool when it fell on the ipsilesional side 
was reduced in these patients, perhaps because it reflects a motor-based response to tools. 
Since the present patients all had right hemisphere lesions and left-sided extinction, an 
attentional drive to the right side tool (in the ipsilesional field) would be reduced in the left-
handed patients. Clearly, the number of patients here is too small to make strong conclusions, 
but the effects of handedness on performance remain an interesting question to examine. 
A final point to note is that the present result appears to be driven largely by whether an 
intact tool falls on the ipsilesional side, and attentional capture by this item is moderated by 
whether the handle is broken. The evidence is consistent with the affordance from the tools 
being coded in an attended region of field (on the ipsilesional side), but there is not strong 
evidence for the tool-related affordance being critical when the tool is in the contralesional 
field. We conclude that performance here is modulated by two factors: (i) an overall effect of 
having a tool within an object pair (action-related objects = unrelated tools), (ii) coding an 
action relation between stimuli (action-related objects > unrelated objects), and (iii) 
attentional capture by an intact tool on the ipsilesional side (overall report better for tool on 
the contralesional side vs. tool on the ipsilesional side). Only this attentional capture effect 
was moderated by breaking the handle of the tool. 
The present data may have clinical implications. Attentional capture by the active object in 
the action (the tool) could be used to improve patients’ performance in everyday tasks. For 
example, training everyday tasks such making a sandwich or preparing a hot drink could 
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benefit by always presenting an action pair (e.g., knife and fork) and positioning the tool (the 
fork) on the contralateral side. Furthermore, our results indicate that drinking containers 
should have a handle to facilitate affordance perception. Whether patients with other 
neuropsychological deficits (e.g., apraxia, dementia) would benefit from affordance in a 
similar way to extinction patients would be an interesting question to follow up. 
 
5.6 Study limitations 
We acknowledge that the limited stimulus set could have contributed to these results. The 
aim of the experiment was to investigate affordance effects with intact and broken objects. As 
previous studies have shown that the object handle and its orientation is the most prominent 
feature to guide visual attention (cf. Matheson et al., 2014; Symes et al., 2007), we chose 
drinking containers with handles to manipulate affordances (cf. Ambrosecchia et al., 2015; 
Garrido-Vasquez & Schuboe, 2014; Buccino et al., 2009). In order to prevent guessing, we 
chose distinct drinking containers instead of using different cups or teapots. We do agree that 
the action pairs “cup-teapot” and “flask-beaker” have a stronger association than non-action 
pairs (cup-beaker or teapot-flask). We expected that action pairs, in contrast to unrelated 
pairs, would increase affordance-based responses. Furthermore, we chose highly familiar 
objects to avoid training effects. We did not observe any improvements across sessions as we 
adjusted the stimulus exposure time for each session to ensure a similar performance across 
sessions. 
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5.7 Conclusion 
The present chapter explored whether recovery from extinction was influenced by the 
graspability of the tool or the passive object within an object pair. The results demonstrate 
that breaking the handle of the tool rather than of the passive object is crucial for the 
affordance effect, and thus recovery from extinction. The data further suggest that tools 
capture attention, with the attentional capture being lessened when the tool handle is broken. 
In addition, recovery from extinction was higher for both action-related object pairs and 
unrelated tool pairs compared to unrelated object pairs. This indicates that the potential for 
action rather than the familiarity with the action pair is important for the perception of 
affordance (cf. Riddoch et al., 2006). 
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CHAPTER 6:  EFFECTS OF PAIRED-OBJECT AFFORDANCE IN SEARCH TASKS 
ACROSS THE ADULT LIFESPAN
1
 
 
6.1 Abstract 
The present chapter directly examined the role of task relevance and context on the 
automatic perception of paired-object affordance effects. Specifically, the processes 
underlying the retrieval of action information about functional object pairs, focusing on the 
contribution of procedural and semantic knowledge, was investigated. The contribution of 
procedural knowledge was examined by the way objects were selected, specifically whether 
active objects were selected before passive objects. The contribution of semantic knowledge 
was examined by manipulating the relation between targets and distracters. A touchscreen-
based search task was used testing young, middle-aged and elderly participants. Participants 
had to select by touching two targets among distracters using two search tasks. In the explicit 
action search task, participants had to select two objects which afforded a mutual action (e.g., 
functional pair: hammer-nail). Implicit affordance perception was tested using a visual-colour 
matching search task; participants had to select two objects which had the same coloured 
frame. In both tasks, half of the coloured targets also afforded an action. Overall, middle-aged 
participants performed better than young and elderly participants, specifically in the action 
task. Across participants, in the action task, accuracy was increased when the distracters were 
semantically unrelated to the functional pair, while the opposite pattern was observed in the 
colour task. This effect was enhanced with increased age. In the action task, all participants 
                                                 
 
1
 Chapter 6 is an adapted version of Wulff, M., Stainton, A., & Rotshtein, P. (submitted). Effects of paired-object 
affordance in search tasks across the adult lifespan. Brain and Cognition. 
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utilised procedural knowledge, i.e., selected the active object before the passive object. This 
result supports the dual-route account from vision to action. Semantic knowledge contributed 
to both the action and the colour task, but procedural knowledge associated with the direct 
route was primarily retrieved when the task was action-relevant. Across the adulthood 
lifespan, the data show inverted U-shaped effects of age on the retrieval of action knowledge. 
Age also linearly increased the involvement of the indirect (semantic) route and the 
integration of information of the direct and the indirect routes in selection processes.  
 
6.2 Introduction 
The processing of visual scenes is influenced by many factors. Gibson (1979) first outlined 
the concept of affordance, proposing that objects are not only perceived in terms of their 
visual properties but also in terms of what they afford (e.g., a knife affords cutting). Several 
studies have demonstrated that affordance processes are activated automatically when we 
view an object, regardless of the viewer’s intention to act upon it (e.g., Grezes & Decety, 
2002). Affordance effects can also be observed when two objects engage in a functional 
interaction: one object acting upon the other to produce an action (a bottle pouring into a 
glass; Gibson, 1979). Accumulating evidence demonstrates that attention and perception is 
facilitated when a functional relation between objects exists (e.g., Wulff et al., 2015; Laverick 
et al., 2015; Xu et al., 2015; Wulff & Humphreys, 2015, 2013; Borghi et al., 2012; Roberts & 
Humphreys, 2011a; Green & Hummel, 2006; Riddoch et al., 2003). It has been argued that 
affordance facilitates perception through the direct route from vision to action without 
accessing semantic knowledge. However, the interplay between procedural and semantic 
knowledge when retrieving action knowledge is still debated. In the present chapter, we 
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examined the contribution of procedural and semantic knowledge to action retrieval using two 
different search tasks. We also explored whether this interaction would change across the 
adulthood lifespan. 
The dual-route account from vision to action (Riddoch et al., 1989) assumes that action 
retrieval is mediated by two routes: A direct route based on the structural properties of objects 
(affordances) which automatically activates action and motor procedures (i.e., procedural 
knowledge; e.g., how to grasp a knife and how to use a knife with a fork) by-passing semantic 
knowledge. The direct route is assumed to be mediated by the dorsal (occipito-parietal) visual 
pathway mediating object-related actions (Goodale & Milner, 1992; Ungerleider & Mishkin, 
1982). The dorsal visual stream route has been further subdivided into a dorso-dorsal and a 
ventro-dorsal stream (Rizzolatti & Matelli, 2003). The dorso-dorsal stream connects area V6 
with areas V6A and MIP of the superior parietal lobule, while the ventro-dorsal stream 
connects the inferior parietal lobule with superior medial temporal (MT/MST) and ventral 
pre-motor cortices (Rizzolatti & Matelli, 2003). It is assumed that the link between affordance 
perception and motor procedures depicting the way we interact with objects is mediated by 
the ventro-dorsal stream rather than the dorso-dorsal stream associated with the on-line 
control of action (Binkofski & Buxbaum, 2013; Buxbaum & Kalenine, 2010; Rizzolatti & 
Matelli, 2003). A second indirect route enables retrieval of semantic knowledge by accessing 
previous knowledge about the object (e.g., knowledge on when and what is a knife used for). 
This knowledge is stored as part of the semantic memory system (e.g., a knife as many other 
kitchen items is used in the context of food such as eating, preparing etc.; for a simulation of 
the dual-route model, see Yoon et al., 2002). The indirect semantic route is associated with 
the ventral (occipito-temporal) visual pathway for recognizing objects (Goodale & Milner, 
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1992) which terminates in the anterior temporal lobe where conceptual knowledge is believed 
to be represented.  
The hypothesis that action retrieval can be mediated by the direct route from vision to 
action is supported by neuropsychological data (for a review, see Humphreys & Riddoch, 
2003). For example, patients with left occipito-temporal brain damage were able to make 
appropriate gestures to objects even though they were unable to name the objects (e.g., Yoon, 
Humphreys, & Riddoch, 2005; Riddoch and Humphreys, 1987; for a similar dissociation in 
semantic dementia patients, see Hodges et al., 2000; Hodges, Spatt, & Patterson, 1999). The 
opposite pattern is evident for patients with left parietal brain damage. These patients were 
able to access semantic knowledge but they were impaired when asked to interact with objects 
(Riddoch et al., 1989). This double dissociation confirms the existence of a direct route and 
challenges the traditional view that vision to action interacts only indirectly through semantic 
knowledge (Ochipa et al., 1992).  
Even though the above cited literature supports the direct route for procedural knowledge 
retrieval and the indirect route for semantic knowledge retrieval, there is evidence that the 
direct and the indirect route may both contribute to action retrieval. For example, using 
computational modelling (naming and action model; Yoon et al., 2002), it has been shown 
that damage to one route impaired (“blocked”) action retrieval of the other route. This is 
supported by experimental data showing a strong linear relationship between semantic 
impairment and accuracy of object use (Silveri & Ciccarelli, 2009), specifically when using 
the same stimulus set in semantic dementia patients (Hodges et al., 2000). Neuroimaging 
evidence in healthy participants also suggests a link between action and semantic knowledge. 
For example, Mizelle et al. (2013) showed that the indirect (semantic) route was involved in 
evaluating functional relations between objects, and thus linking action semantic and action 
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procedural systems. Taken together, these above cited studies suggest a strong relationship 
between action and semantic knowledge (see also, Frey, 2007; Bozeat et al., 2002; Buxbaum 
et al., 1997).  
There is growing evidence that the interaction between the direct (affordance) route and 
the indirect semantic route also affects selection processes. Patients with right fronto-parietal 
brain damage and left-sided extinction, a disorder of spatial selective attention, were able to 
report more objects in their extinguished hemifield when the objects were presented in a way 
that afforded an action (a fork and knife facing each other) or not (a knife facing away from a 
fork; Wulff & Humphreys, 2013; Humphreys et al., 2010a; Riddoch et al., 2006; Riddoch et 
al., 2003). Note that mere semantic associations between objects did not facilitate selective 
attention processes in these patients (Riddoch et al., 2003; for a similar result with healthy 
participants, see Adamo & Ferber, 2009). Similarly, healthy participants showed improved 
performance when the objects were functionally related compared to when they were 
unrelated (McNair & Harris, 2014; Borghi et al., 2012; Roberts & Humphreys, 2011a; Adamo 
& Ferber, 2009; Green & Hummel, 2006).  
An important action cue for interacting objects is the functional role of each object within 
an action pair (i.e., procedural knowledge). Riddoch et al. (2003) differentiated between the 
active and the passive object within a pair, with the active object (e.g., bottle) being the one 
which is typically gripped by the dominant hand and acts upon the passive object (e.g., glass) 
gripped by the non-dominant hand to produce the action (cf. Laverick et al., 2015). However, 
which hand is used to grasp the active object is influenced by the context in which the objects 
will be used (e.g., drinking vs. pouring). Studies with healthy participants also demonstrated 
an attentional bias toward the active object (Wulff et al., 2015; Laverick et al., 2015; McNair 
& Harris, 2014; Roberts & Humphreys, 2010b; Tipper et al., 2006). McNair and Harris 
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(2014), for example, manipulated the temporal sequence of a tool (the active object) or its 
corresponding action recipient (the passive object) in an attentional blink paradigm. Reduced 
attentional blink occurred when the active object preceded the passive object but not when the 
temporal order was reversed. These results suggest that the tool (i.e., the active object) has a 
higher attentional weight than its action recipient (i.e., passive object) in an action pair.  
Wulff and colleagues (Wulff et al., 2015; Laverick et al., 2015) investigated the 
contribution of semantic and procedural knowledge to the retrieval of action knowledge by 
manipulating these two factors orthogonally using real objects and static pictures of the same 
objects on a screen. In the real object task, participants performed a conceptual search, i.e., 
they had to select a pair of real objects affording a mutual action among distracters. In this 
task, search targets were identified based on the retrieval of action knowledge. The authors 
assessed the involvement of semantic processes in action decisions by manipulating the 
semantic relation between action pair and distracters. For example, for the action pair knife 
and fork, the semantically related distracters were cup and spatula and the unrelated 
distracters were pen and scissors (kitchen vs. office items, respectively). Procedural 
knowledge was assessed using the way/order objects were selected. Specifically, if objects 
were selected in a manner matching the execution of an action (e.g., selecting the active 
object first with the right hand) this would indicate an involvement of the direct (procedural) 
route in the retrieval of action knowledge. In the computerised version of the experiment, 
participants had to decide by button press whether two consecutively presented objects can 
interact with each other. Here the involvement of semantic knowledge was assessed by the 
time to reject a functional relation between two semantically related or unrelated objects. As 
with real objects, the involvement of procedural knowledge was tested by manipulating the 
order by which the active and passive objects were presented and the way objects were 
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gripped. Facilitation of action decisions for active-before-passive objects or congruently 
gripped objects for action would indicate the involvement of procedural knowledge. 
In both studies (Wulff et al., 2015; Laverick et al., 2015), semantically related distracters 
interfered with making action decisions in the computer task, whereas the effect of semantic 
interference was attenuated with real objects and only observable when the selection was 
made with one hand (Wulff et al., 2015) but not when the selection was made bi-manual 
(Laverick et al., 2015). In both studies, procedural knowledge affected selection processes. 
Specifically, with real objects the active object within an action pair was selected first (Wulff 
et al., 2015; Laverick et al., 2015), primarily with the right hand (Laverick et al., 2015). 
Similar results were observed in the computerised version of the experiment; action decisions 
were facilitated when the objects were congruently gripped and when the active object was 
presented before the passive object. We tested healthy young and elderly participants, with 
both age groups showing a similar performance pattern (Laverick et al., 2015). 
Using the above-described paradigms, we studied the neurocognitive the mechanisms 
underlying selecting objects for action in neuropsychological patients (Wulff et al., 2015). 
Based on the accuracy performance in the real object task, patients were classified as intact or 
as impaired compared to the accuracy performance of healthy age-matched controls. Impaired 
patients in contrast to intact patients were poorer when selecting objects for action among 
distracters, with similar interference from semantically related and unrelated distracters. In the 
computerised version, impaired patients also performed poorer than intact patients, although 
the effects of procedural and semantic knowledge were weakened. Across both tasks, there 
was evidence that impaired patients were able to utilise to some extent procedural knowledge 
(active before passive object; congruent hand grip information). We suggested that impaired 
patients had degraded access to both procedural and semantic knowledge. This has been 
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supported by a subsequent lesion subtraction analysis. At the group level, impaired patients 
compared to intact patients had lesions to the dorsal (pre-motor and inferior parietal cortices) 
and the ventral (anterior temporal cortices) visual stream. The former has been associated 
with the processing of object-directed actions, while the latter is assumed to be involved in 
object recognition (Goodale & Milner, 1992). Thus, the ability to select objects for action 
relies on access to both procedural and semantic knowledge.  
Taken together, the data of Wulff and colleagues (Wulff et al., 2015; Laverick et al., 2015) 
support the notion that the retrieval of action knowledge results from the interaction between 
the direct procedural (probably ventro-dorsal) and the indirect semantic (ventral) routes. 
However, these two studies have several limitations. Firstly, in the computerized version of 
the experiment the stimuli were presented sequentially and thus evoked working memory 
processes in order to make action relation decisions on any of the two sequentially presented 
objects, while the experiment with real objects where all objects were presented at the same 
time instead evoked selection processes. Secondly, both studies only focused on the explicit 
retrieval of action knowledge. Thus, it is still unclear whether procedural knowledge will be 
‘automatically’ activated even when the task is action-unrelated. Furthermore, the effect of 
age on the retrieval of action knowledge still remains open, as the sample sizes were relatively 
small (Laverick et al., 2015) or there was no direct comparison between different age groups 
(Wulff et al., 2015).  
Does the involvement of the direct route in selecting objects for action depend upon task 
demands, i.e., the observer’s intentions?. Gibson (1979) argued that the affordance properties 
of objects are perceived automatically. It is unclear whether the affordance for paired objects 
is also automatically perceived or whether it depends upon experience, and some learned 
knowledge of object properties in different action contexts, and thus on long-term stored 
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action knowledge. Action knowledge can be represented in two forms: A screwdriver and a 
screw can be represented through the way of how they can be used together (procedural 
knowledge), or through the knowledge that a screwdriver is typically used together with a 
screw (semantic knowledge). Yoon and Humphreys (2007), for example, showed that the 
manipulation of affordance procedural cues (i.e., object orientation) affected action decisions 
but not semantic decisions. In another study, Yoon and Humphreys (2005) demonstrated that 
hand grip and hand movement information primarily affected action decisions, with the effect 
being diminished when the task required object naming. Furthermore, action but not semantic 
decisions were facilitated when pairs of objects afforded an action and when the objects were 
aligned with the preferred hand position of the participant (Yoon et al., 2010). On the other 
hand, Borghi et al. (2012) reported that relation decisions were facilitated for functionally 
related objects relative to when the objects were spatially related, with the effect being 
magnified when the objects were gripped for action. Similarly, target identification based on a 
verbal probe was facilitated when the target object was presented in the context of a 
functionally related distracter and when the two objects were oriented for an action (Green & 
Hummel, 2006). In sum, action procedural information in the stimuli facilitates action-related 
decisions but there is also evidence that action information contributes to semantic decisions. 
Whether affordance processes are modulated by age has not been examined; nor is it clear 
whether the ability to select objects for action remains stable over the lifespan. In general, 
there are two different models of how cognition might change across the lifespan. One 
possibility is that performance across the lifespan changes nonlinearly (e.g., Potter, Grealy, 
Elliott, & Andres, 2012; Waszak, Schneider, Li, & Hommel, 2009; Hommel, Li, & Li, 2004). 
For example, Potter et al. (2012) asked young, middle-aged and older participants to search 
for a specific jar of pasta among other jars of pasta with different shapes and colours. The 
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authors reported non-parametric age-related decline in search performance, with age-related 
decline evident from middle-aged adults onwards. A similar pattern was found using visual 
masking (Waszak et al., 2009) and emotion recognition (Horning, Cornwell, & Davis, 2012). 
In the context of action knowledge (e.g., tool innovation and creativity), research has revealed 
a potential inverted U-shaped performance, with middle-aged participants showing superior 
performance compared to younger participants (Reese, Lee, Cohen, & Pucket, 2001). On the 
other hand, it has been suggested that performance deteriorates linearly throughout the 
adulthood lifespan (Salthouse, 2000). Note that these studies often only focused on the 
extreme ends or tails of the lifespan distribution (young vs. old). Several studies comparing 
young and elderly adults show that age affects selective attention. For example, elders have a 
weak representation of the target object combined with a decreased ability to ignore 
distracters (e.g., Tsvetanov, Mevorach, Allen, & Humphreys, 2013; Kok, 2000; Rogers, 
1992). In these above-cited studies, selection was guided by bottom-up processes (potentially 
relying on fluid intelligence); it is therefore unclear whether conceptual selection based on 
long-term knowledge/experience (potentially relying on crystallised intelligence) would be 
also affected by age. There is evidence that crystallised intelligence (e.g., conceptual 
knowledge, skills, experience) improves or remains stable over the lifespan, whereas fluid 
intelligence (e.g., attention, processing speed, cognitive control) declines with age (for a 
review, see Craik & Bialystok, 2006). In the absence of studies testing middle-aged 
participants, it is unclear how the different types of selection processes are manifested in 
middle-aged adults. 
Age-related changes have been also reported for tool-related knowledge (for a recent 
review, see Mizelle & Wheaton, 2010a). Ska and Nespoulous (1987), for example, showed 
that elders pantomime the use of a tool in a qualitatively different way than young 
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participants. Elders focused on the movement of the tool and substituted the missing object 
with their body (e.g., using a fist to represent the hammer head) – potentially stressing the 
outcome (semantic knowledge) of what the tool is used for, while young participants focused 
on the hand-object interaction (e.g., pretending to hold the hammer handle; see also, 
Rodrigues & Caramelli, 2009) – emphasising procedural knowledge of how the tool is used. 
Moreover, it has been shown that elders were poorer at predicting the time course of familiar 
actions compare to young participants (Diersch, Cross, Stadler, Schutz-Bosbach, & Rieger, 
2012). These findings suggest some changes in the way action knowledge is retrieved, with 
elderly participants focusing on semantic knowledge (‘what for’) and young participants on 
procedural knowledge (‘how to’). As mentioned above, the lack of age-related effects in our 
previous studies (Wulff et al., 2015; Laverick et al., 2015) might be related to the relatively 
small sample size and the relatively low number of trials in the conceptual (real object) search 
task. These factors might have reduced statistical power by increasing noise. There are hardly 
any studies which investigate the retrieval of action knowledge in middle-aged adults. Thus, it 
remains open whether there would be age-related differences across the lifespan in utilising 
action knowledge when making action and non-action decisions. 
The present chapter further examined the contribution of procedural (direct route) and 
semantic (indirect route) knowledge to the retrieval of action knowledge as manifested by 
paired-object affordance in the context of selection processes. Extending our previous work 
(Wulff et al., 2015; Laverick et al., 2015), we investigated the impact of task relevance and 
age on selection processes. Specifically, to examine the effects of task relevance, we used two 
search tasks. One task required explicitly to retrieve action knowledge (‘select the two objects 
that typically interact to perform an action’; action task). This was a conceptual search task as 
the targets were identified based on prior knowledge. The second task assessed the implicit 
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processing associated with action knowledge. Here participants had to select two objects that 
had the same coloured frame (colour task). This was a visual-based search task as targets were 
identified based on the visual properties of the items. We also controlled for the congruence 
of cues (targets’ action relation and frame colour) in the search array, with half the trials 
providing congruent action-colour cues (functional pair had the same coloured frame) and the 
other half incongruent action-colour cues. Importantly, identical displays (stimuli, search 
arrays etc.) were used in both search tasks, and hence any observed effects can only be 
attributed to the specific task demands. We note that in the context of the colour task, the 
assessment of the processes contributing to implicit retrieval of action knowledge was only 
meaningful in congruent trials, i.e., when the coloured-framed targets were also functionally 
related (as in the action task), but this information was irrelevant to the task.  
As in our previous studies (see above), we assessed the contribution of procedural and 
semantic knowledge orthogonally. The involvement of the semantic route in the selection 
process was assessed by manipulating the relation between targets and distracters. The 
distracters were semantically related to the targets (e.g., both targets and distracters are used 
in grooming or in bathroom) or unrelated (e.g., targets are used for food preparation but 
distracters are used for grooming). Based on previous research, we predicted that semantically 
related relative to unrelated distracters will interfere more during the explicit retrieval of 
action knowledge, namely when selecting objects for action.  
The involvement of procedural knowledge in selection processes was assessed by 
recording how objects were selected. Within each functional pair, we defined the active and 
the passive object. It has been shown that the active object is selected first especially when the 
selection is made with the dominant hand (Laverick et al., 2015). We anticipated that the 
active object would be selected before the passive object in the action task, an effect which 
 153 
 
may be emphasised if the active object is in vicinity to the dominant hand. If paired-object 
affordance cues (i.e., procedural knowledge) are evoked automatically, we also expected to 
see order selection effects in the colour task, when the coloured targets were functionally 
related.  
As we manipulated and assessed the contribution of semantic and procedural knowledge to 
action retrieval independently, we could also test whether there was evidence for an 
interaction between these two knowledge streams. For example, if semantic knowledge 
contributes to action retrieval, does the impact of procedural knowledge increases when 
semantic knowledge provides an ambivalent cue e.g., when distracters and targets are 
semantically related?  
Finally, in line with previous research on cognitive ageing, we expected increased 
contribution of the semantic route to action retrieval with increased age. We also anticipated 
an overall decline in performance with age in the visual-based (fluid intelligence) but not in 
the conceptual-based (crystallised intelligence) search task. Though, these hypotheses were 
speculative due to the paucity of the data, especially on this topic. 
 
6.3 Method 
 
6.3.1 Participants 
Forty-five healthy participants, 15 female right-handed undergraduate students (M = 19.00, 
SD = 0.65, age range: 18-20), 15 middle-aged postgraduate students (7 females, 1 left-handed, 
M = 38.97, SD = 6.78, age range: 30-51) and 15 elderly participants (5 females, 2 left-handed, 
M = 72.67, SD = 6.34, age range: 62-93) took part in the study. We recruited participants 
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from three different age groups to generalise results across the lifespan. To provide a better 
description of our elderly sample, all but one elderly participants were tested with the Oxford 
Cognitive Screen (Demeyere, Riddoch, Slavkova, Bickerton, & Humphreys, 2015, see 
Appendix 2 for test scores). One elderly participant was found to be impaired in visuo-spatial 
skills, scoring below the cut-off with 31 out of 50 correct responses (group average = 44.7). 
Another elderly participant scored below the cut-off with 2 out of 4 in the number calculation 
task (group average = 3.5). A third elderly participant scored below the cut-off in the 
executive function task, making a total of 5 errors (group average = 1.46 errors). Handedness 
was determined by self-report. Elderly and middle-aged participants were paid for their 
participation and students were granted course credit. All participants reported normal or 
corrected-to-normal vision. None of the participants reported a history of neurological or 
psychiatric impairment. Informed consent was obtained from all participants and the study 
was approved by the local Ethical Review Committee. 
 
6.3.2 Stimuli and design 
Thirty common household objects found in the kitchen, office and garage were used. Each 
object was photographed in a neutral position against a bright background (600 by 400 pixels 
in size; see Figure 6.1) with the handle facing towards the observer. This was done to avoid 
that the objects would afford a particular hand grip and to reduce proximity cues that may be 
present when the objects are positioned to interact together with each other (e.g., a bottle is 
tilted towards a glass or a hammer is facing towards the nail). Each picture was presented 
surrounding by coloured frame of red, blue, green, yellow, or pink. The pictures were edited 
using GIMP 2.8.14 software. 
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Figure 6.1. Example of an experimental trial for the action task. The target objects were a 
whisk and a bowl; the unrelated distracters were paper, plant pot and socket. Note that this is 
an incongruent trial; target objects have a different coloured frame. 
 
A pilot study was conducted to create individual object sets for each trial. In each object 
set two objects formed an action pair and three were distracters. The aim was to create search 
array sets which would include a highly familiar functional object pair and distracters which 
would not afford a mutual action with any of the other items on this display. We aimed to 
create two search arrays for each action pair, one in which the distracters were semantically 
related and one in which the distracters were semantically unrelated to the target pair (cf. 
Table 6.1). Distracters were considered semantically related if they had a meaningful 
association with the targets such as they can be found in the kitchen but they cannot be 
conventionally used together in action (Borghi et al., 2012). Using written words, 
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corresponding to the name of objects, twelve participants (10 females, 20-52 years of age) 
were asked to identify the action pair in each object set. They were then asked if they 
recognised any other potential action pair(s) within that set. If a set was identified as 
possessing more than one action pair, the distracters were altered to eliminate any additional 
action pairs to the target action pair. An iterative procedure was used, meaning that the pilot 
study was continued until there was a complete agreement across all object sets and across all 
participants that there was only one clearly identifiable action pair. Another pilot study with 
seven participants (2 females, 20-52 years of age) was run to validate the active-passive 
classification within each of the 14 object pairs. See Table 6.1 for a full list of object pairs and 
the corresponding distracter objects. 
Based on the pilot data, the individual objects were combined to make 14 search arrays; 
each set contained five objects (two target objects and three distracters). The objects were 
presented at equal distances to the central fixation cross (Figure 6.1). In each trial the two 
targets appeared to the left and the right side of the fixation cross. However, to reduce the 
possibility of strategic searching, in 7% of the trials the target objects appeared in the same 
visual hemifield; these catch trials were analysed separately.  
The experiment consisted of two search tasks: an explicit conceptual task (referred to as 
action task) and an implicit visual-based search task (referred to as colour task). In the action 
task, participants had to select the two objects that could be used together (i.e., having an 
action relation or not; explicit retrieval of action knowledge); in the colour task, participants 
had to select the two objects that had the same coloured frame (implicit retrieval of action 
knowledge). The same object set was used in both tasks. 
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Table 6.1 Object pairs used in the study 
    
Active object Passive object 
Semantically related 
distracters 
Semantically unrelated 
distracters 
Bottle opener Beer bottle Knife, coffee jar, whisk Trowel, knife, scoop 
Corkscrew Wine bottle Teapot, scoop, tin Paint tin, spoon, screw 
Ice cream scoop Ice cream Tin opener, spatula, peeler Screwdriver, frying pan, paper 
Knife Fork Wine bottle, coffee jar, scoop Paintbrush, scoop, tin opener 
Paintbrush Paint tin Trowel, scissors, screwdriver Fork, teapot, spatula 
Peeler Potato Mug, tin opener, corkscrew Beer bottle, plant pot, scoop 
Scissors Paper Spatula, whisk, tin opener Bowl, tin opener, frying pan 
Screwdriver Screw Scissors, whisk, paintbrush Fork, trowel, coffee jar 
Spatula Frying pan Peeler, teapot, ice cream Coffee jar, bottle opener, paint tin 
Spoon Bowl Peeler, wine bottle, frying pan Plant pot, paintbrush, peeler 
Teapot Mug Knife, bottle opener, bowl 
Washing up liquid, screwdriver, 
ice cream 
Tin opener Tin  Peeler, ice cream, coffee jar Scissors, plant pot, ice cream 
Trowel Plant pot Paper, screw, paint tin Tin, scissor, beer bottle 
Washing up liquid Sponge Potato, wine bottle, coffee jar Screw, potato, paper 
 
We manipulated four factors: Task (action, colour), Distracter (related, unrelated), 
Congruence (congruent, incongruent) and Side of Active Object (left, right). In half of the 
trials the active object appeared on the right side and the passive object on the left side and 
vice versa. Regardless of the task, trials were considered as congruent when the active and 
passive object of an action pair had the same coloured frame (congruent action-colour cue), 
while in incongruent trials the active and the passive object of an action pair did not match in 
colour (incongruent action-colour cue; Figure 6.1). Note that in the colour task, the targets 
were functionally related in the congruent condition (i.e., formed an action pair) but they did 
not form a functional pair in the incongruent condition. In these latter trials, there was always 
an action pair in the array, either between two distracters or between a target and a distracter. 
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The congruence manipulation allowed us to examine whether functional relations are 
processed implicitly though they are task-irrelevant. 
The experiment was divided into two runs (448 trials in total). In each run, there was a 
separate block for each task (224 for each task). Due to time restraints 14 out of 45 
participants (2 students, 12 elders) completed only one run of each task (224 trials in total). 
The pattern of results was not different when we ran the analyses using equal amount of trials 
(224) for each participant (see Appendix 3 for reliable main effects and interactions of the 
accuracy data). Hence the findings reported here are based on all the collected data. The order 
of the task blocks was counterbalanced across participants. Within each task block, object 
pairs were presented pseudo-randomly. There were 56 trials for each distracter condition. 
Additionally, there were 64 catch trials in which both objects appeared on the same side.  
 
6.3.3 Procedure 
Participants sat within comfortable reaching distance of a touchscreen monitor. The search 
array contained target objects and distracters and the participants performed either the action 
or the colour task. In the action task, participants were instructed to touch with their preferred 
(typically their dominant) hand the two targets which could be used together in action (e.g., 
knife and fork). In the colour task, participants were asked to touch the two targets with 
matching coloured frames (e.g., both frames were blue). If participants were unable to find the 
targets, they were instructed to touch the fixation cross. The stimuli remained on the screen 
until a response was made. The next trial immediately followed. Prior each task, participants 
were given at least five practice trials. Participants were instructed to put their hand at the 
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spacebar before selecting the first object to ensure equal distances between left and right 
targets. RT for the whole trial was defined as the time the second target was touched.  
The stimuli were presented on a 22-inch touchscreen monitor with a screen resolution of 
1920 x 1080 pixels using E-prime software (Version 2.1; Psychology Software Tools, 2006). 
 
6.3.4 Data analysis 
The data analysis was completed using IBM SPSS Statistics 19 (SPSS Inc., Chicago, IL). 
To assess the contribution of the semantic route to action retrieval as a function of task 
relevance, we used accuracy and RT data. We standardised the RT data for each participant to 
account for slowed processing speed associated with increased age. The data were examined 
with a 2 x 2 x 2 [Task (action, colour) x Distracter (related, unrelated) x Congruence 
(congruent, incongruent)] repeated-measures ANOVA with Age (young, middle-aged, older) 
as a between-subject factor. Interaction effects were evaluated with paired t-tests (p ≤ .05).  
The contribution of procedural knowledge to action retrieval was assessed using only 
congruent trials. We computed for each participant and condition the proportion of trials in 
which the active object was selected before the passive object. In addition, we divided the 
trials based on the side the active object was presented. We only included right-handed 
participants (N=40) to ensure that the results were not driven by the hand used; the response 
pattern was similar when the three left-handed participants were also included. 
  
6.4 Results 
One middle-aged and one elderly participant were excluded due to an error rate of more 
than 30% in the action and/or colour task, indicating that s/he potentially did not understand 
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the task. For the remaining participants (NYoung=15, NMiddle-aged=14, and NElderly=14), overall 
accuracy was high 94% (action task: 94%, colour task: 94%), indicating that participants 
easily found the target objects. The error pattern of catch trial revealed that participants were 
more surprised when an action pair rather than a colour pair appeared in the same visual 
hemifield (20% vs. 3%, respectively). The mean accuracies and zRT data for each age group 
are presented in Appendix 4.  
Accuracy. We start by reporting the effects across all participants. The main effect of Task 
was not reliable, F(1,40) = .464, p = .464, ɳp
2 
= .013. There were significant main effects of 
Distracter, F(1,40) = 57.73, p < .001, ɳp
2
 = .591 (related > unrelated), and Congruence, 
F(1,40) = 62.78, p < .001, ɳp
2
 = .611 (congruent > incongruent). The main effects of 
Distracter and Congruence should be interpreted in line with the observed interactions. Across 
all participants the task by distracter interaction, F(1,40) = 159.76, p < .001, ɳp
2
 = .800, the 
distracter by congruence interaction, F(1,40) = 11.79, p = .001, ɳp
2
 = .228, as well as the 
interaction between these three factors (Task x Distracter x Congruence), F(1,40) = 85.29, p < 
.001, ɳp
2
 = .681, were reliable (Figure 6.2). This latter interaction was decomposed by 
conducting separate 2 x 2 ANOVAs for each task collapsing across age groups.  
For the action task, there were significant main effects of Distracter, F(1,42) = 11.64, p = 
.001, ɳp
2
 = .217 (unrelated > related), and Congruence, F(1,42) = 20.85, p < .001, ɳp
2
 = .332 
(congruent > incongruent). Responses were more accurate when the two action targets had the 
same coloured frame and when the search array contained semantically unrelated distracters. 
There was also a reliable interaction between distracter and congruence, F(1,42) = 9.35, p = 
.004, ɳp
2
 = .182. For the related distracter condition, accuracy was higher for congruent trials 
than for incongruent trials, t(42) = 5.49, p < .001, while there was a similar trend for the 
unrelated distracter condition, t(42) = 1.85, p = .071; see Figure 6.2a). Thus, participants 
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benefited more from congruent action-colour cues when the targets were presented among 
related rather than unrelated distracters.  
For the colour task, the main effects of Distracter, F(1,42) = 290.82, p < .001, ɳp
2
 = .874 
(related > unrelated), and Congruence, F(1,42) = 23.39, p < .001, ɳp
2
 = .358 (congruent > 
incongruent) reached significance. Finding matching framed coloured objects was more 
accurate when the search array contained semantically related objects. There was also a 
significant distracter by congruence interaction, F(1,42) = 110.08, p < .001, ɳp
2
 = .724. For the 
unrelated distracter condition, accuracy was higher for congruent trials than for incongruent 
trials, t(42) = 9.06, p < .001, while there was no reliable difference between congruent and 
incongruent trials in the related distracter condition (Figure 6.2b).  
Age had a main effect on accuracy, F(2,40) = 4.03, p = .026, ɳp
2 
= .168. There was also a 
significant interaction between task and age, F(2,40) = 6.01, p = .005, ɳp
2 
= .231. This 
interaction showed that middle-aged participants were more accurate than both young and 
elderly participants in the action task but not in the colour task (middle-aged: t(13) = 6.41, p < 
.001, young and elderly: both p > .099). Young and elderly participants did not differ in their 
performances (see Figure 6.2a and Figure 6.2b). The distracter by age interaction was also 
reliable, F(2,42) = 3.85, p = .030, ɳp
2
 = .161. The two-way interaction arose because the 
overall benefit from semantically related distracters was enhanced with increased age, an 
effect that was mostly pronounced in the colour task (Figure 6.2c).  
In light of the above three-way interaction observed across the age groups (i.e., Task x 
Distracter x Congruence), and to better understand how age modulated the overall pattern of 
results, we next computed 2 (Task) x 2 (Congruence) ANOVAs for each distracter condition 
and age group (Figure 6.2a and Figure 6.2b). 
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Related distracter condition: For young participants, there was only a reliable main effect 
of Task, F(1,14) = 17.34, p = .001, ɳp
2
 = .553 (colour > action). For middle-aged participants, 
the main effect of Task, F(1,13) = 9.87, p = .008, ɳp
2
 = .432 (colour > action), and the task by 
congruence interaction were significant, F(1,13) = 13.44, p = .003, ɳp
2
 = .508. This interaction 
arose because middle-aged participants’ accuracy in the action task was higher for congruent 
compared to incongruent trials, t(13) = 4.81, p < .001, while there was no significant 
difference between congruent and incongruent trials in the colour task (p = .174). For elderly 
participants, reliable effects were observed for Task, F(1,13) = 16.22, p = .001, ɳp
2
 = .555 
(colour > action), Congruence, F(1,13) = 12.81, p = .003, ɳp
2
 = .496 (congruent > 
incongruent), and for the interaction between task and congruence, F(1,13) = 10.96, p = .006, 
ɳp
2
 = .457. As with middle-aged participants, elders performed better in the action but not in 
the colour task when the trials were congruent compared to incongruent (t(13) = 4.31, p = 
.001, t(13) = -.65, p = .528, respectively). In summary, semantically related distracter and 
congruent action-colour cues had a similar impact on middle-aged and elderly participants 
compared to younger participants. In all three age groups, selecting functional pairs among 
semantically related distracters was more difficult than when participants had to select the 
same coloured-framed targets. For the young participants this effect was independent of cue 
congruence, while middle-aged and elderly participants showed this effect primarily during 
congruent trials (when the functional pair also had the same coloured frame). Taken together, 
these results suggest that in the context of semantically related distracters middle-aged and 
elderly participants relied more on integrating information from different cues modalities 
(action and colour) than young participants. 
Unrelated distracter condition: For young participants, there was a reliable main effect of 
Congruence, F(1,14) = 16.49, p = .001, ɳp
2
 = .541 (congruent > incongruent), and an 
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interaction between task and congruence, F(1,14) = 4.70, p = .048, ɳp
2
 = .251. Young 
participants were more accurate in the colour task but not in the action task when the trials 
were congruent relative to when they were incongruent, (t(14) = 5.06, p < .001, t(14) = .509, p 
= .619, respectively). For middle-aged participants, the main effects of Task, F(1,13) = 
194.61, p < .001, ɳp
2
 < .001 (action > colour), Congruence, F(1,13) = 34.76, p < .001, 
ɳp
2
 = .728 (congruent > incongruent), and the interaction between task and congruence, 
F(1,13) = 14.63, p = .002, ɳp
2
 = .529, were significant. As the young participants, middle-aged 
participants’ accuracy was higher in the colour but not in the action task for congruent relative 
to incongruent trials, (t(13) = 5.49, p < .001, t(13) = .193, p = .850, respectively). For elderly 
participants, there was only a significant main effect of Congruence, F(1,13) = 25.45, p < 
.001, ɳp
2
 = .662 (congruent > incongruent). To sum up, the young and middle-aged group 
showed a similar pattern which was different from the older participant group. Young and 
middle-aged participants benefited from the combined action-colour cue in the colour task but 
not in the action task, while elders benefited from the combined action-colour cue in both 
tasks to the same degree.  
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Figure 6.2. Mean accuracies for the interaction between distracter, congruence and age 
plotted separately for the (a) action task and the (b) colour task with standard errors of the 
mean (SEM). (c) Accuracy difference (with SEMs) between the related and the unrelated 
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distracter condition as function of task (action, colour) and colour congruence (congruent, 
incongruent). 
 
zRTs. There were significant main effects of Task, F(1,40) = 816.84, p < .001, ɳp
2
 = .953 
(colour > action), and Congruence, F(1,40) = 35.35, p < .001, ɳp
2
 = .469 (congruent > 
incongruent. There were reliable interactions between task and congruence, F(1,40) = 11.64, p 
= .001, ɳp
2
 = .225, and between distracter and congruence, F(1,40) = 7.93, p = .008, 
ɳp
2
 = .165. For both tasks, responses were faster for congruent trials than for incongruent trials 
(action task: t(42) = -5.16, p < .001; colour task: t(42) = -2.39, p = .021; see Figure 3a). For 
both distracter conditions, participants were faster in the congruent compared to the 
incongruent condition (related distracter: t(42) = -3.15, p = .003; unrelated distracter: t(42) = -
6.41, p < .001; Figure 6.3b).  
Similarly to the accuracy data, age had a reliable effect on response time to correct trials
1
, 
F(2,40) = 6.74, p = .003, ɳp
2
 = .252; see Appendix 4). Bonferroni corrected multiple 
comparisons showed that middle-aged participants were significantly faster than older 
participants (p = .003) and marginally faster than young participants (p = .051), while there 
was no significant difference between young and older participants (p = .763). As before, 
there was a significant interaction between task and age, F(2,40) = 4.37, p = .019, ɳp
2 
= .179 
(Figure 6.4). Across all participants, responses were slower in the action compared to the 
colour task, with the effect being strongest for the two younger participant groups (young: 
t(14) = 19.22; middle-aged: t(13) = 17.72; elders: t(13) = 13.08, all p < .001).  
 
                                                 
 
1
 We note that the standardisation procedure of the RT data included all trials (correct + incorrect), while only 
correct trials were included in the zRT analysis. The latter one explains the possibility to observe differences 
between individual zRT averages. 
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Figure 6.3. Mean zRTs (with SEMs) for the interaction between task and congruence (a) and 
between distracter and congruence (b). Asterisk denotes significance (***p < .001; **p < 
.01). 
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Figure 6.4. Mean zRTs (with SEMs) for the interaction between task and age. Asterisk 
denotes significance (***p < .001). 
 
Contribution of procedural knowledge – selection of the active versus the passive object 
first. We first assessed whether across participants in each of the four conditions [2 (Task) x 2 
(Distracter)] participants reliably selected the active object before the passive object (> 50% 
of trials) using one-sample t-tests and Bonferroni multiple comparisons correction. Then we 
tested the effects of the conditions on the contribution of procedural knowledge using a 
repeated-measures ANOVA with the following within-subject factors Task (action, colour), 
Distracter (related, unrelated), and Side of Active Object (left, right); Age (young, middle-
aged, and older) was a between-subject factor.  
For the action task, participants reliably selected the active object before the passive object 
in both the semantically related (mean active first = .66; t(39) = 10.81, p < .001) and 
semantically unrelated (mean active first = .65; t(39) = 8.42, p < .001) distracter condition. 
Across participants, the active object was not reliably selected before the passive object in the 
colour task. 
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The ANOVA revealed a significant main effect of Task, F(1,37) = 137.92, p < .001, 
ɳp
2
 = .788, indicating that participants chose the active object first significantly more often in 
the action than in the colour task. There was no main effect of age, nor was there an 
interaction with age. The task, distracter by side of active object interaction was reliable, 
F(1,37) = 5.20, p = .028, ɳp
2
 = .123 (see Figure 6.5). This interaction was decomposed by 
conducting separate 2 x 2 ANOVAs for each task.  
For the action task, there was a reliable main effect of Side of Active Object, F(1,39) = 
9.50, p = .004, ɳp
2
 = .196 (right > left) and a significant distracter by side of active object 
interaction, F(1,39) = 4. 26, p = .038, ɳp
2
 = .106. For both distracter conditions, the active 
object was selected first significantly more often on the right compared to the left side 
(related: t(40) = -2.53, p = .016; unrelated: t(40) = -3.39, p = .002).  
For the colour task, only the main effect of Distracter, F(1,39) = 5.33, p = .026, ɳp
2
 = .120 
(related > unrelated) was significant. Participants selected the active object first more often 
when the search array contained related than unrelated distracters.  
To ensure that the effect of side of active object was not driven by the responding hand, we 
compared zRTs when participants selected the first object on the left and when they selected 
the first object on the right side. There was no significant difference between the left and the 
right side (p = .890), indicating that the effect of side of active object was independent of the 
response hand.  
In summary, the active was selected in the action task more often first than the colour task. 
In the action task, this effect was more pronounced when the active object was on the right 
side. In the colour task, the active object was selected more often when the distracters were 
semantically related. Age did not reliably affect the selection order. 
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Figure 6.5. Mean proportion of selecting the active object first for congruent trials as function 
of task (action, colour), distracter condition (related, unrelated), side of active object (left, 
right) and age (with SEMs). Act = Active object. 
 
6.5 Discussion 
The present chapter revisited the questions regarding the contribution of semantic 
knowledge (indirect route) and procedural knowledge (direct route) to the retrieval of action 
knowledge manifested by paired-object affordances. More specifically, we investigated the 
relation between semantic and procedural knowledge during a conceptual-action (searching 
for an action pair) and a visual-colour (finding matching colour frames) search task. This 
enabled us to evaluate the explicit and implicit processing of functional object pairs, 
respectively. The contribution of the indirect-semantic route was assessed by manipulating the 
relation between targets and distracters, while the contribution of the direct-procedural route 
was tested by examining the order in which participants selected the targets. Finally, we also 
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explored the effects of age across the lifespan on the ability to retrieve and utilise action 
knowledge.  
The main findings are summarised as follows: (1) Semantic knowledge affected both 
types of searches but in an opposite direction. When distracters were semantically related to 
the targets, semantic knowledge interfered with the selection of objects for actions (action 
task) but facilitated the selection of objects that had the same coloured-frame (colour task). 
The contribution of semantic knowledge linearly increased with age. (2) Procedural 
knowledge reliably affected the way objects were selected but only when the task explicitly 
required the retrieval of action knowledge (action task). The contribution of procedural 
knowledge was not modulated by age. There was a tendency to utilise procedural knowledge 
even in the colour (implicit task) when the distracters were semantically related to the 
coloured targets. (3) Participants integrated action and colour cues in both tasks (congruence 
effects), with an age-related increase in cue integration. (4) There was an advantage for 
middle-aged participants compared to young and elderly participants in the action task, with 
young and elderly participants not showing a reliable difference. We discuss each of these 
effects separately.  
 
6.5.1 Effects of procedural knowledge – selection priority for the active object – direct route 
for action retrieval 
In the context of functional object pairs, one object is acting upon a second passive object, 
we replicated the bias toward the active object within an action pair in the action task (for 
neuropsychological evidence, see Wulff et al., 2015; Wulff & Humphreys, 2013; Riddoch et 
al., 2003; see also e.g., Laverick et al., 2015; McNair & Harris, 2014; Roberts & Humphreys, 
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2010b, for experimental evidence). The preference for selecting the active object (the tool) 
first is consistent with attention being biased toward the tool (e.g., Xu et al., 2015; Wulff & 
Humphreys, 2015, 2013; Handy et al., 2003). However, when action relations were irrelevant 
to the task (as in the colour search task) selection was not biased. This suggests that 
procedural knowledge is primarily used when making explicit action-related decisions but not 
when decisions are unrelated to actions. This result highlights the role of task 
demands/relevance on the retrieval of procedural knowledge. Interestingly, even in the colour-
based selection task procedural knowledge had some impact on search performance as evident 
by a reliable performance difference when distracters were semantically related rather than 
unrelated to the targets (Figure 6.2). It could be that the increase in performance in the related 
distracter condition was partly related to the use of action cues. It is possible that when action 
pairs are presented in their “natural” context, the likelihood to “automatically” utilise 
procedural knowledge is higher. We propose that the bias toward the active object is 
weakened when is task is not action-relevant (visual-based selection in the colour task), 
whereas the bias toward the active object is increased when the task is action-relevant (action 
pair selection in the action task).  
An alternative account for the above results is that the results may be driven by the 
conventional structure of language. In everyday language the order of objects is important, 
with active sentences (a hammer is driving in nails) being more common than passive 
sentences (a nail is driven in by a hammer). The relation between complex actions and 
language processing is a matter of intensive debate (e.g., Glenberg & Kaschak, 2002) as well 
as how much language is developed based on our embodied cognition and knowledge of 
actions (Pulvermueller & Fadiga, 2010). Converging evidence has shown a strong 
relationship between language and action, assuming that language comprehension is grounded 
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in bodily actions by simulating or reactivating motor experience (e.g., Glenberg & Kaschak, 
2002; Barsalou, 1999). Thus, it is unclear whether the similarity between procedural 
knowledge and the structure of language is incidental or whether procedural knowledge 
underlies the structure of active sentences.  
It could also be that selection priority for the active object is not because selection is 
guided by procedural knowledge but due to other strategies. For example, to complete the 
action task participants have to keep the identity of one object in working memory while 
looking at other objects as functional partner candidates. After identifying a potential 
functional object pair, participants may want to verify that the potential pair actually functions 
together, especially in the presence of distracters. Hence the selection priority arises from the 
verification process rather than the initial selection.  
In the action task, the observed selection priority for the active object was sensitive to the 
location of the active object – the active object was prioritised more when it appeared on the 
right rather than on the left side. This effect was pronounced in the unrelated distracter 
condition. The effect of presentation side of the active object matches previous studies with 
healthy participants and neuropsychological patients, showing a performance benefit when the 
spatial arrangement of the active and passive object matched the participant’s preferred 
handedness (Yoon et al., 2010; Humphreys et al., 2010a). This raises the question whether 
this effect was also driven by the syntactic structure of sentences. Yoon et al. (2010) asked 
participants to make action and semantic decisions to pairs of objects (written words), with 
the active object on the left and the passive object on the right and vice versa. For action 
decisions, responses tended to be faster when the active object was on the left side compared 
to when it was on the right side (e.g., pen-paper vs. paper-pen; respectively), whereas there 
was no difference in response times when making semantic decisions. The authors suggested 
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that this pattern might reflect the spatial order of written English sentences where the active 
object precedes the passive object, and hence appears to the left of the passive object. 
However, if the preference for the active object first reflects linguistic constructions, then we 
would expect that participants would select the active object more often on the left side rather 
than on the right side. It was not the case in the present study – participants selected the active 
object on the right (vs. left) side more often in the action task, while there was no location 
priority in the colour task. It is also possible that participants simply selected first the object 
that was closer to their responding hand. If this was the case we would expect a similar 
presentation side advantage in the colour task which we did not observe. Moreover, we did 
not find a reliable difference in response time between selecting the first object on the left 
compared to the right side. Interestingly, in the colour task, the active object was prioritised 
only in the related distracter condition independent of its position in the search array. This 
result seems to be in line with the performance of extinction patients (Wulff & Humphreys, 
2013; Riddoch et al., 2003) who also prioritised the active object over the passive object 
independent of its location in space when reporting the name of the object.  
The retrieval of procedural knowledge has been associated with the dorsal visual stream, 
specifically the ventro-dorsal substream (Binkofski & Buxbaum, 2013; Buxbaum & Kalenine, 
2010; Rizzolatti & Matelli, 2003). Mounting evidence has indicated that the dorsal route is 
sensitive to whether or not the object is aligned with the participants’ preferred hand (e.g., the 
teapot is held by the right (dominant) hand). For example, hand alignment effects have been 
reported in pre-motor, motor, and parietal cortices (e.g., Drew et al., 2015; Proverbio et al., 
2013; Buccino et al., 2009). Moreover, a recent lesion subtraction study revealed that lesions 
to pre-motor, parietal and temporal cortices were associated with reduced effects of hand grip 
on action decisions and with a diminished priority for the active object (Wulff et al., 2015). 
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The involvement of fronto-parietal regions in the retrieval of action knowledge has been also 
reported in a comprehensive review by Noppeney (2008). Thus, we speculate that the effects 
of hand alignment and the bias toward the active object were mediated by fronto-parietal 
regions, although it obviously requires further investigation.  
We did not find conclusive evidence that action cues were used in the colour task. 
Although we observed cue congruence effects in the colour task, this effect was driven by 
unrelated but not by related distracters. In the unrelated congruent distracter condition, the 
targets differed from the distracters based on their functional relation and their semantic 
category. In contrast, in the related congruent distracter condition, the targets differed from 
the distracters only in their functional relation. In the latter case, there was no evidence for 
action-colour cue congruence. Thus, the data suggest that semantic relatedness had implicit 
effects on colour decisions but not on functional knowledge.  
Taken together, the present results suggest that procedural knowledge is not automatically 
retrieved. The degree to which procedural knowledge was used to guide selection processes 
depended upon task relevance and the context in which objects were presented. In the action 
task, participants utilised procedural knowledge to select functional object pairs, favouring the 
active object that is positioned for a right hand action (cf. Laverick et al., 2015). The results 
are in line with the direct route for action retrieval (Riddoch et al., 1989). 
 
6.5.2 Effects of semantic distracters – indirect semantic route for action retrieval 
The present chapter showed that semantic processing affected retrieval of action 
knowledge. The involvement of the indirect semantic route was tested by manipulating the 
relation between targets and distracters. We demonstrated that the relevance of the task (i.e., 
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action-relevant or not) influenced the recruitment of the semantic route. The presence of 
semantically related distracters disrupted performance in the action task, while it improved 
performance in the colour task. In both tasks the impact of semantic processing on target 
selection was enhanced for incongruent trials (coloured targets which did not form an action 
pair). The distracter effect in the action task is in accord with previous studies, showing that 
semantically related distracters interfere with action decisions (Wulff et al., 2015; Laverick et 
al., 2015). This is an intriguing finding as one would expect that action decisions would be 
facilitated in the context of a familiar environment (e.g., finding a knife and a fork among 
other items in the kitchen). This may suggest that objects are not represented based on their 
functional relation but primarily based on their categorical features (e.g., used in the kitchen). 
In this case, all objects from the same category have the potential to interact, and thus action 
decisions are hampered due to the non-specific potential for action as stored within the 
semantic route.  
The question arises as to why semantic relation had such a large effect in the colour task. 
We speculate that effects of semantic relation in the colour task may be due to the fact that 
colour processing occurs in the ventral visual stream (Zeki, 1990), which is part of the indirect 
route. Nevertheless, further research is needed to clarify the association between colour-based 
selection and semantic processing. It is important to note that the effects of semantic relation 
in the colour task were primarily driven by semantically unrelated incongruent trials. In these 
trials the coloured targets were from different semantic categories, and one target was 
functionally and semantically associated with one of the distracters. This could have made the 
selection process more difficult compared to semantically related congruent trials where 
colour targets were always functionally related (Figure 2c). 
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The ventral (anterior temporal) visual pathway is activated during semantic processing (for 
recent reviews, see Visser, Jefferies, & Ralph, 2010; Noppeney, 2008; see also, Goodale & 
Milner, 1992). We assume that anterior temporal regions were involved in processing the 
semantic relations between targets and distracter.  
In summary, the present results support the involvement of semantic knowledge during 
explicit (finding functionally related objects) and implicit (colour frame matching) action 
retrieval demands. The data are consistent with the indirect semantic route from vision to 
action (Riddoch et al., 1989). 
 
6.5.3 Retrieval of action knowledge across the lifespan 
We first demonstrated that retrieval of action knowledge changes across the lifespan. 
Firstly, middle-aged participants performed better than young and older participants in the 
action task. The results show an inverted U-shaped performance pattern across the lifespan 
increased performance in middle-aged adults which then decreases in late life (cf. Potter et al., 
2012; Waszak et al., 2009). This is in line with the assumption that cognitive development 
across the lifespan follows an inverted U-shaped function (e.g., Dempster, 1992). Could this 
be explained by a general cognitive advantage of middle-aged adults, who also happen to be 
more educated? We think this is unlikely, since the advantage of the middle-aged group was 
specific to the action task and was not observed in the colour task. We propose that the 
midlife performance advantage in action retrieval reflects the impact of life experience in 
using and operating objects (cf. performance advantage for middle-aged participants in terms 
of divergent thinking; Reese et al., 2001). Our young participants were university students 
who by and large experienced less than two years of independent living. Hence their 
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experience in using specific kitchen and garage items was relatively limited (even though they 
are visual familiar with these objects). In this context it is difficult to account for the decline 
observed in elders, though it may be related to other sensory (e.g., identifying the pictures) or 
motoric factors specific to the task. Further research is needed to clarify this point. This 
finding, however, stresses the importance of investigating how cognitive processing changes 
across the entire lifespan rather than focusing only on early and/or late adulthood as changes 
across the lifespan are not always linear.  
A second finding was that effects of semantic relation between target and distracters 
increased with age. This effect was primarily observed in the colour task (Figure 2c), and thus 
it is of less relevance to the main questions of the present study. Detailed analyses were 
carried out to disentangle the impact of distracter type on age as function of task and 
congruence. The data showed linear changes across the lifespan in the way action and colour 
cues were used. In the related distracter condition, there was evidence for an integration of 
action and colour cues in middle-aged and elderly but not young participants. In the action 
task, integrating action and colour cues improved performance, while it had no effect on 
performance in the colour task. In the unrelated distracter condition, young and middle-aged 
participants benefited from the combined action-colour cues in the colour task, while elders 
benefited from it in both tasks. Recall that action cues in the unrelated condition are 
inherently confounded by the semantic relatedness of targets and distracters. Nevertheless, the 
data showed that across the lifespan the integration of different cue types (e.g., action and 
colour) increases. This is line with previous studies (e.g., Yankouskaya, Rotshtein, & 
Humphreys, 2014; Laurienti, Burdette, Maldjian, & Wallace, 2006). It seems that with 
increasing age it was more difficult to ignore task-irrelevant information as evident by the 
integration of action and colour cues.  
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To sum up, the present study shows some effects of age on the retrieval of action 
knowledge. While the direct route was not affected by age (i.e., age did not modulate the 
selection order the objects), the semantic route was modulated by age (effects of distracters 
increased with age). Furthermore, there was evidence for an integration of different cue 
information with increasing age. Based on these results, it can be speculated that there is a 
different weighting of the two routes with age, with a primacy of the direct route as 
highlighted by the midlife advantage. However, the extent to which age modulates the 
involvement (weighting) of the two routes requires further investigations.  
 
6.6 Study limitations 
We acknowledge that the present elderly sample included mostly men, the young 
participants were all female, while the middle-aged group was equally matched for gender. It 
is therefore difficult to know how gender contributed to the observed age effects. However, 
we note that the effect of age, the inverted U-shaped performance in the action task, cannot be 
explained by gender differences. In addition, previous literature has demonstrated that there 
are no gender differences (e.g., Borghi et al., 2012). The effects of age could also be 
potentially confounded by the level of education. In the present study, young participants (i.e., 
undergraduate students) spent fewer years in education than the middle-aged participants, 
while middle-aged participants spent more time in education than most of the elderly 
participants. Thus, years in education could contribute to the results in multiple ways (e.g., 
familiarity with the computer interface, motivation, intelligence, executive functions). 
However, if this would be the case, we would expect that education affects overall 
performances rather than being specific to the task or condition, as reported here. The 
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observed effect of semantic distracter in the implicit search task could be due to the nature of 
the targets on incongruent trials. In contrast to the congruent condition, the coloured targets 
were from different semantic categories and thus could have confounded the results. This 
potential limitation certainly deserves more attention in future studies. 
 
6.7 Conclusion 
The presence of paired objects affected search performance explicitly with some evidence 
for implicit effects with increased age. This highlights the role of task relevance on selection 
processes. The results confirm effects of procedural knowledge associated with paired objects 
in the context of an action (explicit) search task, supporting the direct (probably via the 
ventro-dorsal substream) route from vision to action. The presence of semantically related 
distracters affected performance differently in both tasks, indicating that action and non-
action-related features are processed in the indirect semantic (ventral) route from vision to 
action. Finally, effects of action knowledge were modulated by age.   
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CHAPTER 7:  GENERAL DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS 
 
The present thesis systematically investigated the effects of paired-object affordance on 
attention and perception in different contexts. Paired-object affordance effects arise when 
there is improved responding to object pairs that are positioned for action compared with 
object pairs not so positioned. The effect is assumed to be due to both a visual-related 
response to the visual familiarity of the object pair (varying as a function of object orientation 
and perspective) and a motor response to possible actions evoked by the objects (manipulated 
by hand grip/hand alignment; Humphreys et al., 2013; Humphreys et al., 2010a). The present 
thesis examined the neural basis of the paired-object affordance effect and the impact of 
contextual information and task demands on the perception of paired-object affordance. In a 
series of five experimental studies, the thesis aimed to shed light on these topics. 
The findings of these studies will first be summarised (see Table 7.1), then followed by a 
synthesis of the present results linked to existing theoretical frameworks and subsequently 
future research will be briefly discussed. Finally, an overall conclusion of the thesis will be 
drawn.  
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7.1 Summary of thesis 
 
Table 7.1 Summary of all the results of the present thesis 
 
Component 
 
Effect 
Healthy 
participants 
Extinction 
patients 
Visual-based 
affordance 
Action relation  AR > NAR  √Ch2,3   √Ch4,5 
Perspective 
1PP > 3PP √Ch2 
 
3PP > 1PP 
 
√Ch4 
Familiarity Fam > Unfam 
 
√Ch5 
Motor-based 
affordance  
Hand alignment 
RH > LH √Ch6  
LH > RH  √Ch2,3  √Ch4,5 
Graspability Broken tool > Intact tool 
 
√Ch5 
    
Active > Passive √Ch6   √Ch4,5* 
Note. AR = action relation; NAR = no action relation; 1PP = first-person perspective; 3PP = 
third-person perspective; RH = right-handed action; LH = left-handed action; Fam = Familiar 
object pair; Unfam = unfamiliar object pair; Ch = chapter. 
*Based on extinction trials. 
 
The first two experimental chapters investigated the neural mechanisms underlying paired-
object affordance in healthy participants. Chapter 2 revealed that visually-based affordance 
cues (varied by manipulating the orientation and position of objects) activated the IPL 
bilaterally, with increased responses to objects correctly positioned for action compared to 
objects incorrectly positioned for action. Motor-based affordance cues (manipulated by 
varying the alignment of a hand with the object) activated the SMA and the cerebellum, with 
enhanced responses to non-dominant hand assignments (cf. Chapter 3; Kelly et al., 2015; but 
behaviourally the opposite result has been reported, Yoon et al., 2010; Humphreys et al., 
2010a). In these regions, activation was increased for object pairs viewed from a 1PP. The 
novel result was that paired-object affordance effects seem to be mediated by interactions 
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between different networks processing visual- and motor-based affordance cues, respectively 
(cf. Humphreys et al., 2013; Humphreys et al., 2010b).  
In Chapter 3, the role of M1 in paired-object affordance was further studied using TMS-
induced MEPs. The results showed that only the right (non-dominant) M1 was sensitive to the 
experimental manipulations. Excitability of the right M1 was enhanced when two objects 
were positioned to afford an action, with stronger responses when the tool was gripped by the 
non-dominant hand compared to when it was gripped with the dominant hand (cf. Chapter 2). 
The observed motor response seems to reflect the alignment with the tool as motor 
excitability for non-action-oriented objects also tended to be enhanced when the tool was 
presented in non-standard (left) hand positions. As previously discussed in Chapters 2 and 3, 
increased responses to non-dominant hand alignments may reflect unfamiliarity with the 
observed action (e.g., Hoeren et al., 2013; Liew et al., 2013; Cross et al., 2012). Interestingly, 
an effect of hand posture was only observed when the objects were not positioned for action, 
with greater MEPs when the perceived potential for action was high (in case of neural hand 
postures). The data suggest that M1 excitability is modulated by cognitive processes 
supporting paired-objects affordance, in particular processes involved in evaluating the action 
potential of the active object within object pairs. 
Chapters 4 and 5 were both concerned with the effects of paired-object affordance on 
visual extinction by manipulating visual-based affordance cues (manipulating familiarity with 
the object pair; Chapter 4) and motor-based affordance cues (manipulating graspability of the 
stimuli; Chapter 5). For these two chapters, I measured object identification performance (i.e., 
in particular whether there was recovery from extinction) as an index of attentional allocation. 
Chapter 4 showed that unfamiliar but action-oriented object pairs ameliorated extinction, 
replicating the findings previously observed with familiar action-oriented objects (Humphreys 
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et al., 2010a; see also, Riddoch et al., 2006; Riddoch et al., 2003). Chapter 5 further supported 
this argument that familiarity with the action pair is not crucial for the affordance effect. Here 
recovery from extinction was higher for both action-related object pairs and unrelated tool 
pairs compared to unrelated object pairs (note that there was no significant difference in 
extinction recovery rate between the former two pairs). This suggests that the potential for 
action rather than the motor/visual familiarity with the object pair is responsible for the 
perception of affordance (cf. Riddoch et al., 2006). Furthermore, the results revealed that the 
presence of a tool regardless of its relation to the other object is important for the affordance 
effect. Interestingly, in both studies recovery from extinction was increased when the tool 
appeared on the contralesional (i.e., the non-dominant hand position) than on the ipsilesional 
side (cf. Chapter 2 and 3). Moreover, the analysis of extinction trials, when only one of two 
items was correctly reported, showed a bias towards the tool, even if the tool fell on the 
contralesional side (cf. Riddoch et al., 2003). As discussed in Chapters 4 and 5, the error data 
suggest that attention was biased to the tool rather than the passive object. Specifically, 
attentional capture by the ipsilateral item disrupted report of the contralesional item (increased 
extinction), while the opposite pattern occurred when attention was cued to contralesional 
item (less extinction).  
In Chapter 5, the impact of a broken handle on the perception of paired-object affordance 
was assessed. When the tool was intact, patients reported more action-related objects when 
the tool appeared on the contralesional (vs. the ipsilesional) side. This did not occur when the 
handle of the tool was broken. The data suggest that breaking the handle of a tool but not an 
object lessens the degree to which the tool captures attention, with attentional capture being 
strongest when an intact tool appears on the ipsilesional side (cf. Chapter 4). Overall, the 
results of both studies suggest that the perception of paired-object affordance is influenced by 
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both visual-based affordance cues (familiarity with the object pairs, the perspective, and 
action relation) and motor-based affordance cues (graspability and hand alignment).  
The last experimental chapter directly explored the role of contextual information and task 
demands on the automatic perception of paired-object affordance effects across the lifespan. 
When participants searched for action pairs (a task requiring an explicit response to action-
related stimuli) the tool was selected before the passive object in a pair, replicating the 
attentional bias towards the tool previously observed in healthy participants and patients (cf. 
Chapter 4 and 5; see also, e.g., Wulff et al., 2015; Xu et al., 2015; Riddoch et al., 2003; 
Handy et al., 2003). In line with prior research (e.g., Yoon et al., 2010), the tool was 
prioritised when it appeared on the right side (the standard hand position). However, the 
opposite result was found in Chapters 4 and 5. The inconsistency of the findings is likely due 
to task instructions. Participants in the study by Yoon et al. (2010) and Chapter 6 were 
explicitly instructed to use action knowledge (making action decisions), while a naming task 
was used with extinction patients (Chapter 4 and 5; Humphreys et al., 2010a); this latter task 
did not require to retrieve action knowledge. Chapter 6 also revealed effects of age on the 
retrieval of action knowledge. Specifically in the action task, there was a performance 
advantage for middle-aged participants which decreased during late adulthood. When the task 
demands on action retrieval were implicit (participants searched for colour targets), the results 
of action affordance were weakened; for example, the tool was only selected first when the 
distracters were related, and there was no effect of tool location. This indicates that task 
instructions modulate the use of action affordance, with effects being pronounced when the 
task requires action-related decisions.  
The presence of semantic distracters had an opposite impact on both tasks: performance 
was disrupted in the action task (cf. Wulff et al., 2015) but not in the colour task. The effect of 
 185 
 
semantic knowledge in the colour task could be confounded by the nature of the stimuli on 
incongruent trials (here one of the colour targets was functionally and semantically related 
with one of the distracters), and thus the data should be interpreted with caution (see future 
study suggestions, section 7.3). Overall, the results suggest that that the presence of paired 
objects affects search performance, but primarily when the task is action-related. 
 
7.2 Paired-object affordance 
Each of the five experimental studies of the thesis focused on different aspects of paired-
object affordance effects. The results of all the studies highlight that paired-object affordance 
is influenced by contextual information and task demands, with the active object (the tool) 
within a pair modulating attentional allocation. In the following subsections, the results of the 
thesis will be integrated into existing theoretical frameworks.  
 
7.2.1 Automaticity and the role of context and task demands 
The automatic perception of affordance when viewing graspable objects is hotly debated 
(see, Borghi & Riggio, 2015; van Elk et al., 2014; Thill et al., 2013, for reviews). The results 
of the studies of this thesis support both the automatic perception of affordance (especially 
evident in Chapter 4 and 5) and the modulation of affordance perception by task (Chapter 6) 
and context (all chapters). Chapters 4 and 5 revealed that identification responses in extinction 
patients were implicitly influenced by the presence of action-oriented but not necessarily 
familiar object pairs (cf. Riddoch et al., 2006). Moreover, there was evidence for a 
preattentive processing of paired objects. On extinction trials, patients typically reported the 
tool rather than the passive object, regardless of the side of presentation (cf. Riddoch et al., 
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2003). Even though the action relation between the objects was task-irrelevant, patients’ 
performance was implicitly influenced by the presence of action-related objects. This is in 
agreement with the direct (automatic) perception of affordance (cf. Gibson, 1979). 
Previous research has used implicit measures when assessing the automaticity of 
affordance effects using non-ecological settings, typically stimulus-response compatibility 
paradigms (e.g., Xu et al., 2015; Tucker & Ellis, 1998). However, in everyday life we are 
surrounded by multiple objects and the affordances of these objects is influenced by the 
presence of other objects which can be semantically, functionally and/or spatially related 
(e.g., a kitchen contains cups, spoons, and plates placed left or right to each other). Using a 
more ecological approach (searching for targets among distracters), the results of Chapter 6 
suggest that only explicit but not implicit task instructions (action pair vs. colour pair search, 
respectively) led automatically to the perception of action pairs. To the best of the author’s 
knowledge, this is the first behavioural study which directly compared the influence of task 
demands on paired affordance perception. The influence of task instructions has been 
previously reported using neuroimaging (e.g., see meta-analysis by Caspers et al., 2010). For 
example, activity in the posterior parietal cortex, assumed to extract affordance (Jeannerod et 
al., 1995), was only evident when participants had to explicitly retrieve action knowledge 
compared with when they passively viewed objects. Thus, explicit task instructions facilitate 
the retrieval of action knowledge.  
Across all chapters, the influence of contextual information on affordance was 
demonstrated. Presenting object pairs in a way that affords a mutual action facilitates 
performance in normal participants varying age and in patients (e.g., Wulff et al., 2015; 
Laverick et al., 2015; Xu et al., 2015; Bach et al., 2005). Familiarity with the object pair does 
not seem crucial for the occurrence of the affordance effect (Chapters 4 and 5). However, the 
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presence of a tool within action-oriented pairs seems to be important for the perceived action 
potential (affordance), even if the pair is unfamiliar to the participants (cf. Riddoch et al., 
2006). In addition, Chapter 6 revealed that the presence of distracters interfered with task 
performance in the explicit action task. Semantically related distracters disrupted search 
performance when selecting objects for action, indicating that selecting objects for action is 
influenced by the presence of semantic information (cf. Wulff et al., 2015; Laverick et al., 
2015). Moreover, the result also implies that the selection of objects in a more realistic 
scenario relies on both the automatic extraction of affordance (including retrieving of 
procedural knowledge) and semantic processing (cf. dual-route model from vision to action; 
Riddoch et al., 1989). 
To sum up, the present thesis advances knowledge about the automaticity of affordance 
and separates out factors that do and do not affect the automatic perception of affordance.  
 
7.2.2 The role of attention in paired-object affordance 
There is a lack of consensus about whether or not attention can modulate the occurrence of 
the affordance effect (for recent reviews, see Borghi & Riggio, 2015; van Elk et al., 2014; 
Thill et al., 2013). The results of the present thesis provide a first step towards a better 
understanding of the role of attention in affordance activation by presenting pictures of real-
world objects in natural scenes (as opposed to single object presentations). In particular, the 
present results stress the role of tools in visual scenes (cf. Matheson et al., 2014; Handy et al., 
2003). Chapters 4 and 5 directly provide evidence that affordance activation is associated with 
attentional allocation (cf. Riddoch et al., 2003). Objects that were co-located for action 
captured attention and were reported to a greater extent by extinction patients than objects that 
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were not oriented for action. Preattentive grouping based on the affordance for action offered 
by interrelated objects was supported by trials where extinction occurred (cf. Riddoch et al., 
2003). On those trials, there was enhanced report of the tool rather than the passive object 
irrespective of its location in the visual field, but only when the objects were oriented for 
action (Chapter 4; cf. Riddoch et al., 2003). Chapter 5 further demonstrated attentional 
capture from the tool within action-oriented object pairs, by showing that the attentional bias 
towards tools was diminished when the tool handle was broken but not when it was intact. 
This suggests that the action-related but task-irrelevant features of the tool automatically 
capture visual attention, and subsequent to this a visual response is elicited which influences 
attentional selection and the corresponding motor response (for neurophysiological evidence, 
see Matheson et al., 2014; Kumar et al., 2012; Buccino et al., 2009; for a review, see 
Humphreys et al., 2013). Converging evidence for attentional capture by the tool within an 
action-object pairing comes indirectly from the reported studies of this thesis with healthy 
participants, with performance being influenced by the location of the tool with respect to the 
hands the participants would normally use to perform the action.  
Taken together, the thesis further supports the role of attention in the occurrence of the 
affordance effect (attention being captured by affordance) and also highlights the automaticity 
of affordance which guides visual attention.  
  
7.2.3 Mechanisms underlying paired-object affordance 
The results of the present thesis provide empirical evidence for the two suggested 
components of paired-object affordance (for recent reviews, see Humphreys et al., 2013; 
Humphreys et al., 2010b). Humphreys et al. assumed that paired-object affordance stems from 
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a visual- and a motor-based response. Chapter 2 showed that paired-object affordance is 
mediated by different but interacting bilateral parieto-frontal networks. In line with the 
behavioural study by Humphreys et al. (2010a), it was found that viewing objects correctly 
co-located for action presented from a 1PP enhanced visual-based affordance responses in 
fronto-parietal regions. Motor responses to non-dominant hand actions were evident in SMA, 
with enhanced responses when non-dominant hand actions were seen from the 1PP. The 
different neural responses to visual- and motor-based affordance cues offered by paired 
objects imply that the effects of action relation and hand alignment were processed separately, 
and that the perspective manipulation (1PP) enhanced both effects. Using MEPs (Chapter 3), 
the effects of action relation and hand alignment on motor cortex were replicated. 
Specifically, greater MEPs were found for interacting objects misaligned with the hands the 
participant would normally use to act on the objects. As suggested in the discussions of 
Chapters 2 and 3, the increased motor cortex activity for non-dominant hand actions may 
reflect the degree of visual and/or motor familiarity with the observed action (cf. Calvo-
Merino et al., 2006). 
Further behavioural evidence for visual and motor responses to paired objects comes from 
the three behavioural chapters of the thesis. Chapter 4 revealed that familiarity with the object 
pair modulated motor but not visual response, with better performance to non-dominant hand 
actions (but see, Humphreys et al., 2010a). Chapter 5 provided further evidence that the visual 
response to object pairs is not affected by action familiarity. There was no advantage for 
action-related (object-tool) pairs compared to unrelated tool-tool pairs, although the rate of 
recovery from extinction for both pairings was higher than for unrelated object-object pairs. 
This indicates a general advantage for reporting tools over objects, and that possible actions 
have a higher weight than the familiarity with the pair. Thus, it seems that paired-object 
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affordance effects do not entirely rely on learned functional relations between objects (for a 
different interpretation, see Humphreys & Riddoch, 2007). The perceived potential for action 
can determine whether extinction patients can detect the contralesional item, even if the 
contralesional item is an object. One other novel result in Chapter 5 was that the attentional 
bias towards the tool rather than to the passive object within a pair, as indexed through the 
recovery rate, was itself affected by the graspability of the tool – detection of the 
contralesional item was reduced when an intact tool appeared on the ipsilesional side (for 
reduced M1 excitability in healthy participants, see Buccino et al., 2009). This result again 
provides evidence for a motor response to paired objects. 
Using a more complex stimulus display in Chapter 6, visual- and motor-based responses to 
paired objects were also evident, but only when the search task was related to action 
affordances. When searching for functional object pairs, performance was reduced when 
objects were surrounded by semantically related distracters. The semantic similarity between 
targets and distracters (e.g., all item were kitchen items but they are normally not used 
together) may have evoked multiple affordances, and thus affecting the allocation of attention 
and subsequent search performance. Learned associations between objects might be important 
for disambiguating competing affordances if the search display is complex (but see Chapters 4 
and 5; cf. Humphreys & Riddoch, 2007). However, further research is needed to explore this 
possibility. Even though it was task-irrelevant, participants selected the tool before the passive 
object when selecting objects for action, with enhanced selection priority for tools when its 
location matched the participants preferred hands when performing actions (e.g., Xu et al., 
2015; Yoon et al., 2010; Humphreys et al., 2010a). 
Taken together, the present results indicate that visual and motor responses to paired 
objects are independent of each other, but interactions between these responses can occur 
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which in turn enhances visual presentation of the observed objects, and thus attention 
(Humphreys et al., 2013; Humphreys et al., 2010a). The effects of paired-object affordance 
are assumed to be generated by enhanced responses in bilateral frontal motor-related and 
parietal visual-related regions. 
 
7.2.4 Affordance in relation to other perception-action theories 
The results of the thesis are in line with the dual-route model from vision to action 
(Riddoch et al., 1989). Evidence for the direct (non-semantic) route comes from the observed 
effects of hand alignment when viewing correctly co-located objects for action (cf. Yoon et 
al., 2010; Humphreys et al., 2010a). Viewing interacting objects in plausible locations for 
action (even when the tool was grasped with the non-dominant hand) automatically activates 
corresponding action representations bypassing semantic knowledge. This indicates that we 
are sensitive to perceived action affordances regardless of whether objects were in familiar or 
in unfamiliar locations for actions. Interestingly, the involvement of the direct route depends 
upon task demands. Chapter 6 showed that the direct route for action is only activated when 
the task is action-related (searching for action pairs) but not when the task is non-action 
related (colour search). In other words, attention needs to be directed to the objects in order to 
perceive their potential for action (see also, Tipper et al., 2006). Using a more realistic 
(complex) visual scene, Chapter 6 provided evidence for the recruitment of the indirect 
(semantic) route when selecting objects for action; search performance was disrupted when 
semantically related distracters were present (cf. Wulff et al., 2015; Laverick et al., 2015). 
Thus, if the environment is more ambiguous (in the presence of distracters), selecting objects 
for action requires the involvement of both the direct and the indirect semantic route from 
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vision to action (e.g., Wulff et al., 2015; Laverick et al., 2015; Mizelle et al., 2013; Frey, 
2007; Hodges et al., 2000).  
As highlighted in the General Introduction, affordance effects are also related to other 
perception-action neurocognitive modules such as the tool network, the AON, and the MNS. 
Accumulating evidence suggests that activity in dorsal (PMC and IPL) regions of the tool 
network may reflect the neural substrate for affordance effects (e.g., Orban & Caruana, 2014; 
Osiurak et al., 2010; Rizzolatti & Matelli, 2003; Grezes & Decety, 2002). The present IPL 
activity when seeing interacting objects compared to non-interacting objects further confirms 
the automatic perception of affordance. IPL is assumed to store hand and finger movements in 
order to interact with objects (for a recent review, see Vingerhoets, 2014). However, note that 
the tool network is primarily concerned with tool affordance and tool use but not with the 
understanding of these observed actions.  
It can be argued that understanding the action of another person is the focus of the AON 
(Grafton, 2009) and the MNS (Rizzolatti et al., 2001). Similarities and differences between 
paired-object affordance, the AON, and the MNS have been highlighted in Chapter 2. Even 
though the tasks of the present thesis did not explicitly require processing of the goal or the 
intention of the observed actions, implicit processing might have occurred. It is likely that an 
action goal was probably easier to perceive when objects were correctly positioned for action 
(“goal-directed actions”) compared to when they were incorrectly positioned for action (“non-
goal-directed actions”). Thus, brain regions associated with goal understanding could have 
been also automatically activated when viewing static pictures of pairs of objects as in 
Chapter 2. In line with this assumption are the results of Chapter 2 – viewing action-oriented 
objects activated the right MTG and the bilateral IPL. The latter region has been previously 
associated with understanding the goal of an action (e.g., Hamilton & Grafton, 2006). 
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Interestingly, the MTG has been also reported to be involved in the processing of functional 
knowledge about objects (e.g., a knife can be used for cutting; Vingerhoets, 2008; Johnson-
Frey, 2004; Kellenbach, Brett, & Patterson, 2003). Therefore, it is possible that the enhanced 
MTG activity reflects the retrieval of stored knowledge about familiar functional object 
parings and their typical use (e.g., knife and fork are used for cutting), especially when 
interacting objects were seen from a 1PP. A match between observed (implied) action and the 
typical use of this object pair would facilitate understanding the goal of the observed action as 
suggested by the affordance-matching hypothesis (Bach et al., 2014).  
However, in contrast to the AON and the MNS, viewing of paired objects did not activate 
IFG and PMC regions. These regions might mediate the direct matching between action 
observation and action execution (the mirroring mechanism; Rizzolatti et al., 2001). 
Converging evidence for this argument comes from Chapters 2 and 3. Both chapters found 
increased motor cortex activity when action-oriented objects were presented in non-standard 
(hand) locations for actions. The effect of hand alignment when seeing action-oriented objects 
seems not to infer with action intention or action goal understanding. Specifically, it is 
unlikely that understanding goals or intentions of others people’s actions would be more 
difficult when observing interacting objects in non-standard relative to standard hand 
alignments.  
Overall, the present results indicate that affordance and action understanding have distinct 
and shared neural representations. The concept of affordance can contribute to a better 
understanding of a variety of cognitive processes such as selecting objects for actions and 
action understanding.  
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7.3 Future studies 
The thesis provides novel ways for studying paired-object affordance effects. Specifically, 
the visual search paradigm in Chapter 6, mimicking real-world scenes, encourages further 
investigations into the attentional capture by a tool in the presence of other objects. Previous 
research has indicated an automatic coupling between eye movements and upcoming actions, 
with eye movements preceding immediate upcoming actions by roughly half a second (Land, 
Mennie, & Rusted, 1999). This is in line with the observed effects of hand alignment in the 
action but not the colour task in Chapter 6. More precisely, the active object was prioritised 
when it appeared on the right side, and thus matched the preferred hand of the participants 
when performing the action. It would be interesting to examine whether or not the effect of 
tool location can be replicated with eye movement recording, or whether anticipatory glances 
only occur during multi-sequence actions such as tea making. Furthermore, eye tracking 
would help to clarify the influence of semantic distracters on affordance perception. For 
example, does the semantic similarity between targets and distracters evoke conflicting 
affordances, or do only tool-like distracters but not passive-like distracters capture attention, 
and thus generate a semantic interference effect? 
As revealed in Chapter 2, paired-object affordance is mediated by different but interacting 
bilateral parieto-frontal networks. However, is it unclear how patients with parietal damage 
and visual extinction who behaviourally benefit from the presence of paired objects encode 
paired objects (Chapter 4 and 5; see also Humphreys et al., 2010a; Riddoch et al., 2006; 
Riddoch et al., 2003). Research in our laboratory is already under way to examine whether the 
same neural networks as found in healthy participants are used in extinction patients or 
whether additional brain areas are recruited to compensate for the lesioned brain areas. It 
would be expected that undamaged (left) parieto-frontal areas would be more strongly 
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activated during observation of correctly co-located objects for action when seen from a 1PP. 
Further fMRI studies comparing familiar and unfamiliar object pairs would also be greatly 
beneficial to clarify the role of motor expertise on both the AON (e.g., Calvo-Merino et al., 
2006) and on recovery from extinction (e.g., Riddoch et al., 2006).  
Chapter 3 showed that the observed motor resonance was only evident in the right (non-
dominant) M1. Further research should study whether the observed effects can be replicated 
when the MEP amplitude rather than TMS simulation intensity is kept fixed. It is plausible 
that the differences between left and right M1 may be more pronounced using higher TMS 
intensities. A future study may also wish to extend the results by manipulating the perspective 
in which the stimuli are presented. This would test the generalisability of the bias towards the 
tool. This may be particularly important for stroke rehabilitation approaches when retraining 
everyday tasks in patients.  
Further research should also explore the reasons for the inconsistent findings of hand 
alignment together with the role of tools (vs. objects) within object pairs. EEG might be 
useful for exploring the time course and localisation of responses to object pairs aligned or not 
aligned with the participant’s hand. For example, if the viewing of action-related (object-tool) 
and tool-tool pairs (cf. Chapter 5) would elicit a similar neural response, this would confirm 
that the potential for action (evoked by the tool) rather than the familiarity with the action is 
crucial for the perception of paired-object affordance.  
Another avenue for further research is to explore the possible links between action 
understanding (e.g., via the AON, MNS networks) and affordances. The introduction of goal 
manipulations to our two-item affordance displays would allow identification of shared and 
distinct brain areas for affordance extraction and action understanding. Furthermore, it would 
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help to clarify the role of semantic knowledge in understanding the actions of others (Bach et 
al., 2014).  
 
7.4 Conclusion 
The five experiments presented in this thesis make a substantial contribution towards a 
better understanding of the effects of paired-object affordance on perception and attention. 
Firstly, they provide evidence that visual- and motor-based affordance cues contribute to the 
effects of paired objects. Facilitatory effects occur when visual- and motor-based affordance 
cues can be combined, such as seeing intact graspable, correctly co-located objects for action. 
Secondly, the thesis provides empirical evidence for the neural correlates of paired-object 
affordance. More precisely, paired-object affordance effects are mediated by different but 
interacting bilateral parieto-frontal networks. Thirdly, paired objects are only automatically 
perceived in multiple stimulus displays when the task is action-relevant (attention to objects), 
with the automaticity of affordance being sensitive to semantic information in the scene. The 
thesis also highlights which factors modulate the automaticity of affordance and further 
describes the interplay between attention and automaticity in the guidance of visual attention. 
To conclude, paired-object affordance effects are influenced by contextual information and 
task demands, with the active object (the tool) within a pair modulating the allocation of 
attention in a scene.   
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APPENDICES 
 
Appendix 1: Unfamiliar object pairs used in Chapter 4 
 
Active partner Passive partner 
Bottle opener Paint pot 
Corkscrew Cup 
Paintbrush Potato 
Peeler Socket 
Pestle Ice cream 
Plug Mortar 
Scissors Bolt 
Scoop Wine bottle 
Scourer Plant pot 
Spanner Frying pan 
Spatula Paper 
Teapot Bottle 
Tin opener Fairy liquid 
Toothbrush Bowl 
Trowel Toothpaste 
Whisk Tin 
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Appendix 2: Oxford Cognitive Screen
1
 test scores (Chapter 6) 
 
Elderly 
participants  
  Memory     Language   Praxis   Number   Attention 
Orientation 
Verbal 
recall 
recognition 
Episodic 
recognition 
 Picture 
naming 
Sentence 
reading 
Semantics  Imitation  
Number 
writing 
Calculation  Visual field 
Broken hearts 
cancellation 
Executive 
score   
   
Cut-off score less than 4 less than 3 less than 3   less than 3 less than 14 less than 3   less than 8   less than 3 less than 3   less than 4 less than 42 
greater 
than ± 4 
E16 4 4 4 
 
4 15 3 
 
10 
 
3 4 
 
4 31  0 
E17 4 4 4 
 
4 15 3 
 
11 
 
3 3 
 
4 47  3 
E18 4 4 4 
 
3 15 3 
 
12 
 
3 4 
 
4 50 -1 
E19 4 4 4 
 
4 15 3 
 
11 
 
3 2 
 
4 48 -1 
E20 4 4 4 
 
4 15 3 
 
12 
 
3 4 
 
4 50 -1 
E21 4 4 4 
 
4 15 3 
 
12 
 
3 4 
 
4 49 -1 
E22 No data obtained 
E23 4 4 3 
 
4 15 3 
 
12 
 
3 4 
 
4 48 -1 
E24 4 4 4 
 
4 15 3 
 
12 
 
3 4 
 
4 49 -4 
E25 4 4 4 
 
4 15 3 
 
12 
 
3 4 
 
4 50 -1 
E26 4 4 4 
 
4 15 3 
 
10 
 
3 4 
 
4 49 -1 
E27 4 4 4 
 
4 15 3 
 
12 
 
3 4 
 
4 50 -1 
E28 4 4 3 
 
4 15 3 
 
12 
 
3 4 
 
4 50  5 
E29 4 4 4 
 
3 15 3 
 
11 
 
3 4 
 
4 50 -1 
E30 4 4 4   4 15 3   11   3 4   4 50 -1 
Note. Impaired performance is highlighted in bold. 
 
                                                 
 
1
 Demeyere, N., Riddoch, M. J., Slavkova, E. D., Bickerton, W. L., & Humphreys, G. W. (2015). The Oxford Cognitive Screen (OCS): Validation of a Stroke-Specific Short 
Cognitive Screening Tool. Psychological Assessment. 
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Appendix 3: ANOVA summary for the accuracy data when only one run of each 
participant was analysed (224 trials; Chapter 6) 
 
    
Effect F p ηp² 
Task F(1, 40) = 3.833 .057 .087 
Distracter F(1, 40) = 30.288 .000 .431 
Congruence F(1, 40) = 47.878 .000 .545 
Age F(2, 40) = 3.953 .027 .165 
Task x Distracter F(2, 40) = 124.242 .000 .756 
Distracter x Congruence F(2, 40) = 2.052 .030 .112 
Task x Congruence F(2, 40) = .061 .806 .002 
Task x Age F(2, 40) = 6.189 .005 .236 
Distracter x Age F(2, 40) = 4.613 .016 .187 
Congruence x Age F(2, 40) = 2.715 .078 .120 
Task x Distracter x Congruence F(2, 40) = 37.570 .000 .484 
Task x Distracter x Congruence x Age F(2, 40) = 1.337 .274 .063 
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Appendix 4: Accuracy and standardised reaction time (RT) data (Chapter 6) 
  
 
              
  
Task Distracter  Congruence 
Side 
Active 
Object 
Accuracy zRT 
Young 
Middle-
aged 
Elders Young 
Middle-
aged 
Elders 
Action 
Related 
Congruent 
Left 
0.93 
(0.26) 
0.98 
(0.13) 
0.96 
(0.20) 
0.38 
(1.06) 
0.44 
(0.96) 
0.33 
(1.15) 
Right 
0.93 
(0.26) 
0.97 
(0.17) 
0.94 
(0.24) 
0.38 
(0.97) 
0.39 
(1.05) 
0.28 
(0.92) 
Incongruent 
Left 
0.94 
(0.24) 
0.98 
(0.13) 
0.91 
(0.28) 
0.47 
(1.07) 
0.59 
(0.99) 
0.34 
(1.04) 
Right 
0.86 
(0.35) 
0.91 
(0.28) 
0.89 
(0.32) 
0.52 
(0.94) 
0.46 
(1.02) 
0.43 
(1.04) 
Unrelated 
Congruent 
Left 
0.93 
(0.25) 
0.98 
(0.13) 
0.95 
(0.23) 
0.37 
(0.99) 
0.52 
(1.06) 
0.36 
(0.91) 
Right 
0.94 
(0.24) 
0.99 
(0.07) 
0.94 
(0.24) 
0.34 
(1.04) 
0.45 
(1.09) 
0.22 
(0.81) 
Incongruent 
Left 
0.93 
(0.25) 
0.99 
(0.10) 
0.91 
(0.28) 
0.57 
(0.94) 
0.65 
(1.08) 
0.42 
(1.11) 
Right 
0.92 
(0.27) 
0.98 
(0.12) 
0.92 
(0.27) 
0.53 
(1.09) 
0.55 
(1.02) 
0.35 
(1.13) 
Colour 
Related 
Congruent 
Left 
0.97 
(0.17) 
0.95 
(0.22) 
0.97 
(0.16) 
-0.53 
(0.51) 
-0.51 
(0.56) 
-0.41 
(0.61) 
Right 
0.96 
(0.20) 
0.99 
(0.10) 
0.97 
(0.17) 
-0.49 
(0.45) 
-0.54 
(0.47) 
-0.44 
(0.53) 
Incongruent 
Left 
0.96 
(0.20) 
0.98 
(0.13) 
0.98 
(0.14) 
-0.53 
(0.46) 
-0.52 
(0.62) 
-0.41 
(0.57) 
Right 
0.96 
(0.19) 
0.98 
(0.13) 
0.99 
(0.11) 
-0.48 
(0.49) 
-0.54 
(0.53) 
-0.48 
(0.44) 
Unrelated 
Congruent 
Left 
0.97 
(0.17) 
0.99 
(0.11) 
0.97 
(0.17) 
-0.58 
(0.46) 
-0.59 
(0.53) 
-0.53 
(0.49) 
Right 
0.91 
(0.29) 
0.92 
(0.28) 
0.92 
(0.28) 
-0.59 
(0.45) 
-0.52 
(0.52) 
-0.43 
(0.68) 
Incongruent 
Left 
0.92 
(0.28) 
0.93 
(0.25) 
0.93 
(0.26) 
-0.48 
(0.54) 
-0.51 
(0.53) 
-0.49 
(0.49) 
Right 
0.86 
(0.35) 
0.87 
(0.34) 
0.86 
(0.36) 
-0.51 
(0.49) 
-0.49 
(0.62) 
-0.37 
(0.58) 
Note. zRT = Normalised reaction time. Standard deviation in brackets. 
 
 
 
  
 201 
 
REFERENCES 
 
Adamo, M., & Ferber, S. (2009). A picture says more than a thousand words: Behavioural 
and ERP evidence for attentional enhancements due to action affordances. 
Neuropsychologia, 47(6), 1600-1608. 
Alaerts, K., Swinnen, S. P., & Wenderoth, N. (2009). Interaction of sound and sight during 
action perception: evidence for shared modality-dependent action representations. 
Neuropsychologia, 47(12), 2593-2599. 
Ambrosecchia, M., Marino, B. F., Gawryszewski, L. G., & Riggio, L. (2015). Spatial 
stimulus-response compatibility and affordance effects are not ruled by the same 
mechanisms. Front Hum.Neurosci., 9, 283. 
Amunts, K., Schlaug, G., Schleicher, A., Steinmetz, H., Dabringhaus, A., Roland, P. E. et al. 
(1996). Asymmetry in the human motor cortex and handedness. NeuroImage, 4(3 Pt 1), 
216-222. 
Anderson, S. J., Yamagishi, N., & Karavia, V. (2002). Attentional processes link perception 
and action. Proceedings of the Royal Society B-Biological Sciences, 269(1497), 1225-
1232. 
Andersson, J. L. R., Hutton, C., Ashburner, J., Turner, R., & Friston, K. (2001). Modeling 
geometric deformations in EPI time series. NeuroImage, 13(5), 903-919. 
 202 
 
Anquetil, T., & Jeannerod, M. (2007). Simulated actions in the first and in the third person 
perspectives share common representations. Brain Research, 1130, 125-129. 
Ashburner, J., & Friston, K. J. (2005). Unified segmentation. NeuroImage, 26(3), 839-851. 
Avanzini, P., Fabbri-Destro, M., Dalla, V. R., Daprati, E., Rizzolatti, G., & Cantalupo, G. 
(2012). The dynamics of sensorimotor cortical oscillations during the observation of hand 
movements: an EEG study. Plos One, 7(5), e37534. 
Aziz-Zadeh, L., Koski, L., Zaidel, E., Mazziotta, J., & Iacoboni, M. (2006). Lateralization of 
the human mirror neuron system. Journal of Neuroscience, 26(11), 2964-2970. 
Aziz-Zadeh, L., Maeda, F., Zaidel, E., Mazziotta, J., & Iacoboni, M. (2002). Lateralization in 
motor facilitation during action observation: a TMS study. Experimental Brain Research, 
144(1), 127-131. 
Bach, P., Knoblich, G., Gunter, T. C., Friederici, A. D., & Prinz, W. (2005). Action 
comprehension: Deriving spatial and functional relations. Journal of Experimental 
Psychology-Human Perception and Performance, 31(3), 465-479. 
Bach, P., Nicholson, T., & Hudson, M. (2014). The affordance-matching hypothesis: how 
objects guide action understanding and prediction. Front Hum.Neurosci., 8, 254. 
Baeck, A., Wagemans, J., & Op de Beeck, H. P. (2013). The distributed representation of 
random and meaningful object pairs in human occipitotemporal cortex: the weighted 
average as a general rule. NeuroImage, 70, 37-47. 
 203 
 
Barsalou, L. W. (1999). Perceptual symbol systems. Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 22(4), 
577-609. 
Beauchamp, M. S., & Martin, A. (2007). Grounding object concepts in perception and action: 
evidence from fMRI studies of tools. Cortex, 43(3), 461-468. 
Bestmann, S., & Krakauer, J. W. (2015). The uses and interpretations of the motor-evoked 
potential for understanding behaviour. Experimental Brain Research, 233(3), 679-689. 
Binkofski, F., Buccino, G., Posse, S., Seitz, R. J., Rizzolatti, G., & Freund, H. J. (1999). A 
fronto-parietal circuit for object manipulation in man: evidence from an fMRI-study. 
European Journal of Neuroscience, 11(9), 3276-3286. 
Binkofski, F., & Buxbaum, L. J. (2013). Two action systems in the human brain. Brain and 
Language, 127(2), 222-229. 
Bonini, L., Maranesi, M., Livi, A., Fogassi, L., & Rizzolatti, G. (2014). Space-Dependent 
Representation of Objects and Other's Action in Monkey Ventral Premotor Grasping 
Neurons. Journal of Neuroscience, 34(11), 4108-4119. 
Borghi, A. M., & Riggio, L. (2015). Stable and variable affordances are both automatic and 
flexible. Frontiers in human neuroscience, 9, 351. 
Borghi, A. M., Flumini, A., Natraj, N., & Wheaton, L. A. (2012). One hand, two objects: 
Emergence of affordance in contexts. Brain and Cognition, 80(1), 64-73. 
 204 
 
Bortoletto, M., Mattingley, J. B., & Cunnington, R. (2013). Effects of context on visuomotor 
interference depends on the perspective of observed actions. PLoS One., 8(1), e53248. 
Bozeat, S., Ralph, M. A. L., Patterson, K., & Hodges, J. R. (2002). The influence of personal 
familiarity and context on object use in semantic dementia. Neurocase, 8(1-2), 127-134. 
Bruzzo, A., Borghi, A. M., & Ghirlanda, S. (2008). Hand-object interaction in perspective. 
Neuroscience Letters, 441(1), 61-65. 
Buccino, G., Binkofski, F., Fink, G. R., Fadiga, L., Fogassi, L., Gallese, V. et al. (2001). 
Action observation activates premotor and parietal areas in a somatotopic manner: an fMRI 
study. European Journal of Neuroscience, 13(2), 400-404. 
Buccino, G., Binkofski, F., & Riggio, L. (2004). The mirror neuron system and action 
recognition. Brain and Language, 89(2), 370-376. 
Buccino, G., Sato, M., Cattaneo, L., Roda, F., & Riggio, L. (2009). Broken affordances, 
broken objects: a TMS study. Neuropsychologia, 47(14), 3074-3078. 
Buxbaum, L. J., & Kalenine, S. (2010). Action knowledge, visuomotor activation, and 
embodiment in the two action systems. Year in Cognitive Neuroscience 2010, 1191, 201-
218. 
Buxbaum, L. J., Kyle, K., Grossman, M., & Coslett, H. B. (2007). Left inferior parietal 
representations for skilled hand-object interactions: evidence from stroke and corticobasal 
degeneration. Cortex, 43(3), 411-423. 
 205 
 
Buxbaum, L. J., Schwartz, M. F., & Carew, T. G. (1997). The role of semantic memory in 
object use. Cognitive Neuropsychology, 14(2), 219-254. 
Calvo-Merino, B., Glaser, D. E., Grezes, J., Passingham, R. E., & Haggard, P. (2005). Action 
observation and acquired motor skills: an FMRI study with expert dancers. Cerebral 
Cortex, 15(8), 1243-1249. 
Calvo-Merino, B., Grezes, J., Glaser, D. E., Passingham, R. E., & Haggard, P. (2006). Seeing 
or doing? Influence of visual and motor familiarity in action observation. Current Biology, 
16(19), 1905-1910. 
Canessa, N., Borgo, F., Cappa, S. F., Perani, D., Falini, A., Buccino, G. et al. (2008). The 
different neural correlates of action and functional knowledge in semantic memory: An 
fMRI study. Cerebral Cortex, 18(4), 740-751. 
Cardellicchio, P., Sinigaglia, C., & Costantini, M. (2011). The space of affordances: a TMS 
study. Neuropsychologia, 49(5), 1369-1372. 
Cardellicchio, P., Sinigaglia, C., & Costantini, M. (2013). Grasping affordances with the 
other's hand: A TMS study. Social Cognitive and Affective Neuroscience, 8(4), 455-459. 
Casile, A. (2013). Mirror neurons (and beyond) in the macaque brain: an overview of 20 years 
of research. Neuroscience Letters, 540, 3-14. 
Caspers, S., Zilles, K., Laird, A. R., & Eickhoff, S. B. (2010). ALE meta-analysis of action 
observation and imitation in the human brain. NeuroImage, 50(3), 1148-1167. 
 206 
 
Cavanna, A. E., & Trimble, M. R. (2006). The precuneus: a review of its functional anatomy 
and behavioural correlates. Brain, 129(Pt 3), 564-583. 
Cesari, P., Pizzolato, F., & Fiorio, M. (2011). Grip-dependent cortico-spinal excitability 
during grasping imagination and execution. Neuropsychologia, 49(7), 2121-2130. 
Chan, A. W. Y., Peelen, M. V., & Downing, P. E. (2004). The effect of viewpoint on body 
representation in the extrastriate body area. Neuroreport, 15(15), 2407-2410. 
Chao, L. L., Haxby, J. V., & Martin, A. (1999). Attribute-based neural substrates in temporal 
cortex for perceiving and knowing about objects. Nature Neuroscience, 2(10), 913-919. 
doi:10.1038/13217. 
Chao, L. L., & Martin, A. (2000). Representation of Manipulable Man-Made Objects in the 
Dorsal Stream. NeuroImage, 12(4), 478-484. 
Chechlacz, M., Rotshtein, P., Demeyere, N., Bickerton, W. L., & Humphreys, G. W. (2014). 
The frequency and severity of extinction after stroke affecting different vascular territories. 
Neuropsychologia, 54, 11-17. 
Chechlacz, M., Rotshtein, P., Hansen, P. C., Deb, S., Riddoch, J. M., & Humphreys, G. W. 
(2013). The central role of the temporo-parietal junction and the superior longitudinal 
fasciculus in supporting multi-item competition: Evidence from lesion-symptom mapping 
of extinction. Cortex, 49(2), 487-506. 
 207 
 
Cho, D., & Proctor, R. W. (2010). The Object-Based Simon Effect: Grasping Affordance or 
Relative Location of the Graspable Part? Journal of Experimental Psychology-Human 
Perception and Performance, 36(4), 853-861. 
Chouinard, P. A., & Goodale, M. A. (2010). Category-specific neural processing for naming 
pictures of animals and naming pictures of tools: An ALE meta-analysis. 
Neuropsychologia, 48(2), 409-418. 
Cisek, P., & Kalaska, J. F. (2010). Neural Mechanisms for Interacting with a World Full of 
Action Choices. Annual Review of Neuroscience, 33, 269-298. 
Constable, M. D., Kritikos, A., & Bayliss, A. P. (2011). Grasping the concept of personal 
property. Cognition, 119(3), 430-437. 
Costantini, M., Ambrosini, E., Tieri, G., Sinigaglia, C., & Committeri, G. (2010). Where does 
an object trigger an action? An investigation about affordances in space. Experimental 
Brain Research, 207(1-2), 95-103. 
Craik, F. I., & Bialystok, E. (2006). Cognition through the lifespan: mechanisms of change. 
Trends in Cognitive Sciences, 10(3), 131-138. 
Creem-Regehr, S. H., & Lee, J. N. (2005). Neural representations of graspable objects: are 
tools special? Cognitive Brain Research, 22(3), 457-469. 
Cross, E. S., Hamilton, A. F. D., Kraemer, D. J. M., Kelley, W. M., & Grafton, S. T. (2009). 
Dissociable substrates for body motion and physical experience in the human action 
observation network. European Journal of Neuroscience, 30(7), 1383-1392. 
 208 
 
Cross, E. S., Liepelt, R., Hamilton, A. F., Parkinson, J., Ramsey, R., Stadler, W. et al. (2012). 
Robotic movement preferentially engages the action observation network. Human Brain 
Mapping, 33(9), 2238-2254. 
Cross, E. S., Stadler, W., Parkinson, J., Schutz-Bosbach, S., & Prinz, W. (2013). The 
influence of visual training on predicting complex action sequences. Human Brain 
Mapping, 34(2), 467-486. 
Daligadu, J., Murphy, B., Brown, J., Rae, B., & Yielder, P. (2013). TMS stimulus-response 
asymmetry in left- and right-handed individuals. Experimental Brain Research, 224(3), 
411-416. 
De Lange, F. P., Spronk, M., Willems, R. M., Toni, I., & Bekkering, H. (2008). 
Complementary systems for understanding action intentions. Current Biology, 18(6), 454-
457. 
De Stefani, E., Innocenti, A., Bernardi, N. F., Campione, G. C., & Gentilucci, M. (2012). The 
bottle and the glass say to me: "Pour!". Experimental Brain Research, 218(4), 539-549. 
Della Sala, S., Marchetti, C., & Spinnler, H. (1991). Right-sided anarchic (alien) hand: a 
longitudinal study. Neuropsychologia, 29(11), 1113-1127. 
Demeyere, N., Riddoch, M. J., Slavkova, E. D., Bickerton, W. L., & Humphreys, G. W. 
(2015). The Oxford Cognitive Screen (OCS): Validation of a Stroke-Specific Short 
Cognitive Screening Tool. Psychological Assessment. 
 209 
 
Dempster, F. N. (1992). The Rise and Fall of the Inhibitory Mechanism - Toward A Unified 
Theory of Cognitive-Development and Aging. Developmental Review, 12(1), 45-75. 
Derbyshire, N., Ellis, R., & Tucker, M. (2006). The potentiation of two components of the 
reach-to-grasp action during object categorisation in visual memory. Acta Psychologica, 
122(1), 74-98. 
di Pellegrino, G., & De Renzi, E. (1995). An Experimental Investigation on the Nature of 
Extinction. Neuropsychologia, 33(2), 153-170. 
di Pellegrino, G., Fadiga, L., Fogassi, L., Gallese, V., & Rizzolatti, G. (1992). Understanding 
Motor Events - A Neurophysiological Study. Experimental Brain Research, 91(1), 176-
180. 
di Pellegrino, G., Rafal, R., & Tipper, S. P. (2005). Implicitly evoked actions modulate visual 
selection: Evidence from parietal extinction. Current Biology, 15(16), 1469-1472. 
Diersch, N., Cross, E. S., Stadler, W., Schutz-Bosbach, S., & Rieger, M. (2012). Representing 
others' actions: the role of expertise in the aging mind. Psychological Research, 76(4), 525-
541. 
Drew, A. R., Quandt, L. C., & Marshall, P. J. (2015). Visual influences on sensorimotor EEG 
responses during observation of hand actions. Brain Research, 1597, 119-128. 
Driver, J., & Vuilleumier, P. (2001). Perceptual awareness and its loss in unilateral neglect 
and extinction. Cognition, 79(1-2), 39-88. 
 210 
 
Duvernoy, H. M. (1991). The Human Brain: Surface, Three-Dimensional Sectional Anatomy 
and MRI. Wien: Springer-Verlag. 
Fabbri-Destro, M., & Rizzolatti, G. (2008). Mirror neurons and mirror systems in monkeys 
and humans. Physiology, 23(3), 171-179. 
Fadiga, L., Fogassi, L., Pavesi, G., & Rizzolatti, G. (1995). Motor facilitation during action 
observation: a magnetic stimulation study. Journal of Neurophysiology, 73(6), 2608-2611. 
Fogassi, L., Ferrari, P. F., Gesierich, B., Rozzi, S., Chersi, F., & Rizzolatti, G. (2005). Parietal 
lobe: from action organization to intention understanding. Science, 308(5722), 662-667. 
Frey, S. H. (2007). What puts the how in where? Tool use and the divided visual streams 
hypothesis. Cortex, 43(3), 368-375. 
Friston, K. J., Ashburner, J., Frith, C. D., Poline, J. B., Heather, J. D., & Frackowiak, R. S. J. 
(1995). Spatial registration and normalization of images. Human Brain Mapping, 3(3), 
165-189. 
Friston, K. J., Zarahn, E., Josephs, O., Henson, R. N. A., & Dale, A. M. (1999). Stochastic 
designs in event-related fMRI. NeuroImage, 10(5), 607-619. 
Gallese, V., Fadiga, L., Fogassi, L., & Rizzolatti, G. (1996). Action recognition in the 
premotor cortex. Brain, 119, 593-609. 
 211 
 
Gallivan, J. P., McLean, A., & Culham, J. C. (2011). Neuroimaging reveals enhanced 
activation in a reach-selective brain area for objects located within participants' typical 
hand workspaces. Neuropsychologia, 49(13), 3710-3721. 
Gardner, T., Goulden, N., & Cross, E. S. (2015). Dynamic modulation of the action 
observation network by movement familiarity. Journal of Neuroscience, 35(4), 1561-1572. 
Garrido-Vasquez, P., & Schuboe, A. (2014). Modulation of visual attention by object 
affordance. Frontiers in Psychology, 5. 
Gibson, J. J. (1979). The ecological approach to visual perception. Boston: Houghton Mifflin. 
Gilchrist, I. D., Humphreys, G. W., & Riddoch, M. J. (1996). Grouping and extinction: 
Evidence for low-level modulation of visual selection. Cognitive Neuropsychology, 13(8), 
1223-1249. 
Girardi, G., Lindemann, O., & Bekkering, H. (2010). Context Effects on the Processing of 
Action-Relevant Object Features. Journal of Experimental Psychology-Human Perception 
and Performance, 36(2), 330-340. 
Glenberg, A. M., & Kaschak, M. P. (2002). Grounding language in action. Psychon.Bull.Rev., 
9(3), 558-565. 
Goodale, M. A., & Milner, A. D. (1992). Separate visual pathways for perception and action. 
Trends in Neurosciences, 15(1), 20-25. 
 212 
 
Goslin, J., Dixon, T., Fischer, M. H., Cangelosi, A., & Ellis, R. (2012). Electrophysiological 
examination of embodiment in vision and action. Psychol.Sci., 23(2), 152-157. 
Grafton, S. T. (2009). Embodied cognition and the simulation of action to understand others. 
Annals of the New York Academy of Sciences, 1156, 97-117. 
Grafton, S. T., Fadiga, L., Arbib, M. A., & Rizzolatti, G. (1997). Premotor cortex activation 
during observation and naming of familiar tools. NeuroImage, 6(4), 231-236. 
Green, C., & Hummel, J. E. (2006). Familiar interacting object pairs are perceptually grouped. 
Journal of Experimental Psychology: Human Perception and Performance, 32(5), 1107-
1119. 
Grezes, J., & Decety, J. (2001). Functional anatomy of execution, mental simulation, 
observation, and verb generation of actions: A meta-analysis. Human Brain Mapping, 
12(1), 1-19. 
Grezes, J., & Decety, J. (2002). Does visual perception of object afford action? Evidence from 
a neuroimaging study. Neuropsychologia, 40(2), 212-222. 
Grezes, J., Tucker, M., Armony, J., Ellis, R., & Passingham, R. E. (2003). Objects 
automatically potentiate action: an fMRI study of implicit processing. European Journal of 
Neuroscience, 17(12), 2735-2740. 
Hamilton, A. F., & Grafton, S. T. (2006). Goal representation in human anterior intraparietal 
sulcus. Journal of Neuroscience, 26(4), 1133-1137. 
 213 
 
Hamilton, A. F. D., & Grafton, S. T. (2008). Action outcomes are represented in human 
inferior frontoparietal cortex. Cerebral Cortex, 18(5), 1160-1168. 
Hammond, G. (2002). Correlates of human handedness in primary motor cortex: a review and 
hypothesis. Neuroscience and Biobehavioral Reviews, 26(3), 285-292. 
Handy, T. C., Grafton, S. T., Shroff, N. M., Ketay, S., & Gazzaniga, M. S. (2003). Graspable 
objects grab attention when the potential for action is recognized. Nature Neuroscience, 
6(4), 421-427. 
Handy, T. C., & Tipper, C. M. (2007). Attentional orienting to graspable objects: what 
triggers the response? Neuroreport, 18(9), 941-944. 
Heitger, M. H., Mace, M. J., Jastorff, J., Swinnen, S. P., & Orban, G. A. (2012). Cortical 
regions involved in the observation of bimanual actions. Journal of Neurophysiology, 
108(9), 2594-2611. 
Herve, P. Y., Zago, L., Petit, L., Mazoyer, B., & Tzourio-Mazoyer, N. (2013). Revisiting 
human hemispheric specialization with neuroimaging. Trends Cogn Sci., 17(2), 69-80. 
Hesse, M. D., Sparing, R., & Fink, G. R. (2009). End or means--the "what" and "how" of 
observed intentional actions. Journal of Cognitive Neuroscience, 21(4), 776-790. 
Hetu, S., Mercier, C., Eugene, F., Michon, P. E., & Jackson, P. L. (2011). Modulation of brain 
activity during action observation: influence of perspective, transitivity and 
meaningfulness. PLoS One., 6(9), e24728. 
 214 
 
Hlustik, P., Solodkin, A., Gullapalli, R. P., Noll, D. C., & Small, S. L. (2002). Functional 
lateralization of the human premotor cortex during sequential movements. Brain Cogn, 
49(1), 54-62. 
Hodges, J. R., Bozeat, S., Lambon Ralph, M. A., Patterson, K., & Spatt, J. (2000). The role of 
conceptual knowledge in object use evidence from semantic dementia. Brain, 123 ( Pt 9), 
1913-1925. 
Hodges, J. R., Spatt, J., & Patterson, K. (1999). "What" and "how": evidence for the 
dissociation of object knowledge and mechanical problem-solving skills in the human 
brain. Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the United States of America, 
96(16), 9444-9448. 
Hoeren, M., Kaller, C. P., Glauche, V., Vry, M. S., Rijntjes, M., Hamzei, F. et al. (2013). 
Action semantics and movement characteristics engage distinct processing streams during 
the observation of tool use. Experimental Brain Research, 229(2), 243-260. 
Hommel, B., Li, K. Z. H., & Li, S. C. (2004). Visual search across the life span. 
Developmental Psychology, 40(4), 545-558. 
Horning, S. M., Cornwell, R. E., & Davis, H. P. (2012). The recognition of facial expressions: 
an investigation of the influence of age and cognition. Neuropsychol.Dev.Cogn 
B.Aging.Neuropsychol.Cogn, 19(6), 657-676. 
Humphreys, G. W., Bickerton, W. L., Samson, D., & Riddoch, M. J. (2012). BCoS Cognitive 
Screen. London: Psychology Press. 
 215 
 
Humphreys, G. W., Kumar, S., Yoon, E. Y., Wulff, M., Roberts, K. L., & Riddoch, J. M. 
(2013). Attending to the possibilities of action. Philosophical Transactions of the Royal 
Society of London.Series B: Biological Sciences, 368(1628), 20130059. 
Humphreys, G. W., & Riddoch, J. (2007). How to define an object: Evidence from the effects 
of action on perception and attention. Mind & Language, 22(5), 534-547. 
Humphreys, G. W., & Riddoch, M. J. (2001). Detection by action: neuropsychological 
evidence for action-defined templates in search. Nature Neuroscience, 4(1), 84-88. 
Humphreys, G. W., & Riddoch, M. J. (2003). From vision to action and action to vision: A 
convergent route approach to vision, action, and attention. Psychology of Learning and 
Motivation: Advances in Research and Theory: Cognitive Vision, 42, 225-264. 
Humphreys, G. W., Wulff, M., Yoon, E. Y., & Riddoch, M. (2010a). Neuropsychological 
Evidence for Visual- and Motor-Based Affordance: Effects of Reference Frame and 
Object-Hand Congruence. Journal of Experimental Psychology.Learning, Memory, and 
Cognition, 36(3), 659-670. 
Humphreys, G. W., Yoon, E. Y., Kumar, S., Lestou, V., Kitadono, K., Roberts, K. L. et al. 
(2010b). The interaction of attention and action: From seeing action to acting on 
perception. British Journal of Psychology, 101, 185-206. 
Iacoboni, M., Molnar-Szakacs, I., Gallese, V., Buccino, G., Mazziotta, J. C., & Rizzolatti, G. 
(2005). Grasping the intentions of others with one's own mirror neuron system. Plos 
Biology, 3(3), 529-535. 
 216 
 
Iacoboni, M., Woods, R. P., Brass, M., Bekkering, H., Mazziotta, J. C., & Rizzolatti, G. 
(1999). Cortical mechanisms of human imitation. Science, 286(5449), 2526-2528. 
Jackson, P. L., Meltzoff, A. N., & Decety, J. (2006). Neural circuits involved in imitation and 
perspective-taking. NeuroImage, 31(1), 429-439. 
Jeannerod, M. (1994). The Representing Brain - Neural Correlates of Motor Intention and 
Imagery. Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 17(2), 187-202. 
Jeannerod, M., Arbib, M. A., Rizzolatti, G., & Sakata, H. (1995). Grasping objects: the 
cortical mechanisms of visuomotor transformation. Trends in Neurosciences, 18(7), 314-
320. 
Jenkins, I. H., Brooks, D. J., Nixon, P. D., Frackowiak, R. S., & Passingham, R. E. (1994). 
Motor sequence learning: a study with positron emission tomography. Journal of 
Neuroscience, 14(6), 3775-3790. 
Johnson-Frey, S. H. (2003). What's so special about human tool use? Neuron, 39(2), 201-204. 
Johnson-Frey, S. H. (2004). The neural bases of complex tool use in humans. Trends in 
Cognitive Sciences, 8(2), 71-78. 
Karnath, H. O. (1988). Deficits of attention in acute and recovered visual hemi-neglect. 
Neuropsychologia, 26(1), 27-43. 
Karnath, H. O., Himmelbach, M., & Küker, W. (2003). The cortical substrate of visual 
extinction. Neuroreport, 14(3), 437-442. 
 217 
 
Kellenbach, M. L., Brett, M., & Patterson, K. (2003). Actions speak louder than functions: 
The importance of manipulability and action in tool representation. Journal of Cognitive 
Neuroscience, 15(1), 30-46. 
Kelly, R., Mizelle, J. C., & Wheaton, L. A. (2015). Distinctive laterality of neural networks 
supporting action understanding in left- and right-handed individuals: An EEG coherence 
study. Neuropsychologia, 75, 20-29. 
Kim, J. G., & Biederman, I. (2011). Where Do Objects Become Scenes? Cerebral Cortex, 
21(8), 1738-1746. 
Kim, J. G., Biederman, I., & Juan, C. H. (2011). The Benefit of Object Interactions Arises in 
the Lateral Occipital Cortex Independent of Attentional Modulation from the Intraparietal 
Sulcus: A Transcranial Magnetic Stimulation Study. Journal of Neuroscience, 31(22), 
8320-8324. 
Kim, S. G., Ashe, J., Hendrich, K., Ellermann, J. M., Merkle, H., Ugurbil, K. et al. (1993). 
Functional magnetic resonance imaging of motor cortex: hemispheric asymmetry and 
handedness. Science, 261(5121), 615-617. 
Kok, A. (2000). Age-related changes in involuntary and voluntary attention as reflected in 
components of the event-related potential (ERP). Biological Psychology, 54(1-3), 107-143. 
Kostov, K., & Janyan, A. (2012). The role of attention in the affordance effect: can we afford 
to ignore it? Cognitive Processing, 13, S215-S218. doi:10.1007/s10339-012-0452-1. 
 218 
 
Kumada, T., & Humphreys, G. W. (2001). Lexical recovery from extinction: Interactions 
between visual form and stored knowledge modulate visual selection. Cognitive 
Neuropsychology, 18(5), 465-478. 
Kumar, S., Riddoch, M. J., & Humphreys, G. (2013). Mu rhythm desynchronization reveals 
motoric influences of hand action on object recognition. Frontiers in human neuroscience, 
7, 66. 
Kumar, S., Yoon, E. Y., & Humphreys, G. W. (2012). Perceptual and motor-based responses 
to hand actions on objects: evidence from ERPs. Experimental Brain Research, 220(2), 
153-164. 
Land, M., Mennie, N., & Rusted, J. (1999). The roles of vision and eye movements in the 
control of activities of daily living. Perception, 28(11), 1311-1328. 
Laurienti, P. J., Burdette, J. H., Maldjian, J. A., & Wallace, M. T. (2006). Enhanced 
multisensory integration in older adults. Neurobiology of Aging, 27(8), 1155-1163. 
Laverick, R., Wulff, M., Honisch, J. J., Chua, W. L., Wing, A. M., & Rotshtein, P. (2015). 
Selecting object pairs for action: Is the active object always first? Experimental Brain 
Research, 233(8), 2269-2281. 
Leonard, G., & Tremblay, F. (2007). Corticomotor facilitation associated with observation, 
imagery and imitation of hand actions: a comparative study in young and old adults. 
Experimental Brain Research, 177(2), 167-175. 
 219 
 
Lewis, J. W. (2006). Cortical networks related to human use of tools. Neuroscientist, 12(3), 
211-231. 
Lien, M. C., Jardin, E., & Proctor, R. W. (2013). An electrophysiological study of the object-
based correspondence effect: is the effect triggered by an intended grasping action? 
Atten.Percept.Psychophys., 75(8), 1862-1882. 
Liew, S. L., Sheng, T., Margetis, J. L., & Aziz-Zadeh, L. (2013). Both novelty and expertise 
increase action observation network activity. Front Hum.Neurosci., 7, 541. 
Macdonell, R. A., Shapiro, B. E., Chiappa, K. H., Helmers, S. L., Cros, D., Day, B. J. et al. 
(1991). Hemispheric threshold differences for motor evoked potentials produced by 
magnetic coil stimulation. Neurology, 41(9), 1441-1444. 
Maeda, F., Keenan, J. P., Tormos, J. M., Topka, H., & Pascual-Leone, A. (2000). 
Interindividual variability of the modulatory effects of repetitive transcranial magnetic 
stimulation on cortical excitability. Experimental Brain Research, 133(4), 425-430. 
Maeda, F., Kleiner-Fisman, G., & Pascual-Leone, A. (2002). Motor facilitation while 
observing hand actions: Specificity of the effect and role of observer's orientation. Journal 
of Neurophysiology, 87(3), 1329-1335. 
Maranesi, M., Bonini, L., & Fogassi, L. (2014). Cortical processing of object affordances for 
self and others' action. Frontiers in Psychology, 5. 
Matheson, H., Newman, A. J., Satel, J., & McMullen, P. (2014). Handles of manipulable 
objects attract covert visual attention: ERP evidence. Brain Cogn, 86, 17-23. 
 220 
 
McNair, N. A., & Harris, I. M. (2012). Disentangling the contributions of grasp and action 
representations in the recognition of manipulable objects. Experimental Brain Research, 
220(1), 71-77. 
McNair, N. A., & Harris, I. M. (2014). The contextual action relationship between a tool and 
its action recipient modulates their joint perception. Attention Perception & Psychophysics, 
76(1), 214-229. 
Meister, I. G., Wu, A. D., Deblieck, C., & Iacoboni, M. (2012). Early semantic and 
phonological effects on temporal- and muscle-specific motor resonance. European Journal 
of Neuroscience, 36(3), 2391-2399. 
Michaels, C. F. (1988). S-R Compatibility Between Response Position and Destination of 
Apparent Motion - Evidence of the Detection of Affordances. Journal of Experimental 
Psychology-Human Perception and Performance, 14(2), 231-240. 
Mizelle, J. C., Kelly, R. L., & Wheaton, L. A. (2013). Ventral encoding of functional 
affordances: a neural pathway for identifying errors in action. Brain Cognition, 82(3), 274-
282. 
Mizelle, J. C., & Wheaton, L. A. (2010a). The Neuroscience of Storing and Molding Tool 
Action Concepts: How "Plastic" is Grounded Cognition? Frontiers in Psychology, 1, 195. 
Mizelle, J. C., & Wheaton, L. A. (2010b). Why is that Hammer in My Coffee? A Multimodal 
Imaging Investigation of Contextually Based Tool Understanding. Frontiers in human 
neuroscience, 4, 233. 
 221 
 
Molenberghs, P., Cunnington, R., & Mattingley, J. B. (2012). Brain regions with mirror 
properties: A meta-analysis of 125 human fMRI studies. Neuroscience and Biobehavioral 
Reviews, 36(1), 341-349. 
Montagna, M., Cerri, G., Borroni, P., & Baldissera, F. (2005). Excitability changes in human 
corticospinal projections to muscles moving hand and fingers while viewing a reaching and 
grasping action. European Journal of Neuroscience, 22(6), 1513-1520. 
Murata, A., Fadiga, L., Fogassi, L., Gallese, V., Raos, V., & Rizzolatti, G. (1997). Object 
representation in the ventral premotor cortex (area F5) of the monkey. Journal of 
Neurophysiology, 78(4), 2226-2230. 
Murata, A., Gallese, V., Luppino, G., Kaseda, M., & Sakata, H. (2000). Selectivity for the 
shape, size, and orientation of objects for grasping in neurons of monkey parietal area AIP. 
Journal of Neurophysiology, 83(5), 2580-2601. 
Muthukumaraswamy, S. D., & Johnson, B. W. (2004). Changes in rolandic mu rhythm during 
observation of a precision grip. Psychophysiology, 41(1), 152-156. 
Muthukumaraswamy, S. D., Johnson, B. W., & McNair, N. A. (2004). Mu rhythm modulation 
during observation of an object-directed grasp. Brain Res.Cogn Brain Res., 19(2), 195-201. 
Nachev, P., Kennard, C., & Husain, M. (2008). Functional role of the supplementary and pre-
supplementary motor areas. Nature Reviews Neuroscience, 9(11), 856-869. 
 222 
 
Naish, K. R., Houston-Price, C., Bremner, A. J., & Holmes, N. P. (2014). Effects of action 
observation on corticospinal excitability: Muscle specificity, direction, and timing of the 
mirror response. Neuropsychologia, 64C, 331-348. 
Natraj, N., Poole, V., Mizelle, J. C., Flumini, A., Borghi, A. M., & Wheaton, L. A. (2013). 
Context and hand posture modulate the neural dynamics of tool-object perception. 
Neuropsychologia, 51(3), 506-519. 
Netelenbos, N., & Gonzalez, C. L. (2015). Is that graspable? Let your right hand be the judge. 
Brain Cogn, 93, 18-25. 
Niimi, R., Saneyoshi, A., Abe, R., Kaminaga, T., & Yokosawa, K. (2011). Parietal and frontal 
object areas underlie perception of object orientation in depth. Neuroscience Letters, 
496(1), 35-39. 
Noppeney, U. (2008). The neural systems of tool and action semantics: A perspective from 
functional imaging. Journal of Physiology-Paris, 102(1-3), 40-49. 
Ochipa, C., Rothi, L. J., & Heilman, K. M. (1992). Conceptual apraxia in Alzheimer's disease. 
Brain, 115, 1061-1071. 
Oldfield, R. C. (1971). The Assessment and Analysis of Handedness: the Edinburgh 
Inventory. Neuropsychologia, 9(1), 97-113. 
Oosterhof, N. N., Tipper, S. P., & Downing, P. E. (2012). Viewpoint (in)dependence of action 
representations: an MVPA study. Journal of Cognitive Neuroscience, 24(4), 975-989. 
 223 
 
Orban, G. A., & Caruana, F. (2014). The neural basis of human tool use. Frontiers in 
Psychology, 5. 
Ortigue, S., Sinigaglia, C., Rizzolatti, G., & Grafton, S. T. (2010). Understanding actions of 
others: the electrodynamics of the left and right hemispheres. A high-density EEG 
neuroimaging study. Plos One, 5(8), e12160. 
Osiurak, F., Aubin, G., Allain, P., Jarry, C., Richard, I., & Le Gall, D. (2008). Object 
utilization and object usage: A single-case study. Neurocase, 14(2), 169-183. 
Osiurak, F., Jarry, C., & Le Gall, D. (2010). Grasping the Affordances, Understanding the 
Reasoning: Toward a Dialectical Theory of Human Tool Use. Psychological Review, 
117(2), 517-540. 
Oztop, E., Kawato, M., & Arbib, M. A. (2013). Mirror neurons: functions, mechanisms and 
models. Neuroscience Letters, 540, 43-55. 
Pellicano, A., Iani, C., Borghi, A. M., Rubichi, S., & Nicoletti, R. (2010). Simon-like and 
functional affordance effects with tools: The effects of object perceptual discrimination and 
object action state. Quarterly Journal of Experimental Psychology, 63(11), 2190-2201. 
Perry, A., & Bentin, S. (2009). Mirror activity in the human brain while observing hand 
movements: a comparison between EEG desynchronization in the mu-range and previous 
fMRI results. Brain Research, 1282, 126-132. 
 224 
 
Petit, L. S., Pegna, A. J., Harris, I. M., & Michel, C. M. (2006). Automatic motor cortex 
activation for natural as compared to awkward grips of a manipulable object. Experimental 
Brain Research, 168(1-2), 120-130. 
Pfurtscheller, G., Neuper, C., Andrew, C., & Edlinger, G. (1997). Foot and hand area mu 
rhythms. International Journal of Psychophysiology, 26(1-3), 121-135. 
Phillips, J. C., & Ward, R. (2002). S-R correspondence effects of irrelevant visual affordance: 
Time course and specificity of response activation. Visual Cognition, 9(4-5), 540-558. 
Plata Bello, J., Modrono, C., Marcano, F., & Gonzalez-Mora, J. L. (2013). Observation of 
simple intransitive actions: the effect of familiarity. Plos One, 8(9), e74485. 
Plata Bello, J., Modrono, C., Marcano, F., & Gonzalez-Mora, J. L. (2014). The effect of 
motor familiarity during simple finger opposition tasks. Brain Imaging Behav.. 
Potter, L. M., Grealy, M. A., Elliott, M. A., & Andres, P. (2012). Aging and performance on 
an everyday-based visual search task. Acta Psychol.(Amst.), 140(3), 208-217. 
Prabhu, G., Voss, M., Brochier, T., Cattaneo, L., Haggard, P., & Lemon, R. (2007). 
Excitability of human motor cortex inputs prior to grasp. J.Physiol, 581(Pt 1), 189-201. 
Proverbio, A. M., Azzari, R., & Adorni, R. (2013). Is there a left hemispheric asymmetry for 
tool affordance processing? Neuropsychologia, 51(13), 2690-2701. 
Ptak, R., Valenza, N., & Schnider, A. (2002). Expectation-based attentional modulation of 
visual extinction in spatial neglect. Neuropsychologia, 40(13), 2199-2205. 
 225 
 
Pulvermueller, F., & Fadiga, L. (2010). Active perception: sensorimotor circuits as a cortical 
basis for language. Nature Reviews Neuroscience, 11(5), 351-360. 
Raymond, J. E., Shapiro, K. L., & Arnell, K. M. (1992). Temporary Suppression of Visual 
Processing in An Rsvp Task - An Attentional Blink. Journal of Experimental Psychology-
Human Perception and Performance, 18(3), 849-860. 
Rees, G., Wojciulik, E., Clarke, K., Husain, M., Frith, C., & Driver, J. (2000). Unconscious 
activation of visual cortex in the damaged right hemisphere of a parietal patient with 
extinction. Brain, 123, 1624-1633. 
Reese, H. W., Lee, L. J., Cohen, S. H., & Pucket, J. M. (2001). Effects of intellectual 
variables, age, and gender on divergent thinking in adulthood. International Journal of 
Behavioral Development, 25(6), 491-500. 
Rice, N. J., Valyear, K. F., Goodale, M. A., Milner, A. D., & Culham, J. C. (2007). 
Orientation sensitivity to graspable objects: An fMRI adaptation study. NeuroImage, 36, 
T87-T93. 
Riddoch, M., Pippard, B., Booth, L., Rickell, J., Summers, J., Brownson, A. et al. (2011). 
Effects of Action Relations on the Configural Coding Between Objects. Journal of 
Experimental Psychology-Human Perception and Performance, 37(2), 580-587. 
Riddoch, M. J., Edwards, M. G., Humphreys, G. W., West, R., & Heafield, T. (1998). Visual 
affordances direct action: Neuropsychological evidence from manual interference. 
Cognitive Neuropsychology, 15(6-8), 645-683. 
 226 
 
Riddoch, M. J., & Humphreys, G. W. (1987). Visual Object Processing in Optic Aphasia - A 
Case of Semantic Access Agnosia. Cognitive Neuropsychology, 4(2), 131-185. 
Riddoch, M. J., Humphreys, G. W., Edwards, S., Baker, T., & Willson, K. (2003). Seeing the 
action: neuropsychological evidence for action-based effects on object selection. Nature 
Neuroscience, 6(1), 82-89. doi:10.1038/nn984. 
Riddoch, M. J., Humphreys, G. W., Hickman, M., Clift, J., Daly, A., & Colin, J. (2006). I can 
see what you are doing: Action familiarity and affordance promote recovery from 
extinction. Cognitive Neuropsychology, 23(4), 583-605. 
Riddoch, M. J., Humphreys, G. W., & Price, C. J. (1989). Routes to Action - Evidence from 
Apraxia. Cognitive Neuropsychology, 6(5), 437-454. 
Rizzolatti, G., & Craighero, L. (2004). The mirror-neuron system. Annual Review of 
Neuroscience, 27, 169-192. 
Rizzolatti, G., Fadiga, L., Gallese, V., & Fogassi, L. (1996). Premotor cortex and the 
recognition of motor actions. Cognitive Brain Research, 3(2), 131-141. 
Rizzolatti, G., Fadiga, L., Matelli, M., Bettinardi, V., Paulesu, E., Perani, D. et al. (1996). 
Localization of grasp representations in humans by PET. 1. Observation versus execution. 
Experimental Brain Research, 111(2), 246-252. 
Rizzolatti, G., & Fogassi, L. (2014). The mirror mechanism: recent findings and perspectives. 
Philos.Trans.R.Soc.Lond B Biol.Sci., 369(1644), 20130420. 
 227 
 
Rizzolatti, G., Fogassi, L., & Gallese, V. (2001). Neurophysiological mechanisms underlying 
the understanding and imitation of action. Nature Reviews Neuroscience, 2(9), 661-670. 
Rizzolatti, G., & Matelli, M. (2003). Two different streams form the dorsal visual system: 
anatomy and functions. Experimental Brain Research, 153(2), 146-157. 
Rizzolatti, G., & Sinigaglia, C. (2010). The functional role of the parieto-frontal mirror 
circuit: interpretations and misinterpretations. Nature Reviews Neuroscience, 11(4), 264-
274. 
Roberts, K. L., & Humphreys, G. W. (2010a). Action relationships concatenate 
representations of separate objects in the ventral visual system. NeuroImage, 52(4), 1541-
1548. 
Roberts, K. L., & Humphreys, G. W. (2010b). The One That Does, Leads: Action Relations 
Influence the Perceived Temporal Order of Graspable Objects. Journal of Experimental 
Psychology: Human Perception and Performance, 36(3), 776-780. 
Roberts, K. L., & Humphreys, G. W. (2011a). Action relations facilitate the identification of 
briefly-presented objects. Attention Perception & Psychophysics, 73(2), 597-612. 
Roberts, K. L., & Humphreys, G. W. (2011b). Action-related objects influence the 
distribution of visuospatial attention. Quarterly Journal of Experimental Psychology, 
64(4), 669-688. 
Robertson, I., & Frasca, R. (1992). Attentional Load and Visual Neglect. International 
Journal of Neuroscience, 62(1-2), 45-56. 
 228 
 
Rodrigues, C. K., & Caramelli, P. (2009). Evaluation of the performance of normal elderly in 
a limb praxis protocol: influence of age, gender, and education. Journal International 
Neuropsychology Society, 15(4), 618-622. 
Rogers, W. A. (1992). Age differences in visual search: target and distractor learning. 
Psychology and Aging, 7(4), 526-535. 
Rorden, C., Mattingley, J. B., Karnath, H. O., & Driver, J. (1997). Visual extinction and prior 
entry: Impaired perception of temporal order with intact motion perception after unilateral 
parietal damage. Neuropsychologia, 35(4), 421-433. 
Rossi, S., Hallett, M., Rossini, P. M., & Pascual-Leone, A. (2009). Safety, ethical 
considerations, and application guidelines for the use of transcranial magnetic stimulation 
in clinical practice and research. Clinical Neurophysiology, 120(12), 2008-2039. 
Rossini, P. M., Barker, A. T., Berardelli, A., Caramia, M. D., Caruso, G., Cracco, R. Q. et al. 
(1994). Non-invasive electrical and magnetic stimulation of the brain, spinal cord and 
roots: basic principles and procedures for routine clinical application. Report of an IFCN 
committee. Electroencephalography and Clinical Neurophysiology, 91(2), 79-92. 
Ruby, P., & Decety, J. (2001). Effect of subjective perspective taking during simulation of 
action: a PET investigation of agency. Nature Neuroscience, 4(5), 546-550. 
Rumiati, R. I., Weiss, P. H., Shallice, T., Ottoboni, G., Noth, J., Zilles, K. et al. (2004). Neural 
basis of pantomiming the use of visually presented objects. NeuroImage, 21(4), 1224-
1231. 
 229 
 
Ruther, N. N., Tettamanti, M., Cappa, S. F., & Bellebaum, C. (2014). Observed manipulation 
enhances left fronto-parietal activations in the processing of unfamiliar tools. Plos One, 
9(6), e99401. 
Salmon, J. P., Matheson, H. E., & McMullen, P. A. (2014). Photographs of manipulable 
objects are named more quickly than the same objects depicted as line-drawings: Evidence 
that photographs engage embodiment more than line-drawings. Frontiers in Psychology, 5, 
1187. 
Salthouse, T. A. (2000). Aging and measures of processing speed. Biological Psychology, 
54(1-3), 35-54. 
Saxe, R., Jamal, N., & Powell, L. (2006). My body or yours? The effect of visual perspective 
on cortical body representations. Cerebral Cortex, 16(2), 178-182. 
Schluter, N. D., Krams, M., Rushworth, M. F. S., & Passingham, R. E. (2001). Cerebral 
dominance for action in the human brain: the selection of actions. Neuropsychologia, 
39(2), 105-113. 
Semmler, J. G., & Nordstrom, M. A. (1998). Hemispheric differences in motor cortex 
excitability during a simple index finger abduction task in humans. Journal of 
Neurophysiology, 79(3), 1246-1254. 
Shalev, L., & Humphreys, G. W. (2000). Biased attentional shifts associated with unilateral 
left neglect. Cogn Neuropsychol., 17(4), 339-364. 
 230 
 
Silveri, M. C., & Ciccarelli, N. (2009). Semantic memory in object use. Neuropsychologia, 
47(12), 2634-2641. 
Ska, B., & Nespoulous, J. L. (1987). Pantomimes and aging. J.Clin.Exp.Neuropsychol., 9(6), 
754-766. 
Sumner, P., Nachev, P., Morris, P., Peters, A. M., Jackson, S. R., Kennard, C. et al. (2007). 
Human medial frontal cortex mediates unconscious inhibition of voluntary action. Neuron, 
54(5), 697-711. 
Symes, E., Ellis, R., & Tucker, M. (2007). Visual object affordances: Object orientation. Acta 
Psychologica, 124(2), 238-255. 
Thill, S., Caligiore, D., Borghi, A. M., Ziemke, T., & Baldassarre, G. (2013). Theories and 
computational models of affordance and mirror systems: an integrative review. 
Neuroscience and Biobehavioral Reviews, 37(3), 491-521. 
Tipper, S. P., Paul, M. A., & Hayes, A. E. (2006). Vision-for-action: The effects of object 
property discrimination and action state on affordance compatibility effects. Psychonomic 
Bulletin & Review, 13(3), 493-498. 
Tsvetanov, K. A., Mevorach, C., Allen, H., & Humphreys, G. W. (2013). Age-related 
differences in selection by visual saliency. Attention Perception & Psychophysics, 75(7), 
1382-1394. 
 231 
 
Tucker, M., & Ellis, R. (1998). On the relations between seen objects and components of 
potential actions. Journal of Experimental Psychology: Human Perception and 
Performance, 24(3), 830-846. 
Tucker, M., & Ellis, R. (2001). The potentiation of grasp types during visual object 
categorization. Visual Cognition, 8(6), 769-800. 
Tucker, M., & Ellis, R. (2004). Action priming by briefly presented objects. Acta 
Psychologica, 116(2), 185-203. 
Turella, L., & Lingnau, A. (2014). Neural correlates of grasping. Frontiers in human 
neuroscience, 8. 
Turella, L., Pierno, A. C., Tubaldi, F., & Castiello, U. (2009). Mirror neurons in humans: 
Consisting or confounding evidence? Brain and Language, 108(1), 10-21. 
Tzourio-Mazoyer, N., Landeau, B., Papathanassiou, D., Crivello, F., Etard, O., Delcroix, N. et 
al. (2002). Automated anatomical labeling of activations in SPM using a macroscopic 
anatomical parcellation of the MNI MRI single-subject brain. NeuroImage, 15(1), 273-289. 
Uithol, S., & Maranesi, M. (2014). No need to match: a comment on Bach, Nicholson and 
Hudson's "Affordance-Matching Hypothesis". Frontiers in human neuroscience, 8. 
Ungerleider, L. G., & Mishkin, M. (1982). Two cortical visual systems. In D.J. Ingle, M. A. 
Goodale, & R. J. W. Mansfield (Eds.), Analysis of visual behavior. (pp. 549-586). 
Cambridge: MIT Press. 
 232 
 
Vainio, L., Ellis, R., & Tucker, M. (2007). The role of visual attention in action priming. 
Quarterly Journal of Experimental Psychology, 60(2), 241-261. 
Valyear, K. F., Culham, J. C., Sharif, N., Westwood, D., & Goodale, M. A. (2006). A double 
dissociation between sensitivity to changes in object identity and object orientation in the 
ventral and dorsal visual streams: a human fMRI study. Neuropsychologia, 44(2), 218-228. 
Valyear, K. F., Cavina-Pratesi, C., Stiglick, A. J., & Culham, J. C. (2007). Does tool-related 
fMRI activity within the intraparietal sulcus reflect the plan to grasp? NeuroImage, 
36(Supplement 2), 94-108. 
Valyear, K. F., Gallivan, J. P., McLean, D., & Culham, J. C. (2012). fMRI Repetition 
Suppression for Familiar But Not Arbitrary Actions with Tools. Journal of Neuroscience, 
32(12), 4247-4259. 
van den Berg, F. E., Swinnen, S. P., & Wenderoth, N. (2010). Hemispheric asymmetries of 
the premotor cortex are task specific as revealed by disruptive TMS during bimanual 
versus unimanual movements. Cerebral Cortex, 20(12), 2842-2851. 
van der Linden, L., Mathot, S., & Vitu, F. (2015). The role of object affordances and center of 
gravity in eye movements toward isolated daily-life objects. J.Vis., 15(5), 8. 
van Elk, M. (2014). The left inferior parietal lobe represents stored hand-postures for object 
use and action prediction. Front Psychol., 5, 333. 
 233 
 
van Elk, M., van Schie, H., & Bekkering, H. (2014). Action semantics: A unifying conceptual 
framework for the selective use of multimodal and modality-specific object knowledge. 
Phys.Life Rev., 11(2), 220-250. 
Vankov, I., & Kokinov, B. (2013). The role of the motor System in conceptual processing: 
Effects of object affordances beyond response interference. Acta Psychologica, 143(1), 52-
57. 
Vingerhoets, G. (2014). Contribution of the posterior parietal cortex in reaching, grasping, 
and using objects and tools. Front Psychol., 5, 151. 
Vingerhoets, G., Vandamme, K., & Vercammen, A. (2009). Conceptual and physical object 
qualities contribute differently to motor affordances. Brain and Cognition, 69(3), 481-489. 
Vingerhoets, G. (2008). Knowing about tools: Neural correlates of tool familiarity and 
experience. NeuroImage, 40(3), 1380-1391. 
Visser, M., Jefferies, E., & Ralph, M. (2010). Semantic Processing in the Anterior Temporal 
Lobes: A Meta-analysis of the Functional Neuroimaging Literature. Journal of Cognitive 
Neuroscience, 22(6), 1083-1094. 
Vogt, S., Taylor, P., & Hopkins, B. (2003). Visuomotor priming by pictures of hand postures: 
perspective matters. Neuropsychologia, 41(8), 941-951. 
Volkmann, J., Schnitzler, A., Witte, O. W., & Freund, H. (1998). Handedness and asymmetry 
of hand representation in human motor cortex. Journal of Neurophysiology, 79(4), 2149-
2154. 
 234 
 
Ward, R., Goodrich, S., & Driver, J. (1994). Grouping reduces visual extinction: 
Neuropsychological evidence for weight-linkage in visual selection. Visual Cognition, 
1(1), 101-129. 
Wassermann, E. M. (1998). Risk and safety of repetitive transcranial magnetic stimulation: 
report and suggested guidelines from the International Workshop on the Safety of 
Repetitive Transcranial Magnetic Stimulation, June 5-7, 1996. Electroencephalography 
and Clinical Neurophysiology, 108(1), 1-16. 
Wassermann, E. M., McShane, L. M., Hallett, M., & Cohen, L. G. (1992). Noninvasive 
mapping of muscle representations in human motor cortex. Electroencephalography and 
Clinical Neurophysiology, 85(1), 1-8. 
Waszak, F., Schneider, W. X., Li, S. C., & Hommel, B. (2009). Perceptual identification 
across the life span: a dissociation of early gains and late losses. Psychological Research, 
73(1), 114-122. 
Watanabe, R., Watanabe, S., Kuruma, H., Murakami, Y., Sen, A., & Matsuda, T. (2011). 
Neural activation during imitation of movements presented from four different 
perspectives: A functional magnetic resonance imaging study. Neuroscience Letters, 
503(2), 100-104. 
Worsley, K. J., & Friston, K. J. (1995). Analysis of Fmri Time-Series Revisited - Again. 
NeuroImage, 2(3), 173-181. 
 235 
 
Wulff, M., & Humphreys, G. W. (2015). Effects of broken affordance on visual extinction. 
Frontiers in human neuroscience, 9. doi:10.3389/fnhum.2015.00515. 
Wulff, M., Laverick, R., Humphreys, G. W., Wing, A. M., & Rotshtein, P. (2015). 
Mechanisms underlying selecting objects for action. Frontiers Human Neuroscience, 9, 
199. doi:10.3389/fnhum.2015.00199. 
Wulff, M., & Humphreys, G. W. (2013). Visual responses to action between unfamiliar object 
pairs modulate extinction. Neuropsychologia, 51(4), 622-632. 
doi:10.1016/j.neuropsychologia.2013.01.004. 
Wulff, M., Humphreys, G. W., & Rotshtein, P. (2014). Distinct neural effects of perspective 
and hand alignment on paired-object affordance: an fMRI study. Poster presented at the 
Organization for Human Brain Mapping conference, Honolulu, Hawaii. 
Xu, S., Humphreys, G. W., & Heinke, D. (2015). Implied actions between paired objects lead 
to affordance selection by inhibition. Journal of Experimental Psychology: Human 
Perception and Performance, 41(4), 1021-1036. doi:10.1037/xhp0000059. 
Yankouskaya, A., Rotshtein, P., & Humphreys, G. W. (2014). Interactions between Identity 
and Emotional Expression in Face Processing across the Lifespan: Evidence from 
Redundancy Gains. J.Aging.Res., 2014, 136073. 
Yoon, E. Y., Heinke, D., & Humphreys, G. W. (2002). Modelling direct perceptual 
constraints on action selection: The Naming and Action Model (NAM). Visual Cognition, 
9(4-5), 615-661. 
 236 
 
Yoon, E. Y., & Humphreys, G. W. (2005). Direct and indirect effects of action on object 
classification. Memory and Cognition, 33(7), 1131-1146. 
Yoon, E. Y., Humphreys, G. W., & Riddoch, M. J. (2005). Action naming with impaired 
semantics: Neuropsychological evidence contrasting naming and reading for objects and 
verbs. Cognitive Neuropsychology, 22(6), 753-767. 
Yoon, E. Y., & Humphreys, G. W. (2007). Dissociative effects of viewpoint and semantic 
priming on action and semantic decisions: Evidence for dual routes to action from vision. 
Quarterly Journal of Experimental Psychology, 60(4), 601-623. 
Yoon, E. Y., Humphreys, G. W., Kumar, S., & Rotshtein, P. (2012). The Neural Selection and 
Integration of Actions and Objects: An fMRI Study. Journal of Cognitive Neuroscience, 
24(11), 2268-2279. 
Yoon, E. Y., Humphreys, G. W., & Riddoch, M. (2010). The Paired-Object Affordance 
Effect. Journal of Experimental Psychology: Human Perception and Performance, 36(4), 
812-824. 
Zeki, S. (1990). A century of cerebral achromatopsia. Brain, 113 ( Pt 6), 1721-1777. 
 
  
 237 
 
Endnote 
 
i
 All patients were also impaired on a short computer-based test of visual extinction, 
defining their inclusion in the study. In this test, we presented the letters A to D, 0.5° x 0.5° 
centred at locations 3° to the left or right side of fixation. The letters were presented for 200 
ms unmasked either alone (randomly in the left or right field) or bilaterally. Patients had to 
identify the letters presented. There were 24 single left trials, 24 single right and 48 two-item 
trials. Patients were classified as having extinction if they showed a lateralised difference of 
more than 2 when reporting items under bilateral relative to unilateral conditions. A group of 
12 age-matched control patients were able to report all the items under these presentation 
conditions. All the patients met this definition for extinction. 
 
